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Summary
Health economic models are representations of judgements about the relationships
between the model's input parameters and the costs and health eects that the
model aims to predict. We recognise that we can rarely dene with certainty a
`true' model for a particular decision problem. Building an `incorrect' model will
result in an uncertain prediction error, which we denote `structural uncertainty'.
The absence of observations on the total costs and health eects under each de-
cision option limits the use of data driven approaches to managing structural
uncertainty, such as model averaging.
We therefore propose a discrepancy based approach in which we make judge-
ments about structural error at the sub-function level within the model and in-
troduce a series of terms to `correct' the errors. This is deemed to be easier than
making meaningful statements about the error at the level of the model output.
The specication of discrepancy terms within the model also allows us to use
sensitivity analysis methods to determine the relative importance of the dierent
structural uncertainties in driving output and decision uncertainty.
Following the computation of either the main eect index or the partial ex-
pected value of perfect information for each discrepancy term, we can review the
structure of those parts of the model where structural uncertainty is an important
source of model output or decision uncertainty. We interpret the overall expected
value of perfect information for all the discrepancy terms as an upper bound on
the expected value of model improvement (EVMI).
We illustrate the sub-function discrepancy method in two case studies: a simple
decision tree, and a more complex Markov model. Finally, we propose an ecient
method for computing the main eect index and the partial expected value of
perfect information when inputs and/or discrepancies are correlated.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Mathematical models are routinely used to aid healthcare resource allocation de-
cisions, with the majority of such models falling into the broad category of `cost-
eectiveness' models. These models aim to predict the costs and health conse-
quences associated with a range of competing decisions. Although decision theory
tells us that we only need to know the expectation of the net benet of the resource
costs and health eects under each decision option in order to make the optimum
choice, we will usually also want to quantify our uncertainty about the costs and
health eects. If we are suciently uncertain then we may wish to gather more
information before embarking on a decision that is costly to reverse, or commit-
ting resources that are potentially unrecoverable (McKenna and Claxton, 2011).
A cost-eectiveness model will be most helpful then if it allows us to properly
specify all of our uncertainty about the quantity we wish to predict.
There are two primary sources of uncertainty when basing statements about
costs and health eects on a mathematical model: uncertainty about the model
inputs and uncertainty about the model structure. Methods for quantifying the
rst source of uncertainty are well established, but understanding and managing
the second is rather more dicult to since it involves making judgements about a
model's ability to faithfully represent a (possibly highly complex) real life decision
problem.
1
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The problem of uncertainty in deterministic mathematical model (or `computer
model') predictions is common to many disciplines, and has been the subject of
much research (see for example Santner et al., 2003; Bayarri et al., 2009). Methods
for analysing the eects of input uncertainty are particularly well developed (Oak-
ley and O'Hagan, 2004; Saltelli et al., 2008), however the problem of structural
uncertainty has received much less attention. There are two broad approaches
to quantifying structural uncertainty: via model averaging (for example Draper,
1995; Kass and Raftery, 1995; Kadane and Lazar, 2004; Bojke et al., 2009; Jackson
et al., 2009) and via specication of model discrepancy (Kennedy and O'Hagan,
2001; Goldstein and Rougier, 2009).
There are, however, diculties with both methods when applied in the context
of health economic models. There is usually an absence of direct observations on
the costs and health eects under the set of decision options being considered
in the economic evaluation. This means that in the model averaging approach
model weights cannot be based on some likelihood based measure, and in the
discrepancy approach there are no data that will directly inform beliefs about
the dierence between the model output and the expected population costs and
benets. Elicitation could in theory provide a means of specifying the necessary
weights or distributions, but it is not clear whether this is feasible in practice.
How would a modeller (or a decision maker) weight a set of competing computer
models? How would he or she make meaningful judgements about how wrong the
predictions of a given model might be?
The motivation then for this research is to develop a method for managing
structural uncertainty in health economic models that does not rely on past ob-
servations on the output quantities (the costs and health eects) that are pre-
dicted by the model. We use the term `managing uncertainty' to include the goal
of understanding better the sources of structural uncertainty such that it can be
reduced through model revision, as well as the goal of formally quantifying the
uncertainty. We also consider the problem of deciding when it is worth spending
resources to improve a model. The output of a computer model is not a free
good. Considerable resources may be required to gather the necessary evidence
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to inform the input distributions and model structure, to program, debug and
validate the model, and to report the results in a meaningful fashion. Running a
complex model may also require expensive computer software and/or hardware,
and require long run times. Given a decision where we have considerable uncer-
tainty, how much is a computer model worth? Given a computer model that we
know is not perfect, how much should we pay to make it better?
Throughout the thesis we adopt a subjectivist Bayesian perspective since this
provides a sensible and coherent framework within which to think about decision
making under uncertainty (de Finetti, 1974; Dowie, 2006; Smith, 2010). In health
care resource management, a decision maker will choose from competing options
based on her own subjective uncertainty specication of the net benets of the
various options open to her. This specication may well be informed by the results
of a mathematical model, but ultimately, it is the decision maker's own personal
probabilities that will guide the decision.
1.2 Thesis overview
We begin in chapter 2 by introducing some basic decision theory that underpins
the economic evaluation methods that are used to inform resource allocation deci-
sions in health care. We go on to discuss health economic evaluation methods and
the use of computer models, and end the chapter by thinking about how models
used for economic evaluation might be `wrong'. Chapter 3 begins with a general
introduction to computer models, followed by a discussion of the management
of the dierent sources of uncertainty that are evident when we wish to make
predictions based on a computer model output. We recognise that we will often
need to quantify aspects of health economic model uncertainty in the absence of
data to inform the uncertainty distribution, and this motivates the use of formal
elicitation methods. We introduce some basic ideas about elicitation in chapter 4
and review the use of elicitation in health services research and health economic
evaluation.
In chapters 5 and 6 we consider the problem of health economic model uncer-
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tainty and introduce a novel approach to managing this source of uncertainty. We
illustrate the method in two case studies, the rst concerning a simple decision tree
model, and the second a more complex Markov model. Sensitivity analysis tech-
niques are used to help us understand the implications of our uncertainty about
model structure, and chapter 7 contains the description of an ecient method for
calculating those sensitivity measures (the main eect index and the partial ex-
pected value of perfect information) when model inputs are correlated. The thesis
ends with a discussion in chapter 8 of the main themes along with implications
for future research and practice.
Chapter 2
Economic Evaluation in Health
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we introduce the basic decision theory that underpins the economic
evaluation framework used to inform health care resource allocation decisions. We
see that economic evaluation methods seek to generate predictions about the costs
and health eects that will follow some set of competing decision options open
to the decision maker. For such predictions to be evidence based we must have
some mechanism for linking observations of the world that have taken place in
the past, to the predictions of costs and health eects that will take place in the
future under each decision option. It is this linking of past observations to future
predictions that motivates the building of a computer model.
We describe some types of computer model that are commonly found in health
economic analysis, and show that these are all particular cases of a general form
of model. Given this general model, we are able to identify a number of important
basic criteria that must be fullled in order to avoid error in the model predictions.
Towards the end of the chapter we begin to unpick the meaning of `structure' in
the context of health economic decision models, and look ahead to methods for
quantifying uncertainty in this structure.
5
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2.2 The problem of allocating scarce resources
Healthcare resources are scarce. Demand for consultations, treatments, services
and health care programmes exceeds our ability to supply them within the re-
sources committed by society for this purpose. Scarcity necessitates resource
allocation choices (Weinstein and Stason, 1977).
We assume the existence of a single decision maker, whose responsibility it is
to allocate some set of scarce resources for the benet of some population. Each
choice open to the decision maker will result in an outcome: a set of health (and
other) consequences, along with some degree of resource usage. Taken together,
the consequences and the size and nature of the resources used to achieve those
consequences has some net value to the decision maker. Following the description
given in Smith (2010) our decision maker wishes to act in a logical, coherent and
honest fashion; has responsibility for and the authority to enact the decision; and
is answerable to some higher `auditor' for her actions. We recognise that in reality
decisions are rarely taken by single individuals acting in isolation, and that in
many circumstances the responsibility for making a decision belongs very explicitly
not to an individual, but instead to a group or committee (the committees of
NICE1 being a good example).
So, to give an example of a health resource allocation problem, a decision
maker may be faced with the choice to either recommend or not recommend the
use of a new drug treatment for some disease. Using the drug will result in costs
(i.e. an allocation of the scarce resources) and consequences, which include (but
are not necessarily limited to) the health outcomes for those who will take the
drug. By not allowing the drug to be used, other costs (perhaps those of an
existing drug treatment) and consequences (the health outcomes related to the
existing drug) will result. Given these two options, how should a decision maker
choose between them?
Formal methods for economic evaluation to inform health care resource alloca-
tion decisions have been routinely applied for several decades in many developed
countries, and there are now a considerable number of standard texts that de-
1The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (http://www.nice.org.uk/).
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scribe these methods (e.g. Drummond et al., 2005; Gold et al., 1996; Neumann,
2005). Underpinning the economic evaluation approach is the theory of decision
making under uncertainty (Raia, 1968), and it is from this perspective that we
will review methods in the remainder of this chapter, and indeed this perspective
underpins the thesis as a whole.
2.3 Decision Theory
For any decision problem, the decision maker is faced with a range of competing
decision options. Each of these options will lead to a set of outcomes. The
decision maker is able to express preferences for the outcomes through a utility
function that describes the value to her of any particular set of outcomes. We
write the set of possible decisions as d = 1; : : : ; D, and we denote the (vector
of) relevant outcomes following decision d to be Z(d). The decision maker has a
utility function, UfZ(d)g, either implicit or explicit, and a desire to choose the
option d that maximises utility,
d = argmax
d
UfZ(d)g: (2.1)
Decision makers are, however, faced with a problem. The outcomes that will
occur under each decision option are almost always unknown before the decision
is made. If this is the case then we can say that the decision maker has uncer-
tainty about the outcomes, and this uncertainty may (but not always) result in
uncertainty about which of the choices that are available has the greatest utility.
We now write the vector of outcomes as a function not only of the decision,
but of a vector of unknowns,  2 . Our optimal decision is now that which
maximises expected utility,
d = argmax
d
E[UfZ(; d)g] = argmax
d
Z
2
UfZ(; d)gp(jd)d: (2.2)
We note in passing here that E[UfZ(; d)g] = U [ZfE(); dg] if and only if
UfZ(; d)g is linear in  (or multilinear in UfZ(; d)g with independence in the
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components of ). If not, then we must somehow evaluate the integral on the RHS
of (2.2). If we have used a computer model to dene UfZ(; d)g then we may nd
that there is no closed form solution to this integral. If this is the case we typically
use Monte Carlo integration. In health economic evaluation this approach is called
`probabilistic sensitivity analysis' (Grin et al., 2006). We return to this topic in
Chapter 3.
To show why the optimal decision is that which maximises expected utility we
rst dene two reference states, S0 and S1, that describe our least preferred and
most preferred outcomes with utilities U(S0) = u0 and U(S1) = u1. From the
denition of utility we have
UfZ(; d)g = qu1 + (1  q)u0; (2.3)
for some value q. Equation (2.3) implies that we have equal preference for Z(; d)
and a state Sq in which we will move to state S1 with probability q, and to state
S0 with probability 1  q.
If we were to learn the value of , then our conditional utility would be
UfZ(; d)jg = Pu1 + (1  P)u0; (2.4)
for some probability P, following the same argument as above. We now write q
in equation (2.3) in terms of an integral over  as follows:
q = P (move to state S1) (2.5)
=
Z
2
P (move to state S1j)p()d (2.6)
=
Z
2
Pp()d: (2.7)
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Our unconditional utility is therefore
UfZ(; d)g = qu1 + (1  q)u0 (2.8)
=
Z
2
Pp()d

u1 +

1 
Z
2
Pp()d

u0 (2.9)
=
Z
2
fPu1 + (1  P)u0g p()d (2.10)
= E[UfZ(; d)jg]: (2.11)
Therefore the utility of the outcome Z(; d) for uncertain , is its expectation
E[UfZ(; d)g]. In order to maximise utility under uncertainty, the decision
maker simply chooses the decision option with maximum expected utility.
In an important sense the decision maker acts rationally by choosing d in
this way to be the optimal choice: expected gains in utility are maximised and
conversely expected losses are minimised. This is shown by Raia (1968) in his
seminal text on decision theory, and comprehensively discussed in the explicitly
subjectivist introduction to decision analysis by Smith (2010).
We note that nding the optimal decision does not depend on the `statistical
signicance' of any measure of dierence between the utilities of the dierent
decisions (or indeed the Bayesian posterior probability of equivalence), and as
such there is an `irrelevance of inference' (Claxton, 1999). If we wish to make
the decision now, only the expectations (equation 2.2) are required to rationally
choose between options.
If the uncertainty in costs and consequences is such that there is uncertainty
as to which decision option has greatest net utility, then by making a choice the
decision maker is taking a risk. The choice may be the wrong choice. Choosing
a dierent option may have resulted in greater utility. The decision maker may
therefore also wish to quantify the probability that d is the decision option that
maximises utility, given uncertainty about ,
P [UfZ(; d)g  UfZ(; d)g 8d]: (2.12)
If new evidence 0 becomes available at some point in the future we may nd
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that the optimal decision d is no longer optimal, i.e. that
argmax
d
E[UfZ(0; d)g] 6= argmax
d
E[UfZ(; d)g]: (2.13)
This is of little concern if a decision maker can costlessly switch between decision
options each time new evidence implies an optimal choice dierent to that cur-
rently adopted. However, this is usually not the case in health care. Adopting
or reimbursing a new intervention or service almost always implies certain `sunk'
costs; irrecoverable costs associated with the change in practice (Eckermann and
Willan, 2008). Identifying one of the decision options as optimal may also lead
to another important irreversibility; a trial or study that could gather additional
evidence to support the decision may be deemed unnecessary or unethical (Grin
et al., 2011). If a decision maker anticipates that the adoption of the optimal
decision option (under current information, ) will be associated with sunk costs
and/or other irreversibilities, then she may wish to quantify the value of reducing
uncertainty about  rst. We will consider methods for computing the value of
information in detail in our discussion of computer model uncertainty in chapter
3.
2.4 Utility functions
For brevity we denote the uncertain outcomes under decision d as the random
variable vector Zd where Zd = Z(; d), and the vector of outcomes under all
decisions as Z = (Z1; : : : ;ZD). Using this notation we can re-express (2.2) and
(2.12) respectively as
d = argmax
d
EfU(Zd)g = argmax
d
Z
Zd
U(Zd)p(Zd)dZd; (2.14)
and
PfU(Zd)  U(Zd) 8dg: (2.15)
Each choice available to the decision maker results in a vector of outcomes,
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which we have denoted Zd. For example, this vector may comprise costs (of
drugs, primary and secondary care and so on), health outcomes, and a range of
non-health outcomes such as those related to the ability of the patient to work.
Let there be j = 1; : : : ; J outcomes of interest, and the vector of outcomes under
decision d be Zd = fo1;d; : : : ; oJ;dg. Note that the decision that maximises one
outcome may not be the same as the decision that maximises another. We treat
the outcomes here (and in the rest of this section) as known with certainty to
simplify the notation.
Given J outcomes of interest, the decision maker must choose which of the D
J-dimensional vectors of outcomes that she prefers. Even if we ignore uncertainty,
this is not a trivial problem and may involve complex value tradeos between
outcomes (Keeney and Raia, 1976). In order to proceed the decision maker
must express a utility function U(), which can be thought of as a projection of
the J-dimensional outcome space onto the real line. The function must result
in U(Zd0) > U(Zd) if the outcome fo1;d0 ; : : : ; oJ;d0g is preferred to fo1;d; : : : ; oJ;dg,
U(Zd0) < U(Zd) if fo1;d; : : : ; oJ;dg is preferred to fo1;d0 ; : : : ; oJ;d0g and U(Zd0) =
U(Zd) if there is indierence between the two vectors of outcomes.
We note at this point that any decision maker is likely in reality to have a
complex implicit utility function that includes not only costs and health conse-
quences, but also may include for example the political or personal (for example
in terms of career advancement) consequences of each decision option. The exis-
tence of some of these aspects of the decision problem may be quite hidden and
we will not consider this problem further, other to recognise that decisions are
rarely made solely on the result of an economic evaluation analysis.
2.5 What are the outcomes under each decision
option?
If we consider health as a measurable set of `health outputs' that is produced at
the individual level in part as a result of `resource inputs' in the form of health
care then we can divide the outcomes under each decision option into two sets:
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`inputs' which represent the allocation of resources, and `outputs' which represent
health. We may also want to consider non-health outputs such as ability to work,
but in the simple case we will consider outcomes under each decision option as just
comprising a set of resource inputs (which we will often refer to just as `costs'),
and a set of health outputs (for which we will also use the term health eects).
2.6 Measuring resource inputs
Implementing a decision option will result in the allocation of resources. These
allocations are termed `inputs' to whatever process that is generating health `out-
puts'. The relevant inputs are those that are expected to dier systematically
between the dierent decision options within the decision problem, since these dif-
ferences will inform the choice between the decision options. The decision maker
should therefore choose to include in their utility function all resource allocation
inputs that are expected to dier between the decision options. For example, if
we are considering a decision problem that relates to treatments for heart disease
then relevant inputs would include the competing treatments themselves, but also
resources committed for primary and secondary care if we believe that these will
dier between decision options. We would probably not be interested in resource
inputs relating to ophthalmic care, since these would not be expected to dier
between the decision options (though ophthalmic services may still be used by
individuals who have heart disease).
Inputs are usually valued in monetary units. For any health economy to func-
tion inputs to the health care process must be assigned monetary values to allow
accounting of resources.
Resource allocation decisions almost always relate to populations rather than
individuals, and the decision maker is therefore rarely interested in resource inputs
only for a single individual, but rather in the total or per person `average' input in
some dened population. The decision maker is also likely to be interested in the
inputs committed over some period of time, rather than at a single point in time.
For decisions that have outcomes only in the short term, the mean per person cost
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of resources allocated may be of interest. Where the decision maker is interested
in outcomes over extended time periods, inputs might be expressed as mean per
person, per year, costs.
2.7 Measuring health outputs
There is no single accepted denition of health, and therefore no single measure
of health output. There is an established literature on the measurement of health
(e.g. Bowling, 1997; McDowell, 2006; Streiner and Norman, 1995). For our pur-
poses `health' is the set of measurable characteristics that the decision maker
herself would dene as comprising those aspects of an individual's health relevant
to the decision problem. These characteristics may be objectively measurable us-
ing an instrument or test, such as blood pressure or cholesterol level, clinically
measurable (i.e. based on the opinion of a health care professional) such as the
presence or absence of a disease, or subjectively measurable, such as pain.
Given the set of measurable characteristics relevant to the decision problem,
an individual can be said to exist in a `health state' comprising the set of measured
values of the characteristics. So, for example, the relevant health characteristics
for some decision problem might be chest pain (measured on a four level scale:
none, mild, moderate, severe) diagnostic status for angina (yes or no as diagnosed
by a cardiologist) and blood pressure (measured on a continuous scale in mmHg).
At some time t the health state of individual A might therefore be fno chest pain;
no angina; 120mmHgg while the health state for individual B might be fmild
chest pain; angina; 130mmHgg.
Again, the decision maker is rarely interested in the health of a single individ-
ual, but rather in the `average' health experience within some dened population.
The decision maker is also likely to be interested in the health experience of the
population over some period of time, rather than at a single point in time, and be
specically interested in changes in health experience that dier between decision
options. The decision maker therefore needs to consider meaningful measures of
health output that reect the aggregated health experience of a population of
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individuals over time.
In a simple case in which there is a single health characteristic of interest, alive
or dead, then a sensible aggregate measure of population health output over time
could be mean survival time. If the health characteristic of interest is chest pain
on a four point scale (none, mild, moderate, severe), the aggregate measure might
be the mean number of days on which moderate or severe pain is experienced. It
is then be up to the decision maker to value this population aggregated health
output under each of the decision options, along with costs and other relevant
outcomes.
In the above examples health is measured in `natural' units. `Natural units'
does not have a precise denition, but loosely speaking, a natural unit denes
some measure of health that we can measure directly (but which is not a measure
of health state preference or utility). So, for example for a set of decision options
relating to the treatment of cancer the `natural unit' outcome of interest may
be the length of survival post treatment. For the treatment of hypertension the
outcome might be blood pressure; and for decision options concerning a screening
test the outcome may be numbers of cases of disease detected.
This may present a problem if there are dierent natural units for the dier-
ent decision options within some decision problem. So, for example, if we were
faced with the rather articial decision problem: fund hip replacements versus
asthma treatment, then we might nd it dicult to decide the relative value of
an increases in mobility versus a reduction in breathlessness. For this reason,
health measured in natural units is often transformed onto a health state prefer-
ence scale where a value of 1 represents perfect health, 0 represents death, and
negative values represent states worse than death. Given two health states h1
and h2 the preference scale transformation u() is dened such that if h1 is pre-
ferred to h2 then u(h1) > u(h2), if h2 is preferred to h1 that u(h2) > u(h1) and
if there is indierence that u(h2) = u(h1). The valuation of health in this way is
not straightforward and as for health measurement there is a large literature. A
comprehensive recent text on the subject is Brazier et al. (2007).
The preference for a health state can be elicited from the individual who
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is experiencing the health state, or from the general population who are asked
to imagine that they are in that health state. A commonly used method for
transforming health states to preferences elicited from the general population is
via a generic health outcome measurement instrument such as the SF36 (Brazier,
1993) or EQ5D (Brooks, 1996). These instruments measure health on a number of
dimensions, so for example in EQ5D there are ve: degree of mobility impairment,
ability to self-care, ability to engage in usual activities, level of pain or discomfort,
and level of anxiety or depression, with three levels for each dimension. Each of the
resulting 243 health states is then associated with a measure of preference derived
from the responses of study participants drawn from the general population who
were asked to value each of the states, relative to full health and to death. The
preferences are elicited using methods such as time trade o or standard gamble
(see Drummond et al., 2005, for basic details).
Health state preference values can be considered to be measures of `quality
of life' (Bowling, 1997). Quality of life values are aggregated over time to create
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). This generic measure of health outcome,
Q, measured in QALYs is dened as
Q =
Z t1
t0
ufh(t)gdt; (2.16)
where h(t) describes the health state of an individual at time t and u() is the
health state preference transformation. Time t is measured in years within some
interval of interest (t0; t1). If time is considered discrete rather than continuous
then we replace the integral with a summation,
Q =
t1X
t=t0
u(ht): (2.17)
2.7.1 Which health measures should the decision maker
choose?
Let us imagine a large randomised controlled trial where patients in each arm
of the trial are exposed to one of a set of decision options. Each individual in
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the trial will experience `health' over the subsequent course of the trial. As we
have discussed above, this experience of health is multifaceted and it is up to
the decision maker to choose the appropriate measures to capture the `relevant'
aspects. What are the `relevant' aspects? If our trial has randomised individuals
to various treatments for heart disease then we can see that health experience
related to heart disease is likely to be relevant. In this case we might measure
level of chest pain, breathlessness and blood pressure say. We could also measure
visual acuity or hair loss or knee joint exibility, but we would probably not
consider these relevant. Why? Because we don't expect there to be systematic
dierences in these measures between the trial arms.
The relevant measures are therefore those that capture health experience that
is expected to dier systematically between those exposed to the dierent decision
options. We only expect to see systematic dierences in those aspects of health
that are associated causally with some aspect of the decision option.
Before we describe the various approaches to mathematical modelling in health
economic evaluation, we briey review four broad types of economic analysis.
2.8 Types of economic evaluation analysis
In the health economics literature, methods for economic evaluation are cate-
gorised according to the measurement units of the output of the analysis. Clas-
sically, four types of analysis are described: cost-minimisation analysis, cost-
eectiveness analysis, cost-utility analysis and cost-benet analysis (Drummond
et al., 1997).
2.8.1 Cost-minimisation analysis
A cost-minimisation analysis is applicable if all outcomes, except costs, are identi-
cal under all decision options. So, if we denote costs over the relevant time period
(expressed as mean per person costs, say) as o1;d and the remaining J 1 outcomes
of interest as o2;d; : : : ; oJ;d then the analysis is applicable if oj;d = oj;d 8d; j >
1; j > 1. The results of this analysis are the costs o1;d for each of the decision
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options. The decision maker usually then has a utility function of the simple form
U(o1;d) =  o1;d; (2.18)
i.e. negative costs. The optimal decision is that which maximises utility, and
therefore minimises costs, i.e.
d = argmax
d2D
 o1;d; (2.19)
hence the name cost-minimisation analysis. Given that we need to determine
that outcomes except costs really are equal before a cost-minimisation analysis is
applicable, a cost-minimisation analysis is better seen as just a special case of the
next analysis type, cost-eectiveness analysis.
2.8.2 Cost-eectiveness analysis
A cost-eectiveness analysis is applicable if health outcome is easily measurable
in `natural units' under each decision option. The results of this analysis are the
(population mean per person) inputs in cost units, o1;d, and the (population mean
per person) health outcome in natural units, o2;d, for each of the decision options.
The decision maker must then value the health outcome on the monetary scale
via their `willingness to pay' for one unit of this health outcome, , resulting in
the net benet (or net monetary benet) of decision option d,
NBd = o2;d   o1;d: (2.20)
The decision maker's utility for the outcomes (in monetary units) is usually then
assumed to be the net benet itself, i.e.
U(o1;d; o2;d) = NBd (2.21)
= o2;d   o1;d: (2.22)
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Net benets can equally be expressed in health rather than monetary units, giving
the net health benet (Stinnett and Mullahy, 1998),
NBd = o2;d   o1;d=: (2.23)
2.8.3 Cost-utility analysis
A cost-utility analysis extends the cost eectiveness method to the case where
there is no single common `natural' measure of health outcome for all decision
options. Instead, health states are transformed onto a health state preference
scale and aggregated over time to generate population mean numbers of QALYs.
The results of this analysis are the population mean per person inputs in cost
units, o1;d, and the population mean per person health outcome on the QALY
scale, o2;d, for each of the decision options. Given the decision maker's willingness
to pay for one QALY unit, , the net monetary benet is
NBd = o2;d   o1;d; (2.24)
and as above, utility in monetary units is assumed to equal the net benet, i.e.
U(o1;d; o2;d) = NBd. Net benet can be expressed in QALY rather than monetary
units,
NBd = o2;d   o1;d=: (2.25)
2.8.4 Cost-benet analysis
A cost-benet analysis is a more general approach to economic evaluation in which
all outcomes are transformed within the analysis onto the monetary scale. This
allows decision options that have outcomes across multiple sectors, e.g. health,
education, and transport to be compared. We again denote resource inputs, mea-
sured in cost units, as o1;d. If there are j = 2; : : : ; J health and other outcomes of
interest for each decision d, and the monetary value of one unit of each outcome
oj;d is j then the result of this analysis is fo1;d; 2o2;d; : : : ; JoJ;dg for each decision
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option. The net monetary benet is simply
NBd =
JX
j=2
noj;d   o1;d; (2.26)
and again, the utility U(o1;d; : : : ; oJ;d) is assumed to equal NBd itself. A cost
benet analysis, which results in outcomes on the monetary scale, implies that all
outcomes are valued within the analysis itself.
2.9 Discounting
We allow costs and health outcomes to be time dependent in part because costs
and outcomes may change over time, but also to allow discounting. The decision
maker may wish to value resource inputs and health (and other) outputs that
are accrued at dierent points in time dierently. This commonly takes the form
of discounting, where outcomes that are accrued in the future are reduced in
value to reect society's preference for rewards now rather than later. Costs and
consequences that are accrued now are valued more highly than those accrued in
the future (Krahn and Gafni, 1993). Discounting usually takes the form
Ufoj;d(t)g = Ufoj;d(t0)g(1 + rj) t; (2.27)
where rj is the discount rate per unit time for outcome j.
2.10 The role of mathematical modelling in eco-
nomic evaluation
In section x2.3 we dened Z = (Z1; : : : ;ZD) as the vector of outcomes (resource
inputs, health outputs, and possibly other outputs) under all decision options in
some population of interest, aggregated over some period of time. Some or all of
the components of Z are likely to be uncertain, and in order to determine the
decision option that maximises the expected utility, d = argmaxdEfU(Zd)g, we
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must specify p(Z).
It is perfectly possible for a decision maker to derive her own distribution
p(Z), and therefore evaluate argmaxdEfU(Zd)g with little or no reference to any
external evidence. It is unlikely, however, that these statements will be useful,
and the resulting decision may easily be challenged. For a robust decision to be
made, meaningful, evidence informed statements must be made about Z, and it
is this that provides the primary motivation for the building of a computer model.
Building a model is usually seen as a necessary alternative to conducting a
study to determine the costs and consequences of the competing decision options.
Given a decision problem it is, at least in theory, possible to allocate the population
of interest randomly to the various decision options, follow up the groups for
some period of time judged to be adequate, and count all the relevant costs and
consequences in each of the study arms. Although conducting such a trial would
arguably provide the means of deriving p(Z), such a trial is usually not feasible.
Firstly, the decision maker may be interested in costs and health outcomes accrued
over a time period of the order of years or decades. Running a trial of such a length
is likely to be extremely expensive, and results will only be known at some point
far into the future. This is of little benet if the decision needs to be be made
now. Secondly, it may be unethical to randomise participants to all the available
decision options if some decision options are already known to result in better
clinical outcomes than others (but perhaps at greater cost). Lastly, a trial, once
set up does not have the same exibility of a mathematical model in its ability to
explore large numbers of alternative scenarios or sets of assumptions.
Within the context of health economic evaluation, models built to predict Z
are variously referred to as `health economic models', `decision models', `decision
analytic models', `economic evaluation models' or `cost-eectiveness models' (note
that the term `cost-eectiveness' is used here more loosely than in section x2.8.2
to encompass any economic evaluation analysis).
The primary purpose then of a health economic decision model is to provide
the decision maker with an `evidence based' judgement about outcomes, i.e. the
model allows the decision maker to evaluate p(ZjD) for some data D, rather
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than just their prior beliefs p(Z). Models therefore link evidence (in the form of
parameters estimated from data along with other judgements about the world)
to the outcomes Z. Buxton et al. (1997) dene a number of specic functions
that models perform: extrapolating beyond the data observed in a trial; linking
intermediate clinical endpoints to nal outcomes; generalising from one setting to
another; and synthesising head-to-head comparisons where relevant trials do not
exist. These roles can all be thought of as falling under the banner of `evidence
synthesis' in the sense that in each case we combine data from various sources,
perhaps with other evidence in the form of any elicited parameter values, and
evidence that is encoded in the model structure itself.
Brennan and Akehurst (2000) cite two additional roles for models in addition
to their use in synthesising evidence in order to make healthcare resource allo-
cation decisions: to inform research strategy and design, and to make explicit
the evidence supporting a decision. The rst of these acknowledges that a deci-
sion maker always has the option of delaying a decision until more information is
available. Models can be used to quantify the expected value of any additional
information, and this can be combined with the costs of obtaining the informa-
tion (say, from a new study) to predict the net utility of delaying the decision to
gather data (see Bernardo and Smith (1994) and Howard (1966) for theoretical
discussions regarding the value of information, and Claxton and Posnett (1996),
Felli and Hazen (1998) and Chilcott et al. (2003) for discussions in the context of
health economic decision modelling).
Viewing models as vehicles for making explicit the evidence supporting a de-
cision is attractive, but potentially problematic. For this to be strictly true, the
decision would need to lie with the model, and not with the decision maker. There
would be no possibility that a decision maker could weigh the evidence from the
output of a model with other evidence or considerations from elsewhere, since the
model would then no longer be making explicit the evidence behind the decision!
By placing the model output in a wider `political' context, say, the decision maker
is combining the model output with other evidence, using some implied concep-
tual model and a utility function that is almost certainty not explicitly stated (or
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even understood).
2.11 How do health economic evaluation models
work?
The majority of models that are used to aid healthcare resource allocation de-
cisions fall into the broad category of `cost-eectiveness' models. Such a model
is, in one sense, just a representation of the modeller's judgements about the
functional relationships between the inputs and outputs of the model, which in
turn is informed by their views about the processes by which a population utilises
healthcare resources and the causal chain that links health care utilisation to
health related events at the individual level. For example, if the decision was
whether or not to allow a new drug for diabetes, then the causal pathways linking
the costs and consequences to the use or not of the drug would be embedded
within the structure of the model.
Operationally, cost-eectiveness models synthesise information in order to
quantify the costs and consequences associated with each competing decision
option such that the optimum decision option can be chosen. The sources of
information synthesised for, say, a diabetes model may be: estimates of treatment
eects for the new drug and any alternatives, the costs of the new drug, its alter-
natives, and the other healthcare costs associated with diabetes, the epidemiology
and natural history of diabetes and related diseases, and the utility valuations of
the health care costs and health states associated with diabetes. These sources of
information become the model inputs. Cost-eectiveness models are typically de-
terministic, but because we are uncertain about the model inputs, this uncertainty
is propagated through to the model output.
Unless there has been a study that assesses the eect of the dierent decision
options in a population that is relevant to our decision, then we can not usually
derive the distribution on the outcomes under each decision directly. Instead, we
estimate the outcome (i.e. the vector of resource inputs and health outputs) for
each of a series of well dened states at each time point, along with the proportion
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of our population of interest who occupy that state at that time point.
2.12 Categorising health economic decision mod-
els
Models for economic evaluation can be categorised on a number of dierent dimen-
sions. Brennan et al. (2006) suggest a taxonomy based on the following criteria:
 whether individuals are explicitly modelled,
 whether interaction between individuals is modelled,
 whether time is modelled, and if so, whether it is treated as discrete or
continuous,
 whether transitions between states are assumed to be Markovian,
 whether the model is purely deterministic, or whether Monte Carlo sampling
is used to compute expectations.
This categorisation of the various economic models that were in use at the time of
the study led Brennan et al. (2006) to produce the following table of model types
(table 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of model structures. (From Brennan et al., 2006)
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Although the range of model types used in economic analysis is broad, the
majority of models fall into one of the following three categories: decision trees,
Markov models and individual level simulation models.
2.12.1 Decision tree models
The simplest model commonly used in economic evaluation is the `decision tree'.
Figure 2.2 shows a decision tree designed to inform whether or not to fund an
exercise promoting intervention. The left-most (square) node represents the choice
between the two decision options, d = 1, no intervention, and d = 2, the exercise
promoting intervention.
The subsequent circular nodes are `chance nodes'. If we imagine a single
individual at the left most chance node, we expect them to proceed to an `exercise'
state with some probability p1 and to a `sedentary' state with some probability
1  p1. The next chance node then represents the options open to an individual,
conditional on them being in the `exercise' state: they will proceed to the `exercise
maintained' state with probability p2 and to the `exercise not maintained' state
with probability 1 p2. The third node represents the probability of eight mutually
exclusive `terminal' states, conditional on each of the three outcomes from the rst
two nodes: exercise that is maintained, exercise that is not maintained, and no
exercise (sedentary lifestyle).
We can calculate the probability of each of the `terminal' states by multiplying
out the conditional probabilities along each of the possible paths through the tree
to the terminal state. Given the terminal state probabilities and a vector of
outcomes associated with each state (usually costs and some measure of health
output such as QALYs) we can analytically calculate the expected outcomes under
each decision. This process is sometimes described as `rolling back' the decision
tree.
Decision tree models are typically `cohort' models in that the values for the
conditional probabilities and the outcomes are population `average' measures of
these quantities, and as such that the expected costs and health outputs relate to
the population, not any single individual. In this sense single individuals are not
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Decision node 
Chance node 
Figure 2.2: A simple decision tree designed to inform whether or not to fund an
exercise promoting intervention.
explicitly modelled in this form of simple decision tree, and neither is there any
explicit modelling of interaction between individuals.
Within a decision tree model as expressed in gure 2.2, time is implied from
left to right, in that the probabilities in the model relate to moving from some
state A to a state on the right of A, conditional on being in A (and in this sense
the model is Markovian, though the intermediate nodes in a decision tree may
not be obviously thought of as states). However, there is no explicit modelling
of time within the model. For the purposes of the computation all events can be
considered to occur simultaneously.
In a decision tree model population level expected outcomes can be computed
analytically without the need for Monte Carlo sampling, and as such these models
are entirely deterministic. Note that by dening the model as deterministic we
are not saying that the values of the model inputs (and hence the model outputs)
are known with certainty, just that each set of model inputs uniquely determines
a single model output set.
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2.12.2 Markov models
We may decide that in order to inform a particular decision we need to predict
outcomes over some period of time. Within this period of time (say the ve years
following the implementation of the decision option), we expect that individuals
will move through various states, each state having dierent outcomes in terms
of resource inputs and health outputs. So, for example, if our decision problem
concerns a choice between a number of dierent cardiovascular drug treatments we
might dene a set of states for each treatment option as `stable angina', `unstable
angina', `myocardial infarction' and `dead'. We expect resource inputs and health
outputs (measured say in terms of quality of life) to dier between the states.
In order to compute the total resource inputs and health outputs over the time
period of interest under each decision option we wish to predict the proportion
of the population in each health state at each time point t, where we treat time
as a discrete variable. If we have data that allow us to estimate the probabilities
of transition to each state j at time point t + 1 conditional on being in state i
at time t, one approach would be to construct a decision tree that recursively
branches at each time point. Assuming D decision options and a time period of
interest that is divided into T time steps, this will result in a tree with D  4T
branches - potentially a very `bushy' tree indeed. It will be dicult to graphically
represent a decision tree of this type for any T that is not trivially small. In these
circumstances it is more convenient to specify a `Markov' model rather than a
decision tree (Beck and Pauker, 1983; Sonnenberg and Beck, 1993).
In a Markov model we specify a `state vector', d(t) = f1;d(t); : : : ; Id;d(t)g0
that describes the proportions of the population that exist in each of the id =
1; : : : ; Id states dened in the model at time point t under decision option d;
and a matrix of transition probabilities, Md(t), that describes the probability of
transition from state i at time point t to state j at time period t + 1. Given the
proportion of the population in each state at time point zero (under each decision
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State 1
CD4 > 200
CD4 < 500
State 3
AIDS
State 2
CD4 < 200
State 4
Death
Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of a Markov model for a decision concerning
treatment for HIV/AIDS
option) the proportion of the population in each state at time point t is given by
0d(t) = 
0
d(0)
tY
n=1
Md(t): (2.28)
Figure 2.3 shows a graphical representation of a four state Markov model rst
described in Chancellor et al. (1997) and subsequently used for illustrative pur-
poses in Drummond et al. (2005) and Briggs et al. (2006). The purpose of the
model is to predict costs and health outcomes (life years) under two drug treat-
ment options in people with HIV. The directed arrows show `allowable' transitions
between states. Where no arrow exists between states, the probability of transi-
tion is zero (this occurs, for example, for all transitions out of the dead state).
The j = 1; : : : ; J outcomes associated with state id at time t are denoted oid;j(t)
and the total outcome j is therefore
oj =
t1X
t=t0
IdX
id=1
id(t)oid;j(t): (2.29)
Markov models are described as `time homogeneous' if Md(t) = Md 8t. Re-
laxing this assumption allows the transitions between states to dier according
to, for example, age or the length of time since initial treatment with some drug.
As with decision tree models, Markov models in this simple formulation are
`cohort' models if the values for the conditional probabilities and the outcomes
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are population `average' measures of these quantities. Single individuals are not
explicitly modelled, and neither is there any explicit modelling of interaction be-
tween individuals. In this form, outcomes can be computed analytically without
the need for Monte Carlo sampling, and as such Markov models are entirely de-
terministic.
2.12.3 Individual patient level simulation models
Individual patient level simulation models are a broad class of models in which
individuals are explicitly modelled. This approach allows outcomes to be func-
tions of individual level covariates, rather than functions just of population level
covariates.
This approach is often adopted if the relationship between outcomes and in-
dividual level covariates is non-linear. If we write outcome j for individual i as a
function () of some individual level covariates v = vi, as well as uncertain inputs
X, then oij = (vi;X). Assuming covariates vary across the population of in-
terest, the population mean outcome, Evf(v;X)g, will only equal fEv(v);Xg,
the function () evaluated at the population mean value of the covariate, if ()
is linear in v. Even in a very simple case in which a single risk factor exists at
two levels within a population, Zaric (2003) shows that result of a Markov cohort
model is biased if transition probabilities are functions of the risk factor.
Evaluating the expectation Evf(v;X)g in an individual level model is usu-
ally dicult or impossible analytically, hence the use of Monte Carlo simulation.
Samples vi (i = 1; : : : ; n) are drawn from a joint distribution p(v) that represents
individual level variability in the covariates, and (vi;X) evaluated in each case.
The resulting sample set f(v1;X); : : : ; (vn;X)g is then taken as a sample from
the distribution of the outcome oj across individuals in the population of interest
(conditional on X). From this the population level mean for the outcome can
be easily estimated by the sample mean of f(v1;X); : : : ; (vn;X)g, along with
any other statistic of interest. This individual level variability is usually referred
to as `rst order' uncertainty (e.g. see Groot Koerkamp et al., 2010). It is quite
separate to any consideration of uncertainty about X, the values of the inputs to
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the model (`second order' uncertainty in this context).
If Monte Carlo simulation is used to evaluate the expectation Evf(v;X)g
then the model is no longer deterministic. However, as the simulation size n is
increased, the Monte Carlo estimate of the population mean outcome will converge
to Evf(v;X)g, which is uniquely determined for each input set. In this sense
individual level simulation models can be considered deterministic.
A second reason for adopting an individual level model is in the case where dif-
ferences in outcomes between dierent population subgroups is of interest. Rather
than having to run a cohort model with a new set of input parameters for each sub
group, an individual level model allows the sub group analysis to be performed
on the single set of results that the model generates. This may allow considerable
extra exibility in dening the sub groups.
Thirdly, an individual level model can allow the incorporation of time and his-
tory dependence in transition probabilities in an intuitive manner. Incorporation
of time and history dependence is possible within a Markov cohort model, but
at the expense of generating an unwieldy model with a large number of states
(Karnon, 2003).
Lastly, by treating individuals within a model separately, interactions between
individuals can be considered. For example, we may want to model the eect of
herd immunity in the context of a decision scenario involving competing immu-
nisation schedules. Modied cohort model approaches to this problem have been
described (Bauch et al., 2009), but these are only approximate. Alternatively,
interaction may arise through competition for scarce resources such as hospital
beds. An individual level model can allow the probability that an individual en-
ters some state (e.g. occupying a hospital bed) at some time t to depend on the
number of other individuals already occupying that state at time t.
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2.13 The general formulation of a cost eective-
ness model
The various forms of cost-eectiveness model described above are all particular
forms of a more general model that we can specify as follows.
We imagine that for decision option d all of the individuals within our popula-
tion of interest exist at each time point t 2 (t0; t1) in one of a set of id = 1; : : : ; Id
states. Each state is associated with a vector of j = 1; : : : ; J outcomes of interest
(i.e. resource inputs and health outputs) at each time point t. We write the nu-
merical value of the outcome j associated with state id at time t as oid;j(t). The
proportion of the population of interest that exists in state id at time t under
decision option d is denoted by id(t). Alternatively, id(t) can be thought of as
the probability that a single individual exists in state id at time t given decision
option d.
Summing over the states gives us the total outcome j at time t under decision
d,
oj;d(t) =
IdX
id=1
id(t)oid;j(t): (2.30)
Summing over time then gives us the total outcome j under decision d,
oj;d =
t1X
t=t0
oj;d(t); (2.31)
=
t1X
t=t0
IdX
id=1
id(t)oid;j(t): (2.32)
If we treat time as continuous we replace the summation over time with an integral,
oj;d =
Z t1
t0
oj;d(t)dt; (2.33)
=
Z t1
t0
IdX
id=1
id(t)oid;j(t)dt: (2.34)
Given the outcomes oj;d the decision maker then evaluates the utility for each
decision, U(o1;d; : : : ; oJ;d), and (if we ignore uncertainty) chooses the decision that
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maximises this, i.e. d = argmaxd U(o1;d; : : : ; oJ;d). If outcomes are uncertain due
to uncertainties in id(t) or oid;j(t) then the decision maker maximises expected
utility, i.e. d = argmaxdEfU(o1;d; : : : ; oJ;d)g.
So, for example, we have a decision problem relating to whether or not to
recommend a new anti-hypertensive drug (d = 1) versus an existing drug (d = 2).
The outcomes of interest are costs (j = 1) and health eects in QALYs (j = 2)
in some population of interest. There has been no trial of the new drug against
the old that measures these outcomes. We do, however, have trials that measure
the eects of the old and new drugs on the incidence of stroke and myocardial
infarction (MI). We dene a set of four states under decision d = 1 as fwell
after taking new drug; stroke after taking new drug; MI after taking new drug;
stroke and MI after taking new drugg, and index these states i1 = 1; : : : ; 4. We
dene a set of four states under decision d = 2 as fwell after taking existing drug;
stroke after taking existing new drug; MI after taking existing drug; stroke and MI
after taking existing drugg, and index these i2 = 1; : : : ; 4. The proportion of the
population that experiences state id under decision d at time t is id(t).
We also have data on the costs of the drugs and the costs of treating stoke
and MI, and the population mean numbers of QALYs for those who are well, and
those who have had a stroke, MI, or both. The costs and the QALYs associated
with state id at time t are oid;1(t) and oid;2(t) respectively. We then sum over
the states and over time to obtain costs and QALYs under each decision d via
equation (2.31).
So the components of this general model are, oid;j(t), the outcomes associated
with each state as functions of time, and id(t), the proportions of the population
in each health state, again as functions of time. Dierent types of economic
evaluation models primarily dier in the `machinery' that determines how the state
vector, d(t) = f1d(t); : : : ; Id(t)g0, evolves with respect to time. For example,
the evolution of the state vector may be explicitly determined by a simple Markov
process, or instead it may be determined indirectly as the result of an individual
level discrete event simulation. It is in this `machinery' that much of the uncertain
`structure' of the model is.
CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC EVALUATION IN HEALTH 32
2.14 Sources of error in a health economic deci-
sion model
In chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis we will discuss in detail the management of struc-
tural uncertainty in the context of two cost-eectiveness model case studies. At
this point we consider some possible causes of model error, given the general for-
mulation of the model in the section above. This will help to provide a framework
for thinking about model structure uncertainty.
2.14.1 Choice of outcomes
First we note that to avoid potential structural error all of the j = 1; : : : ; J
outcomes must be counted under all decision options. Any outcomes that are
missing from the model specication for a subset of decision options are implicitly
assumed to be zero. If in reality they are not zero, then this is a source of error. For
example, if a decision is between heart transplants (d = 1) and hip replacements
(d = 2), and we have counted only the costs of heart transplants for d = 1 and
only the costs of hip replacements in d = 2, we are implicitly assuming that there
are no costs associated with heart transplants for d = 2 and no costs associated
with hip replacements in d = 1. Likewise, when we are computing health outputs,
if the output is not included in the model specication it is assumed to be zero.
In many circumstances this may be entirely reasonable.
The set of outcomes that the model generates has to include all relevant out-
comes. If we are interested in a choice between cardiac drugs and in our model we
count costs and health outcomes that relate to ophthalmic care, then our model
might be entirely correct. However, it it will not be useful for the decision problem
at hand (the right answer to the wrong question, or an `error of the third kind',
Kimball, 1957). Whether or not the model includes all relevant outcomes is a
judgement that the decision maker must make before they use the results of the
model to inform the decision.
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2.14.2 Determining the evolution of the state vector
Next, whatever the form of the model, it must generate the correct value for the
probability that an individual exists in state id at time t, id(t), and the correct
value for outcome j associated with state id at time t, oid;j(t). Given that states
are just arbitrary constructs that allow probabilities (or population proportions)
and outcomes to be associated together, what we are really saying here is that the
model must correctly compute weights for a set of outcome values. If not, there
is error.
We can always write down a correct model. For example, if the resource costs
of interest under decision option d are od;1 and health eects are od;2 then we can
write the following model for the net benet,
NBd = od;2   od;1: (2.35)
The model inputs are X = f(o1;1; o1;2); : : : ; (oD;1; oD;2)g. If we learned the true
values of these inputs, then we would know the true net benet under each decision
option, and there is no model error. The source of uncertainty about the target
quantity is therefore entirely located within the inputs, and there is no structural
uncertainty.
If we partition the population of interest into n sub groups we can again write
down a correct model. If the proportion of the population in subgroup i under
decision d is i;d, and if subgroup i has mean costs oi;d;1 and mean health eects
oi;d;2, then the mean population net benet is
NBd = 
nX
i=1
i;doi;d;2  
nX
i=1
i;doi;d;1: (2.36)
The inputs are now X = f(o1;1;1; o1;1;2); : : : ; (on;D;1; on;D;2); 1;1; : : : ; n;Dg. As
above, if we learned the true values of X we would know the net benets, and
there is no structural error. Extending this argument further, we could introduce
a time element and write down a correct model in which we now also sum over
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the time steps,
NBd = 
t1X
t=t0
nX
i=1
i;d(t)oi;d;2(t) 
t1X
t=t0
nX
i=1
i;d(t)oi;d;1(t): (2.37)
The problem is how to correctly compute the population proportion terms i;d(t).
Decision trees, Markov models and discrete event type models reect dierent
levels of sophistication in generating the population proportion terms i;d(t), and
therefore allow dierent levels of complexity in terms of assumptions regarding
the relationships between states in the model. We get structural error if the
assumptions embedded in the model that link inputs to the population proportion
terms i;d(t) do not properly reect the system. So, for example, if the Markov
assumption is invalid, then there is structural error, or if in a simple decision tree
there are branches missing, then we have structural error.
2.14.3 Choice of model states
The ultimate purpose of the model is to quantify p(ZjD), the conditional distri-
bution of the outcomes given some body of evidence. The model structure needs
to be chosen to facilitate the incorporation of D in such a way as to minimise
uncertainty. If we have good quality data on the costs and outcomes that relate
to a set of well dened states, along with good quality data from which we can
estimate the population proportions in each of these states, then using this set of
states in our model seems sensible. If we use a dierent set of states, less `con-
gruent' with the data, then we are likely to introduce an uncertain error into our
predictions.
2.14.4 Choice of decision options
We have implicitly assumed that the set of decision options d = 1; : : : ; D is given,
but it is worth noting that this is of course a `structural' choice that must be
made, along with many others. To some extent there is an issue of semantics,
in that any single decision problem may be considered to be dened by the set
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of competing options chosen, and therefore that within the decision problem the
choice of options is given. If, however, we consider the wider problem of how to
maximise eciency in resource allocation then the choice of decision options for
each analysis is important. By not including within the competing set an option
which is in fact the optimum choice, then resource allocation will be inecient.
2.15 The health care decision context and NICE
Up to now we have discussed decision making in rather general terms without
considering any specic context in which resource allocation decisions are made.
In England and Wales the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE) has been given a remit by parliament to make recommendations on the
use of new and existing interventions and programmes within the NHS, and as
such acts as a `decision maker'.
In its decision making capacity, NICE operates according to well dened pro-
cesses (see for example the methods manual for technology appriasal NICE, 2008).
These processes dene certain aspects of the decision problem that would other-
wise be considered uncertain, and so, in a sense, reduce the space of  in (2.2)
and (2.12). By making methods and processes explicit, decision problems become
more manageable, but more importantly, a certain degree of consistency across
decisions is ensured.
Table 2.1 shows the NICE `reference case' for a decision problem that concerns
the assessment of a set of competing health technologies. It denes (to some
extent) the following: the technologies that should be considered as competing
decision options; the set of costs and outcomes that should be considered relevant;
the type of economic evaluation (though the term `cost-eectiveness analysis' in
the table means cost-utility analysis as described in section x2.8.3); the sources of
evidence for various components of ; the unit of measurement for health eects
(the QALY) and the discount rate for costs and eects. Not included in the table,
but implicit in the way in which NICE makes decisions, is the assumption that
the utility associated with a decision option is equal to its expected net monetary
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benet.
Table 2.1: The NICE Reference Case
Element of health technology assess-
ment
Reference case
Dening the decision problem The scope developed by the Institute
Comparator Therapies routinely used in the NHS, includ-
ing technologies regarded as current best prac-
tice
Perspective on costs NHS and PSS
Perspective on outcomes All health eects on individuals
Type of economic evaluation Cost-eectiveness analysis
Synthesis of evidence on outcomes Based on a systematic review
Measure of health eects QALYs
Source of data for measurement of HRQL Reported directly by patients and/or carers
Source of preference data for valuation of
changes in HRQL
Representative sample of the public
Discount rate An annual rate of 3.5% on both costs and
health eects
Equity weighting An additional QALY has the same weight re-
gardless of the other characteristics of the in-
dividuals receiving the health benet
HRQL, health-related quality of life; NHS, National Health Service; PSS, personal social
services; QALYs, quality-adjusted life years.
From NICE (2008) Guide to the methods of technology appraisal, p30.
By adopting the NICE reference case, the decision maker is restricting her
ability to properly compute her posterior beliefs about the `true' utility for each
decision option. In fact, the reference case restricts the ability of the analysis to
properly estimate the uncertain future costs and health eects. Not all costs will
fall within the perspective of the NHS or social services, and `health' cannot be
captured perfectly by the QALY. We are in some senses trading o bias against
uncertainty. An analysis that counts all relevant costs and measures health in
all its facets may lead to a better specication of posterior beliefs about the net
benet of each decision option, but will result in larger uncertainties. We will
not discuss this problem further, other than to note that we will assume the
CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC EVALUATION IN HEALTH 37
constraints of the NICE reference case when presenting the two case studies.
Finally, we note that NICE play a role in determining the implied value of
health, in the sense that they set a `threshold' value for a QALY. If an inter-
vention, programme or service can generate QALYs at a cost per QALY that
is less than this threshold value, then the intervention, programme or service is
usually adopted. The assumption is that when any new intervention is funded,
the activity that is displaced (due to the total budget constraint) was generating
QALYs at a cost per QALY greater than the threshold. The threshold therefore
represents an estimate of the `shadow price' of the budget constraint, rather than
a `willingness to pay' for one unit of health (Claxton et al., 2010; McCabe et al.,
2008; Culyer et al., 2007). Current NICE guidance is that the threshold should
be set at between $20,000 and $30,000 (NICE, 2008).
2.16 Conclusion
In this chapter we have reviewed some basic decision theory that underpins health
economic evaluation. We have identied the role of computer models in the process
of economic evaluation as allowing the decision maker to derive the uncertainty
distribution of relevant outcomes conditional on evidence. Various common types
of economic model were shown to be special cases of a general model that inte-
grates outcomes of interest over a population and over time. In order to compute
the integration a series of states is dened in such a way to allow the resulting
input parameters to be conditioned on evidence. The choice of states, along with
the structure of the model that determines the evolution of the state vector with
respect to time, is an important determinant of model `correctness'.
The next chapter reviews the literature on managing uncertainty computer
models. What can we learn from the wider literature that will help us to manage
uncertainty in cost-eectiveness models?
Chapter 3
Managing Uncertainty in
Computer Models
3.1 Introduction
We saw in chapter 2 that health economic evaluation methods typically make
use of some kind of computer model in order to make predictions about uncer-
tain future costs and health eects. In this chapter we broaden our perspective
and review the management of uncertainty in computer models in general. Com-
puter models are built for many dierent purposes and have a variety of forms,
but typically an individual model can be represented as a (known or unknown)
mathematical function, y = f(x), that is implemented in computer code.
We recognise that we are uncertain about the quantity we are trying to predict
(indeed that is why we build a predictive model), but that after building the model
we are almost always still uncertain about the true value of the target quantity.
We discuss three important sources of this uncertainty: uncertainty about the
`true' values of the model inputs, uncertainty about the model output when the
model is expensive (slow) to evaluate, and uncertainty about the `true' structure
of the model. We dene `true' input and `true' structure later in the chapter.
There is an extensive literature on the treatment of uncertainty in computer
models, particularly regarding the uncertainty in the inputs. More recently, meth-
ods for managing `code' uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty due to an computationally
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expensive model) have been established, most notably those based on the con-
struction of a statistical `emulator' for an expensive `simulator'. Finally we note
the emerging literature on the treatment of computer model structural uncer-
tainty in the eld of health economics, including some applications of statistical
approaches to model uncertainty.
3.2 Computer models
3.2.1 Denitions
We can think of a computer model as a representation of some process by a series
of instructions that is understood and executed by computer. Computer models
are used widely in the physical and social sciences for the purposes of exploring
and understanding phenomenon, as well as for prediction. Importantly, models
usually attempt to represent a complex process that may or may not be fully
understood in a form that is less complex and/or better understood. This is
reected in the following denitions in Bayarri et al. (2009):
\Computer models are computational representations of complex real-
world processes ... often based on numerical implementations of math-
ematical models developed to approximately describe the real-world
process, or on eorts at direct simulation of the process"
and Bunge (1967) (quoted in Devooght, 1998):
\a model is a reduced and parsimonious representation of a physical,
chemical, or biological system in a mathematical, abstract, numerical,
or experimental form."
McKay and Morrison (1997) point out that a mathematical model is a formalisa-
tion of assumptions :
\a formal statement of assumptions about a relationship between known
quantities x and unknown quantities y. The structure of a model de-
nes how characteristics of y are determined from those of x. Struc-
ture, in this sense, is a mathematical or computational algorithm."
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Santner et al. (2003) regard computer models as simulators for physical pro-
cesses and as such generate data just as physical processes do. We can therefore
conduct computer experiments in order to observe the output of a computer model.
This necessitates thinking about (statistical) design and analysis in a similar way
to that which we would for a natural experiment. Where models are explicitly
built to simulate a real world process in this way, the term `simulator' is some-
times used. We will use this term when discussing the statistical emulation of
computationally expensive models in section x3.4.2.
Kotiadis and Robinson (2008) describe a series of stages between the world,
where the decision problem resides, and the computer model (gure 3.1). Firstly,
the authors postulate the existence, within the mind of the modeller, of a `system
description' of the real world processes of interest. This is fairly loosely dened,
but represents the modeller's understanding of all of the relevant real world pro-
cesses. Given the system description, the modeller then denes a `conceptual
model': an abstraction and simplication of the system description that describes
the `objectives, inputs, outputs, content, assumptions and simplications of the
model.' (Robinson, 2008). Lastly, a `computer model' is built (i.e. code is written)
to represent the conceptual model.
Figure 3.1: `Artifacts of conceptual modelling' from Kotiadis and Robinson (2008).
This framework is helpful because it forces us to make a distinction between
what we know, but choose not to model, and what we do not know. We can not
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say anything useful about the world beyond our understanding that comprises
our system description. When we come to think about model error we can use
this distinction to partition the model error into a portion that represents error
that we can make some judgements about (the dierence between the output of
the model I build and the best model I might be able to imagine), and a portion
that represents error that we can make no useful judgements about (the `unknown
unknown') that exists in the world that is outside of my system description.
Our understanding is that our `best' model above represents Goldstein and
Rougier (2009)'s reied simulator, the simulator that we do not expect to be
able to build, but which reects all our useful judgements about the system.
Once we have conceived of our `best' model we can, by denition, incorporate no
further useful judgements about the system. Thus, the residual error between the
prediction and reality is probabilistically independent (in the Bayesian subjective
sense) of the built model and the best model and their corresponding inputs.
3.2.2 Saltelli's classication of models
Models vary in their purpose, as well as in their structure and underpinning as-
sumptions about the world. Saltelli et al. (2008) categorise models on two dimen-
sions: diagnostic versus prognostic, and data-driven versus law-driven.
The rst of these dimensions, diagnostic versus prognostic, concerns the aim
of the model. Diagnostic models are used to understand a law or phenomenon,
whereas prognostic models are used for prediction. We may build a diagnostic
model for the purposes of exploring the emergent properties of a complex sys-
tem, or to play a series of `what-if' games, or to better understand the range
of behaviour of some system when parameters are pushed to their limits. The
primary purpose is understanding the system, rather than to predict a quantity.
Prognostic models on the other hand are primarily built to predict the value of
an unknown quantity for the purposes of some decision or action. The distinction
is of course blurred, and many models are useful for both purposes.
Saltelli et al. (2008)'s second dimension concerns the broad distinction between
two underlying principles that drive the construction of models. Data-driven
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models begin with data and attempt to describe in functional form, usually as
parsimoniously as possible, the (unknown) underlying process that led to the
generation of the data. This contrasts with law-driven models that begin with an
understanding of the laws, or `building blocks', that drive the processes within
some system, and explore the behaviour of a more complex process based on
some aggregation of the building blocks. In the social sciences the law-driven
nature of a model is sometimes encapsulated in the description of the model as
a logic or causal model, i.e. a model as a sequence of events or states linked
by causal pathways. This distinction between law-driven and data-driven models
has also been described as `mechanistic vs empirical' (e.g. in the context of a
pharmacokinetic model in Nestorov et al., 1999) and in the econometrics literature
in terms of `highly structured vs reduced form' (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
Statistical models typically fall within the data-driven category, whereas health
economic evaluation models typically fall within the law-driven category. Indeed,
health economic models are built because of a lack of data on long term costs and
health consequences. The aim of the model is to predict costs and consequences
under the competing decision options, and the `laws' that are used to structure
the model are the plausible causal links between the various decision options and
the costs and health consequences. The law-driven nature of the cost-eectiveness
model has important implications for our choice of technique for managing struc-
tural uncertainty, as we discuss later.
Many other categorisations of computer models are possible, and even within
Saltelli's classication, some models may have aspects of both diagnostic and
prognostic, data-driven and law-driven. Climate models are a good example. One
reason for the construction of these models is in order for us to make predictions
about future global temperature under various greenhouse gas emission scenarios,
and in this sense the models are clearly predictive. However, the models also
inform our understanding of the highly complex climate system and are therefore
also `diagnostic'. Climate models are law-driven in that they are constructed with
reference to well understood physical and chemical laws, but they also have data-
driven aspects, usually through some form of calibration. The calibration against
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data is necessary to allow for gaps in our knowledge of the underlying physics,
or our unwillingness (say, for practical reasons) to fully specify a model structure
that reects a highly complex physical system.
3.2.3 Notation
We denote the `true' unknown values of the vector of quantities that we wish
to predict as Z. We represent our predictive computer model by the function
y = f(x) where x is a vector of inputs, and y a vectors of outputs in the same
units as Z. Note that there may be no closed form expression for f(), for example
if the model consists of a set of partial dierential equations, or if the model is of
an individual level simulation form.
We may be uncertain about some or all the components of x and write the
`true' unknown values of the inputs as X. If we are uncertain about the inputs,
then this induces uncertainty in the outputs and we write the vector of outputs
(conditional on the model f) as Y = f(X). We may have additional uncertainty
about Y jX = x if the model f() is stochastic, or if the model is computationally
expensive such that we can only evaluate f() a small number of times.
The `true' value of a component of Z or an input X is not easy to dene,
and can have a somewhat dierent meaning depending on whether the quantity
has a real physical meaning, or whether it is in the model for the purposes of
`tuning' or `calibration' (we will discuss the distinction below when we discuss
types of inputs). For a quantity that relates to a real physical counterpart the
`true' value is that which would be observed in a perfect study (e.g. for a drug
eect, the eect observed in a perfect randomised controlled trial with an innite
number of patients). For a `tuning' parameter, the meaning of `true' is less clear,
but Kennedy and O'Hagan (2001) dene it as that which leads to the best t to
observations against which the model is calibrated. They go on to suggest that in
some circumstances inputs that have real physical meanings should be allowed to
deviate from their real values (even when known) if this produces a better model
t.
Taking the three components X, Y and f() in turn, we make the following
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observations.
3.2.4 Types of inputs
It is often helpful to distinguish dierent types of input variable in a computer
model. We follow here the classication given in Santner et al. (2003). Firstly,
there are variables that are set by the owner or user of the model. These variables
represent quantities with values that can be chosen at will and are termed `control'
variables. So, for example, in the health economic context such variables would
usually include the time horizon of the model, the discount rate and the decision
maker's willingness to pay for a unit of health eect. Such variables are not
considered uncertain. Our prediction of Z is conditional on the choice of the
values of the control variables.
Secondly, a model will usually have inputs that represent real world quantities
that are estimated from data, and therefore uncertain. These are termed `environ-
mental' variables by Santner et al. (2003), but in the context of health economic
evaluation are usually called simply `parameters'. Examples would be the relative
risk of some health outcome given some intervention `A' versus some control treat-
ment `B', or the number of QALYs associated with living in some health state
for some period of time. Within a Bayesian framework we specify a joint prob-
ability distribution to reect our judgements about the uncertain environmental
variables.
Santner et al. (2003) recognise a third type of input called a `model' variable
or alternatively a `tuning parameter'. These variables represent quantities that
do not necessarily have a direct real world counterpart, but are used in a model to
describe relationships between real world quantities. Unobservable rate constants
in a pharmacokinetic model would fall into this class. Tuning parameters are often
estimated through a process of calibration, in which variables that are functions
of the tuning parameters (including perhaps the model output itself) are tted to
observed data.
We distinguish a further type of input that is not strictly within our control
(and therefore not a `control' input), but which we do not necessarily consider as
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uncertain. Covariates in a individual level simulation model would fall into this
class. We do not usually consider the value of a covariate as uncertain, but often
use a probability distribution to describe the variability of the covariate in our
population of interest, something that is outside of our control (this variability
is sometimes termed heterogeneity). One of the purposes of the individual level
simulation is to integrate outcomes with respect to the variability described by
this distribution (an integration that may not be possible analytically). Of course,
the hyperparameters of the (joint) distribution of the covariates may be considered
uncertain, and therefore themselves have an associated (joint) distribution.
3.2.5 Types of outputs
In the health economic context, the output of a cost-eectiveness model is usually
a low dimensional vector that consists of a cost and health output under each
decision d = 1; : : : ; D, for small D. In other contexts, the model output may be
either a scalar quantity, or at the other extreme of very high dimension. High
dimensional outputs typically occur when the model output relates to a time
series, a spatially indexed quantity, or a quantity that is indexed both spatially
and temporally. For example, a weather forecasting model may seek to predict
hourly temperatures for several days into the future on a 4 km square grid over
some area large area of a country or continent.
3.2.6 The form of f()
We have represented our computer model by the function f() that takes inputs x
and results in outputs y. A computer model is a computer code implementation
of some underlying model that has a certain mathematical or logical form. We do
not seek to dene `form' rigorously, other than to describe certain broad types of
model that are commonly in use.
Firstly, a model can be either deterministic, where each choice of inputs
X = xi results in a unique Y = yi, or stochastic, where input X = xi in-
duces a distribution pi(Y ) in the output. As we noted in chapter 2, there are
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examples of both deterministic and stochastic models in use in health economic
evaluation. `Cohort based' models that predict population level expected costs
and health outcomes tend to be deterministic, whereas models that explicitly in-
clude individual level covariates tend to be simulation based and stochastic. In a
stochastic model the component of the model output Y that represents population
level outcomes is obtained by simulating a large number of individuals, thereby
integrating out the covariates that vary across the population. As the number of
simulations increases this component of the output Y converges to some value.
We can think of these models as being deterministic for the expectation with
respect to the individual level variability.
Another important distinction between dierent model forms is whether or
not there are relationships between variables within the model that are dened
through dierential equations. Dierential equation models typically require the
use of numerical solvers and lead to approximate results. The choice of solver
method and solver resolution will determine the accuracy of the numerical estima-
tion, with greater accuracy usually coming at the expense of greater computational
burden. Apart from in the modelling of decisions that relate to interventions for
infectious diseases, dierential equation type models are relatively rare in health
economic evaluation.
Lastly, we make the distinction between models that are `black boxes' and
those that are `white boxes'. By this we mean to distinguish between models
that have a structure that is clearly comprehensible in its entirety (a white box
model), and one that is of sucient complexity that this kind of understanding
is impossible (a black box model). Clearly, there is a continuum here rather
than a dichotomy. When considering structural uncertainty a white box model
implemented in a simple spreadsheet package may allow considerably more scope
for `getting inside' the structure and thinking about how the model diers from
reality, than a black box model that is implemented as 100,000 lines of C code.
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3.3 Uncertainty
Uncertainty is described by de Finetti (1974) as `the extent of our own knowledge
and ignorance'. Uncertainty exists within the individual, rather than being a
property of the world. I own my uncertainty, along with any statements that
I make that characterises this uncertainty. There is no `objective' uncertainty:
your uncertainty about some event can be quite dierent to my uncertainty about
the same event. The use of probability as a measure of personal uncertainty
goes back to the work of Savage (1954); DeGroot (1970) and de Finetti (1974).
They argued strongly for a subjectivist interpretation of probability as the single
coherent measure of uncertainty. Whether or not there really is a single `objective'
description of uncertainty about an unknown quantity is contentious and has
underpinned the long running debate between subjective Bayesian's and the rest
of the statistics fraternity (see Gelman, 2008, and associated comments for a
avour of this debate).
Sometimes the distinction is made between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty.
Aleatory uncertainty describes uncertainty that arises from the inherent random-
ness in a non-determined system, so for example, the toss of a coin generates
aleatory uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty on the other hand describes uncer-
tainty due to lack of knowledge. Once the coin is tossed and has landed, I have
epistemic uncertainty about whether that particular coin toss has resulted in heads
or tails until I look to see which way up it lies. Although this distinction between
aleatory and epistemic uncertainty is sometimes useful, there are philosophical ar-
guments about whether this distinction really exists. If we knew everything, then
would there be any randomness? If randomness is merely a description of the
behaviour of systems that are not fully determined (i.e. systems for which we do
not have complete knowledge) then all uncertainty is surely epistemic (O'Hagan
and Oakley, 2004; Nilsen and Aven, 2003).
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3.3.1 Uncertainty in the context of computer models
Imagine that an individual wishes to base a decision on some quantity Z. We
could elicit the individual's judgements about Z, and hence specify a distribution
p(Z). This judgement reects the individual's `prior' knowledge about the world,
and is entirely coherent, but such probability statements may be of limited use
in making the decision. The individual may wish to base her judgements about
Z, and therefore their decision, on evidence. She wishes to quantify p(ZjD), the
distribution that describes her judgements about the target quantity given some
observations on the world,D. It is the quantication of this `posterior' probability
that motivates the building of a model. We need some method for linking D to
Z.
In the context of health economic evaluation our decision maker wishes to
determine argmaxdEfU(Zd)g, where Zd is the vector of uncertain outputs (costs
and health outputs) associated with decision option d 2 D. The decision maker's
prior beliefs about Z = (Z1; : : : ;ZD) is represented by the joint distribution p(Z).
The decision maker could choose to make the decision based on her prior beliefs
about Z. This may potentially lead to two problems. Firstly, if p(Z) is such that
there is considerable uncertainty as to which decision is optimum, the expected
opportunity loss could be large.
The expected opportunity loss of choosing decision option d0 is dened as
EOL = Efmax
d
U(Zd)g   EfU(Zd0)g: (3.1)
The rst term is the expectation of the random variable maxd U(Zd), which is
the utility of our optimum decision if we knew the true value of the vector Z.
The second term is the utility of the decision d0. If our optimal decision under
current uncertainty is d = argmaxdEfU(Zd)g then the expected opportunity
loss of choosing this optimal decision based only on prior knowledge is
EOL = Efmax
d
U(Zd)g   EfU(Zd)g; (3.2)
= Efmax
d
U(Zd)g  max
d
EfU(Zd)g; (3.3)
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which is also the expected value of perfect information (Raia, 1968). We will
discuss value of information more fully in section x3.4.1.
Secondly, a decision based on the decision maker's prior p(Z) may be all well
and good for the decision maker herself, if she alone must live with the conse-
quences. However, for decisions that eect others, it will probably be necessary
for the decision maker to justify the choice of p(Z). She therefore pays a modeller
to evaluate the distribution of Z, conditional on some evidence, some observations
of the world D. The primary motivation for building the model then is to link Z
to D in order to evaluate p(ZjD).
However, in section x3.2.3 we dened the model as Y = f(X) not Z = f(D),
so we need to describe the relationship between the quantity we wish to predict,
Z, the model, f , and the evidence, D. We write
p(ZjD) =
Z
X
Z
Y
p(ZjY ;X;D)p(Y jX;D)p(XjD)dY dX; (3.4)
where we have factorised p(Z;Y ;XjD) into the three terms p(ZjY ;X;D),
p(Y jX;D) and p(XjD).
3.3.2 Sources of uncertainty
The three terms in (3.4) capture three dierent sources of uncertainty. The term
p(XjD) is the specication of beliefs about the model inputs X given the obser-
vations D. The uncertainty in X is called `input uncertainty', or in the health
economic evaluation context, `parameter uncertainty'.
The term p(Y jX;D) represents uncertainty about Y conditional on X and
D, though we usually consider that Y ? DjX and therefore that p(Y jX;D) =
p(Y jX). If f() is deterministic and computationally cheap to evaluate then Y
is known immediately that X is known, and p(Y jX) reduces to (Y   f(X))
where () is the Dirac delta function. If f() is computationally expensive such
that we can evaluate it only a small number of times ff(x1); : : : ; f(xn)g, then
we have uncertainty about Y jX = x except at x 2 fx1; : : : ;xng. This source of
uncertainty is often termed `code' uncertainty. These two sources of uncertainty,
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input and code, are termed internal uncertainties by Goldstein (2011).
Finally, the term p(ZjY ;X;D) represents our beliefs about the target quan-
tity Z given the model output Y , inputsX and dataD, though again we usually
consider that Z ? DjX;Y and therefore p(ZjY ;X;D) = p(ZjY ;X). If we
imagine that we could build a model that directly predicts Z, i.e. Z = f (X)
then we can interpret p(ZjY ;X) as in some way representing uncertainty about
the model f () and on this basis call it structural uncertainty. Alternatively, if we
write Z = f(X) + , where  is the discrepancy between the model output and
reality, we can consider the uncertainty in ZjY ;X as arising from uncertainty
about the unknown structural error . This source of uncertainty is termed ex-
ternal uncertainty by Goldstein (2011).
In the context of health economic evaluation Briggs (2000) describes a fourth
source of uncertainty which is termed `methodological'. This describes uncertainty
about how to perform the economic analysis and includes choices about the per-
spective (what outcomes should be included?), the time horizon (what time frame
is relevant for this decision?) and the role of discounting (should discounting be
applied, and if so, at what rate?). In our view, methodological `uncertainty' is
not really uncertainty, but describes a set of choices that need to be made a pri-
ori by the decision maker. These are control variables in the categorisation in
section x3.2.4 rather than uncertain environmental variables or structural choices.
The implementation of modelling guidelines, through for example the use of the
NICE reference case (NICE, 2008), is an attempt to reduce variation in choices of
methodology between decision models.
3.4 Managing uncertainty in computer models
In this section we discuss the `management' of uncertainty, which we take to
include the following: uncertainty quantication, uncertainty propagation, uncer-
tainty analysis and sensitivity analysis. Under the broad heading of `management
of uncertainty' we draw a distinction between those methods that seek to quantify
uncertainty, and those that seek to reveal the sensitivity of a result or predic-
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tion or decision to changes in the value of an uncertain input, or dierences in
assumptions about the structure of the model. We will refer to the former as
uncertainty analysis and the latter as sensitivity analysis. A good introduction to
the management of uncertainty in cost-eectiveness analysis is Claxton (2008).
In an uncertainty analysis of a computer model output we wish to quantify the
uncertainty in Y = f(X) induced by uncertainty aboutX. Unless we believe our
model to be perfect, we may also wish to quantify uncertainty about our target
quantity of interest, Z, given our uncertainty about both X and f().
In a sensitivity analysis, we investigate how changes in the model inputs or
structure lead to changes in the model output, or to any decision that is made
based on the model output. Within the literature on sensitivity analysis as it
relates to inputs, a distinction is made between `local' and `global' sensitivity
analysis (Saltelli et al., 2008). Local sensitivity analysis quanties the change in
the model output due to small perturbations in a model input around some xed
point. Global sensitivity analysis seeks to understand the relationship between
changes in the model output and changes in an input across its whole range.
3.4.1 Managing input parameter uncertainty
In this section we discuss the management of uncertainty in the output of the
model due to uncertainty in the model inputs. We assume that the model itself is
both deterministic and computationally cheap to run, so that given X = xi, we
will immediately know Y = yi = f(xi)
Uncertainty analysis methods
We are uncertain about some or all of the inputs to our model, and represent our
beliefs about the inputs via a joint probability distribution p(X). Uncertainty in
X induces uncertainty in the model output Y = f(X), with the joint distribution
p(Y ) representing judgements about Y .
The typical approach to deriving p(Y ) is via Monte Carlo sampling. We
draw samples fx1; : : : ;xng from p(X), and then evaluate fy1 = f(x1); : : : ;yn =
f(xn)g, treating this as a sample from p(Y ). In the health economics literature
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this is called `probabilistic sensitivity analysis' (PSA) (Doubilet et al., 1985), and
is considered a standard method in the assessment of health technologies (Claxton
et al., 2005). As noted in section x2.3, even if we are just interested in the expecta-
tion E(Y ) = EXff(X)g we will need to compute the integral
R
X f(X)p(X)dX
if f() is non-linear in X, or multilinear in f() with correlated components of X
(Grin et al., 2006). In the absence of a closed form solution to the integral, the
mean of the Monte Carlo `PSA' sample provides an estimate of this expectation.
Simple Monte Carlo analysis is straightforward if the model is computationally
cheap to evaluate. We can obtain any degree of accuracy for any summary statistic
based on the sample from p(Y ) simply by ensuring an adequate number of samples
from the input space. If this is not practical due to either the cost of sampling
from p(X), or more likely the cost of evaluating f(), then alternative methods
must be used.
McKay et al. (1979) show that greater eciency (i.e. a reduction in the vari-
ance of the Monte Carlo estimator) can be gained by employing either a stratied
or Latin hypercube scheme when sampling from p(X). The gain in eciency de-
pends on the choice of strata, the form of p(X) and the nature of the model. Stein
(1987) shows that the gain in eciency for Latin hypercube sampling depends on
the degree of additivity in the model, with eciency increasing with degree of
additivity. Thus, we can in most circumstances gain the same level of accuracy as
we would under simple Monte Carlo sampling with fewer model evaluations if we
employ stratied or Latin hypercube sampling. If the limitation on the number
of model evaluations due to computational cost means that we cannot gain su-
cient precision even with these sampling methods then we may have to consider
building an emulator for the computer model. We discuss this approach in section
x3.4.2.
Note that these Monte Carlo based methods (simple, stratied and Latin hy-
percube sampling) all quantify uncertainty in the model output, Y , due to un-
certainty in the model input, and not our uncertainty about the target quantity
Z. Alternatively, if we denote the unknown true model that links X to Z as
f () then the sample f(x1); : : : ; f(xn) represents a sample from the distribution
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of Zjf = f . To properly represent uncertainty about Z we must also consider
uncertainty in the model structure. However, quantifying uncertainty in model
structure is hard since it requires judgements about a model's ability to faithfully
represent a complex real life decision problem. We return to this point in section
x3.4.3.
Sensitivity analysis methods
Sensitivity analysis seeks to investigate the eects of changes to the inputs on
the output of the model, or on the decision made based on the output of the
model. `Local' sensitivity analysis is concerned with determining the eect of small
perturbations in some input of interest, usually around some central value. This
contrasts with `global' sensitivity analysis, which is concerned with determining
the behaviour of the model output over the whole range of the input of interest.
See (Saltelli et al., 2008) for an extensive discussion of model input sensitivity
measures.
The simplest form of global sensitivity analysis is to select an single input of
interest, and vary it over some plausible range while keeping all other inputs xed.
This `one way' sensitivity analysis is easy to perform, but may lead to misleading
results if inputs are correlated, or if the model is non-additive (Saltelli et al.,
2008).
In most cases, a more sophisticated analysis that accounts for correlated inputs
and/or non-additive model structure will be required. For a model with a scalar
output, Y = f(X), the variance based sensitivity analysis approach denes the
`main eect' of the input of interest, Xi, on Y as
Zi(Xi) = E(Y jXi)  E(Y ); (3.5)
and the `main eect index' as the variance of the main eect normalised by the
total variance of Y ,
varXifZ(Xi)g
var(Y )
=
varXifE(Y jXi)g
var(Y )
: (3.6)
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Given the identity varXifE(Y jXi)g = var(Y )   EXifvar(Y jXi)g the main eect
index can be seen to be the expected proportional reduction in variance of Y on
learning Xi.
A related quantity is the `total eect index'
var(Y )  varX ifEXi(Y jX i)g
var(Y )
=
EX ifvarXi(Y jX i)g
var(Y )
; (3.7)
whereX i is the vector of all inputs except Xi. The total eect index is a measure
of the overall eect of the input Xi, including any interactions. It is the expected
variance (as a proportion of the total variance) that is left when all inputs except
Xi are xed. In general, the main eect index is useful in determining the eect
of learning a single input, whereas the total eect index is useful in determining
non-inuential inputs.
The decision theoretic approach to determining sensitivity asks the more gen-
eral question, what eect does changing Xi have on the decision that will be
made given the model output, rather than on the model output itself? It is quite
possible for an input Xi to be highly inuential on the output Y , but to have no
inuence on the decision.
If we imagine that we will choose a decision option, d from some set of possible
options D, based on the value of the model output Y (note that Y is no longer
constrained to be scalar as it was above). We have a utility function U(d;Y )
for each decision d given the model output Y , and wish to choose the optimal
decision, dened as that which maximises expected utility,
d = argmax
d2D
EfU(d;Y )g = argmax
d2D
E[Ufd; f(X)g]: (3.8)
We call the maximised expected utility, maxd2D EfU(d;Y )g, the baseline utility.
Within this framework, we can determine the value (in units of utility) of
learning some set of components of the inputs Xi. The maximised expected
utility given Xi is
max
d2D
EX ijXifU(d;Y )g; (3.9)
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where X i is the set of inputs not in Xi. The maximised expected utility (3.9)
itself is uncertain because Xi is uncertain, and has expectation
EXi [max
d2D
EX ijXifU(d;Y )g]: (3.10)
The expected gain in utility on learning Xi is the dierence between (3.10) and
the utility at baseline,
EXi [max
d2D
EX ijXifU(d;Y )g] max
d2D
EfU(d;Y )g: (3.11)
This quantity is called the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) for Xi
(or sometimes the `partial' EVPI, to reect that we are conditioning on only a
subset of the inputs).
We can similarly derive expressions for the expected value of collecting a sam-
ple of data, D to inform the estimate of some subset of inputs Xi. This is known
as the expected value of sample information (EVSI).
It can be shown that the variance based measure is a special case of the EVPI
where the decision problem is to estimate Y , and where utility is negative squared
error, U(Y ) =  fY   dg2 (i.e. quadratic loss). Utility is maximised (loss is
minimised) at d = E(Y ), so under these conditions the EVPI (3.11) is
EV PI = EXi [max
d2D
EX ijXifU(Y jXi)g] max
d2D
EfU(Y )g; (3.12)
= EXi [max
d2D
 EX ijXifY jXi   dg2] max
d2D
[ EfY   dg2]; (3.13)
= EXi [ EX ijXifY jXi   E(Y jXi)g2] + EfY   E(Y )g2; (3.14)
= EXif varX ijXi(Y jXi)g+ var(Y ); (3.15)
= varXifEX ijXi(Y jXi)g; (3.16)
which is the numerator in (3.6).
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Dealing with correlation in the inputs
Calculating the expected value of perfect information (or the main eect in-
dex as a special case) requires the computation of the conditional expectation
EX ijXi(Y jXi) (or alternatively the conditional variance varX ijXi(Y jXi)). This
is problematic if there is no closed form solution to the expectation and no easy
(i.e. computationally cheap) way to sample from the conditional distribution of
X ijXi. Clearly, if Xi ? X i then EX ijXi(Y jXi) reduces to EX i(Y jXi), and
we only require to sample from the marginal joint distribution of X i. It should
always be possible to use a numerical method such as MCMC to sample from
the conditional distribution of X ijXi, but this is likely to be computationally
demanding.
A number of solutions to this problem have been proposed. Firstly, Jacques
et al. (2006) propose a simple solution whereby the vector of n inputs, X, is
partitioned into p sub vectors, i.e.
X = (X1; : : : ; Xn) (3.17)
= (X1; : : : ; Xk1| {z }
U1
; Xk1+1; : : : ; Xk1+k2| {z }
U2
; : : : ;
Xk1+k2+;:::;+kp 1+1; : : : ; Xk1+k2+;:::;+kp| {z }
Up
); (3.18)
where k1 + k2+; : : : ; kp = n. The partitioning is such that Ui ? Uj 8i 6= j.
Sensitivity measures are then calculated for each subset of inputs Ui; i = 1; : : : ; p,
noting that the conditional distribution EU ijUi(Y jUi) = EU i(Y jUi). This is a
reasonable approach if X can be partitioned in this manner, and if the sensitivity
of Y to some subset of inputs Ui is of interest. If not, then this approach fails.
Da Veiga et al. (2009) suggest that for scalar Y and scalar Xi that the condi-
tional moments, EX ijXi(Y jXi) and varX ijXi(Y jXi) are estimated using a local
polynomial regression approach based. Firstly, given a single sample set, Y is
regressed on Xi for Xi in the neighbourhood of some point x, assuming the p-th
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order polynomial regression equation
Yi =
pX
j=0
j(Xi   x)j + "i: (3.19)
The error term "i is estimated by a second local polynomial regression, this time a
regression on Xi of the squared residuals from the rst level of t. The Da Veiga
et al. (2009) method has some similarities to the solution we propose to the prob-
lem of correlated inputs which we describe in chapter 8. In our method we ef-
fectively regress Yi on Xi for Xi in the neighbourhood of some x, but assume a
simple mean only linear regression Yi = 0 + "i with E("i) = 0.
In theory the method presented by Da Veiga et al. (2009) is extendible to mul-
tidimensional Xi, but will suer from the `curse of dimensionality'. If n samples
are required for some specied precision in the case of a scalar Xi, then for the
same precision with Xi of dimensionality d we will require a sample size of order
nd. This exponential growth in the number of samples required severely limits
this kind of analysis to problems in which the vector of inputs of interest, Xi is
of low dimension.
Bias modelling
So far we have implicitly assumed that the distribution p(XjD) represents the
decision maker's judgements about the inputs, conditional on some observations
of the world (or at least, that the decision maker is happy to accept p(XjD) as
specied by the authors of the various studies who collected the data and wrote the
papers, or perhaps as specied by the modeller who trawled the primary research
literature). If for simplicity we take a single input Xi we nd that in reality
the decision maker may have good reasons for making quite dierent judgements
about XijDi, than are specied in the p(XijDi) implied in the published results
of the paper(s) reporting Di. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the decision
maker may have concerns about the internal validity of the study, and may wish to
correct certain important internal biases that may have arisen due to inadequacies
in either study design or analysis. Secondly, the decision maker may believe that
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the circumstances of the study are suciently dierent to those of the decision
problem that the resulting external biases must also be corrected.
Bias adjustment has received some attention in the literature, and we note
the contributions of Eddy et al. (1990, 1992) (the condence prole method),
Spiegelhalter and Best (2003), Greenland (2005) and Turner et al. (2009). In
particular, Greenland (2005) and Turner et al. (2009) discuss the important role
of prior knowledge in specifying bias terms, given that these terms are typically
unidentiable from the data. The structural discrepancy modelling approach that
we propose in chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis draws on these ideas of bias modelling,
but instead of making judgements about errors in the inputs, we are concerned
with making judgements about errors further `downstream' within the structure
of the model.
3.4.2 Managing code uncertainty
In this section we discuss the management of uncertainty when the computer
model is expensive to run. A computationally expensive model adds an extra
layer of uncertainty: uncertainty about Y for all values of X = x where we do
not have the time or resources to evaluate y = f(x).
Increasing the eciency of the computation
One approach to overcoming the limitations imposed by a computationally expen-
sive model is of course to use a faster computer. In particular, the type of problem
we face, that of evaluating a model repeatedly for a large number of inputs sets
lends itself to `embarrassingly parallel' computation. An `embarrassingly parallel'
computation is one that can be easily divided into a number of independent tasks,
each of which can be performed on a separate processor (Foster, 1995). In this
form of parallel computation there is little or no communication required between
processors. Functions to implement embarrassingly parallel computation within
R (R Development Core Team, 2011) are readily available, for example within the
snow and snowfall packages.
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Alternatively, if the computer model is implemented in high level code, partic-
ularly if it is written in an interpreted language like R, then a signicant gain in
speed may be obtained by rewriting the model in a low level compiled language
such as C.
Emulators for computationally expensive simulators
In this subsection we refer to our computationally expensive model, f(), as the
simulator. Due to the complexity of the simulator, and because we can only run
it a small number of times, Y = f(X) is unknown for all input value sets except
those at which we have evaluated it. One solution in this situation is to build a
statistical model for the simulator. This model, which is called an emulator for
the simulator, is a full joint probability specication of f() that allows us not only
to determine f(x) for any x, but also allows us to quantify our uncertainty about
f(x) due to only having run the simulator a limited number of times (O'Hagan
and Oakley, 2004; Oakley, 2011).
We denote the limited number of simulator runs that we are able to obtain as
T = fy1 = f(x1); : : : ;yN = f(xN)g. We use these as `training data' to construct
an estimate, f^(), of the unknown function f(). An emulator should have the
following properties: rstly, it should result in f^(xi) = yi for the `design' points
xi 2 fx1; : : : ;xNg; secondly, the mean value for f^(x) should be a plausible in-
terpolation (or extrapolation) of the training data; and thirdly, the distribution
around the mean of f^(x) should be a reasonable expression of uncertainty about
f(x) (Bastos and O'Hagan, 2009). The second and third of these criteria can
be checked by comparing additional runs of the simulator with the predicted val-
ues, or alternatively by constructing the emulator from only a subset of available
simulator runs, and using the remainder for validation.
An established method for modelling an uncertain function f() is via the
specication of a Gaussian process. A Gaussian process (GP) is a stochastic
process in which any nite set of samples has a multivariate normal distribution
(Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001). The GP is specied by a mean function m()
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and a covariance function c(; ), and we write
f()  GPfm(); c(; )g: (3.20)
Given a set of inputs, fx1; : : : ;xng, for which we have not evaluated the simulator,
our uncertainty about the corresponding outputs, ff(x1); : : : ; f(xn)g is described
by a multivariate normal distribution with some mean  and covariance V .
The mean function is typically dened as having the following linear form
m(x) = h(x)T; (3.21)
where h() is a vector of regressor functions called `basis' functions. The simplest
case is h(x) = 1, which implies thatm(x) =  then represents an unknown overall
mean for the simulator output. Or, we could dene h(x)T = (1;x), leading to
m(x) = 1+2x1+ : : :+1+pxp where p is the dimensionality of the input vector
x. This corresponds to a belief that the simulator output has a linear trend with
respect to all the inputs. Higher order polynomial forms for m(x) can be specied
through writing h(x)T = (1;x;x2), h(x)T = (1;x;x2;x3) and so on.
As with the mean function, there are many possible choices for the form of the
covariance function, with the most common being the `Gaussian' form
2c(x;x0) = 2 expf (x  x0)TC(x  x0)g: (3.22)
Here, C is a diagonal matrix, with diagonal elements f! 21 ; : : : ; ! 2p g. The hyper-
parameter ! = f!1; : : : ; !pg is known as the correlation length and controls the
smoothness of the resulting Gaussian process. Prior beliefs about the smoothness
of the unknown function f() are specied through this hyperparameter.
Analytic solutions to the posterior Gaussian process conditional on training
data are shown in Kennedy and O'Hagan (2001) and Oakley and O'Hagan (2002)
for certain classes of prior distribution for  and 2, and a plug-in estimate for !.
A fully Bayesian posterior specication allowing for uncertainty in ! is obtainable
via MCMC, though this is computationally demanding (Neal, 1999).
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Given the posterior Gaussian process Oakley and O'Hagan (2004) show how
various measures of input uncertainty and sensitivity can be calculated either
analytically, or using Monte Carlo methods where the number of runs required of
the emulator is much smaller than would have been required of the simulator for
the same level of accuracy.
The use of emulation is not widespread in health economic evaluation, prob-
ably reecting the relative simplicity of the models that are typically employed.
Notable examples of Gaussian process emulation for cost-eectiveness studies are
Tappenden et al. (2004), Stevenson et al. (2004) and Rojnik and Naversnik (2008).
Specifying beliefs about the simulator via a Gaussian process is not the only
route to building an emulator. An alternative approach, which only requires the
expression of beliefs about the rst two moments of the uncertain simulator out-
put, is to build a Bayes linear emulator (Craig et al., 2001; Goldstein and Rougier,
2006, 2009; Goldstein, 2011). The Bayes linear approach has a somewhat dier-
ent underpinning philosophy from the fully Bayesian approach in that prior belief
statements are made as expectations rather than as probabilities. Treating expec-
tation as the primitive quantity avoids the need to make a full joint probabilistic
specication over the unknowns, which can be an extremely daunting task. Up-
dating the expectation of some random quantities B (about which we specify prior
second order beliefs) given some observations D generates an adjusted expectation
(in the Bayes linear terminology). For each element Bi in B the adjusted expecta-
tion, written ED[Bi] is the linear combination a
T
i D that minimises E[(Bi aTi D)2].
This leads to expressions for the adjusted expectation for B,
ED[B] = E[B] + cov[B;D]var[D]
 1(D   E[D]); (3.23)
and adjusted variance
varD[B] = var[B]  cov[B;D]var[D] 1cov[D;B]: (3.24)
The adjusted expectation, ED[B], is an approximation to the conditional expec-
tation E(BjD) that would be obtained under a full Bayesian prior-to-posterior
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analysis. The adjusted variance varD[B] provides an upper bound for the condi-
tional variance var(BjD). The approximations are exact in the case where the
joint probability distribution of B and D is multivariate normal.
3.4.3 Managing structural uncertainty
We now discuss the management of uncertainty about the target quantity Z due
to our uncertainty about the `true' model. A law driven model can be thought
of as a representation of judgements about the relationship between the model
inputs and the model outputs. If we are uncertain what this `true' structural
relationship is, then even if we were to run the model at its true inputs, there
would be an uncertain `structural error' in the model prediction. We denote this
uncertain error `structural uncertainty'. Note that we use the term `true' value
of the input to mean that which we would estimate in some perfect study with
innite sample size, and `true' structural relationship to mean a (possibly non-
unique) functional relationship that would result in the correct output given any
set of `true' values of the inputs.
Unless we are able to build a model that is true in the sense above we should
expect an uncertain structural error in the model prediction. What are our judge-
ments about this error? Given that we are likely to be uncertain about some or all
of the model inputs is the uncertainty about the model structure important? Is
the imperfect model good enough for the decision that we will base on the model
output? If not, which bit of the model is inadequate? In the words of Box (1976)
\Since all models are wrong the scientist must be alert to what is
importantly wrong. It is inappropriate to be concerned about mice
when there are tigers abroad".
Quantifying structural uncertainty is, however, dicult since it involves making
judgements about a model's ability to faithfully represent a (possibly highly com-
plex) real life system.
We note two important distinctions that are made in the treatment of model
uncertainty. Firstly, is the focus of the uncertainty analysis the correctness of the
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model, or the discrepancy between the model output and reality? Historically, the
statistical treatment of model uncertainty has located the uncertainty in themodel
itself, explicitly seeking to determine the adequacy of the model (usually within
the context of a set of competing models). This contrasts with the treatment of
the problem in the computer models literature, where the uncertain model error is
primarily of interest. A key concept in this latter treatment is that of discrepancy :
the dierence between the model run at its `best' or `true' input, and the true
value of the output quantity (Kennedy and O'Hagan, 2001; Goldstein and Rougier,
2009).
The second distinction we make is whether or not there are observations on the
target quantity Z. For a statistical model the answer is yes, since for statistical
models the data that are modelled are the observations on Z. These observations
are the beginning point for a statistical model, and as we have noted before, such
models are therefore termed data-driven. However, for law-driven models we may
be in a position where there are no observations on the target quantity. Certainly,
in the context of health economic evaluation, at the point of making a decision we
have no direct observations of the costs and health eects for each of our decision
options. However, this lack of data is not the case in all situations in which law-
driven models are used. In physical systems modelling for example, the target
quantity is often partitioned as Z = fZo;Zug, where we have (noisy) observa-
tions z on Zo, but no observations on Zu. We may have historic observations and
wish to predict future values (forecasting), or we may have observations at a set of
points in space and wish to predict values at locations in between (interpolation).
Of course, the problem of dening the `correct' model structure arises whether or
not we have observations on Z, rather, the distinction is important since it deter-
mines whether we can use the likelihood (or similar measure) of the observations
on Z to update beliefs about the whole model structure (we will elaborate on this
when we discuss model averaging).
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Alternative scenario analysis
A basic form of structural sensitivity analysis is to explore the sensitivity of the
model prediction to underlying assumptions in a `what if' scenario analysis in
which sets of alternative assumptions are modelled (see Bojke et al. (2009) for a
review of the methods that are currently used to manage health economic evalua-
tion model uncertainty, and Kim et al. (2010) for a specic example of modelling
alternative scenarios). However, this process cannot in any formal sense quantify
the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions, and nor can it quantify any re-
sulting prediction uncertainty. If a decision maker is presented with the results
of a number of dierent models, with each model having a dierent set of struc-
tural assumptions, it is not clear how she should proceed with her decision. What
should her posterior beliefs about Z be?
Model averaging
Model uncertainty has been addressed from a statistical perspective (e.g. Draper,
1995; Kass and Raftery, 1995). Here, a key concept is that of model averaging in
which the predictions or probability statements of a number of plausible models
are averaged, with weights based either on some measure of model adequacy, or
some measure of the probability that the statistical model is `correct'. Bernardo
and Smith (1994) and Kadane and Lazar (2004) oer a Bayesian decision theoretic
treatment of model averaging in the general statistical context, and Jackson et al.
(2009, 2010) and Bojke et al. (2009) illustrate its application to health economic
evaluation.
Suppose we have a set of plausible models fMi; i 2 Ig, withMi = ffi(X); pi(X)g.
We draw on Bernardo and Smith (1994)'s notion of describing a set of possible
models as M  closed or M  open. A set of models, fMi; i 2 Ig, is described as
M  closed if we believe that one of the models in fMi; i 2 Ig is `true', but we do
not know which. Conversely, a set of models is described as M  open if we do
not believe that one of the models in fMi; i 2 Ig is correct. In model averaging,
we predict Z using a weighted mean value of the individual model outputs. The
weighting process could simply consist of choosing the model from the set that
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we believe is `best' while discarding the rest, eectively placing all the weight on
a single model. Or, we may want to more formally assess our beliefs about how
likely the dierent models are, and weight the outputs by these probabilities.
If we have data, D, (that have not been used to inform the inputsX) and can
calculate some measure of the adequacy of the model, givenD, then we can weight
the model outputs by (some function of) the adequacy measure. If we believe our
set of models is M  closed then, within a Bayesian framework, we can specify
prior model probabilities, p(Mi), and calculate the posterior probabilities given
D via
p(MijD) = p(DjMi)p(Mi)P
i2I p(DjMi)p(Mi)
; (3.25)
leading to a weighted mean output
p(ZjD) =
X
i2I
p(ZjMi;D)p(MijD): (3.26)
Where there are two or more conicting, defensible models, then such an
approach has obvious benets, in comparison with using one model only and
ignoring the others. However, model averaging approaches are unlikely to be
sucient for fully quantifying uncertainty about Z, and do have some practical
limitations.
The obvious shortcoming is that we will not usually believe any of the models
are correct: we do not believe that fi(X) = Z for any i. Jackson et al. (2010)
acknowledge this, and instead of using (3.25) to obtain weights for use in (3.26)
adopt an M  open view and derive a weight p(MijD) based on the probability
that model Mi \gives the best predictions on a replicated data set, among the
models being compared". However, even with this weighting scheme, why should
we believe that a weighted average of the outputs from anM open set of models
(i.e. a set of models that are all wrong) represents our posterior beliefs about Z?
Another important limitation is the form of the available data, D. Model
averaging approaches involve evaluation of a likelihood function for each model:
p(DjMi) =
Z
X
pifDjfi(X)gpi(X)dX: (3.27)
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However, in many applications, health economic evaluation included, we do not
have dataD. There are no observations on the model output fi(X), as this would
have been the reason for building the model in the rst place. We may, however,
have some relevant data,D. For example, in the health economics context, fi(X)
may correspond to mean costs and benets over a twenty year period, and D
may be observations of the treatment ecacy in a clinical trial over a two year
period. If we imagine that fi contains a `sub-function', gi, that describes ecacy
at two years, then we would have
p(DjMi) =
Z
X
pfDjgi(X)gp(X)dX (3.28)
which we could plug into (3.25) to get (3.26).
This is helpful, but not sucient. All those elements that dier between
models and that are downstream of the sub-function gi() (and which therefore
may lead to dierent predictions of Z) remain untested. These methods clearly
have a role in guiding structural choices for parts of the model where intermediate
outputs can be tted to data, but they cannot guide choices about the whole
model structure since we do not observe future costs and health eects under
each of our competing decision options.
Finally, we may wish to consider competing models in the absence of any data
that would inform the choice between them. In this latter case we are left with
just our prior model probabilities p(Mi). If we were to adopt anM  closed view
then our posterior beliefs about Z would be
p(Z) =
X
i2I
p(ZjMi)p(Mi): (3.29)
Learning about p(Mi) might now be considered to be an expert elicitation problem,
the extreme example being that of a modeller choosing a single model because
they believe it to be `best'. Elicitation of prior model probabilities is not, however,
a trivial problem. For example, how would an expert decide how much probability
to place on two competing Markov models, one with three health states, and one
with four?
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More likely is the situation in which we have a set of plausible models, none
of which we believe to be `true', and we have no observations to guide model
selection. In this situation even the notion of the prior model probability is prob-
lematic, since by assuming that our model set is M   open we have already
eectively stated that p(Mi) = 0 8i.
Discrepancy based approaches
A fundamentally dierent approach to quantifying structural uncertainty is in-
stead to represent our uncertainty about model structure through our judgements
about the discrepancy between the model output and the `true' quantities we
wish to make statements about. Rather than consider some measure of the `cor-
rectness' of our model, we instead make judgements about the structural error
that arises from its imperfection. Important papers demonstrating the approach
include Kennedy and O'Hagan (2001); Craig et al. (2001); Higdon et al. (2005)
and Goldstein and Rougier (2009).
In the model discrepancy approach to structural uncertainty we focus on the
discrepancy, , between the output of a model evaluated at the `true' inputs, and
the true target value,
Z = f(X) + : (3.30)
The discrepancy term, , quanties the structural error : the dierence between
the output of the model evaluated at its true inputs and the true target quantity.
Instead of specifying model weights, the key task is now to usefully quantify
our beliefs about the discrepancy via p(X; ). We are explicitly recognising in
equation (3.30) that our model may be decient, but note that when we speak
about model deciency we are not concerned with mistakes, `slips', `lapses' or
other errors of implementation (for a discussion on this topic see Chilcott et al.,
2010b). Rather, we are concerned with deciencies arising as a result of the gap
between our model of reality, and reality itself. Obtaining a joint distribution
that reects our beliefs about inputs and discrepancies, p(X; ), allows us then
to fully quantify our uncertainty in the target quantity due to both uncertain
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inputs and uncertain structure. This approach has the important advantage that
only a single model need be built, though methods for making inferences about
discrepancy in the context of multiple models have also been explored (Goldstein
and Rougier, 2009).
In the situation where we have partial, noisy, observations z on Z, Kennedy
and O'Hagan (2001) propose a method for fully accounting for the uncertainty
in Z, given z and uncertain inputs X. They begin by specifying a Gaussian
process for the model function f(), and then specify a second Gaussian process
for the model discrepancy . Prior beliefs about the model and model error are
incorporated via the hyperprior terms in the Gaussian process specications, and
observations (both z, and the output from the `simulator' f() training runs) are
then used to update beliefs within a Bayesian framework.
Goldstein and Rougier address the same problem, but from the Bayes linear
perspective, for the case when there is a single simulator (Goldstein and Rougier,
2006) and when there are multiple simulators (Goldstein and Rougier, 2004, 2009).
The diculty in health economics with any of the discrepancy approaches
described above is the lack of observations on the target quantity Z. We do not
directly measure the costs and health consequences of sets of competing decisions,
and calibration of the model output (Y ) against data (observations on Z) is
therefore usually not possible. In this case we are left with expert judgement
as the means by which to make statements about the model discrepancy . In
theory, the modeller at least should be a able to make some judgement about the
model error, if only a very crude one.
Imagine that a modeller builds a model to predict the incremental net benet of
recommending drug A versus the current best alternative (incremental net benet
here is the dierence between the net benets of the two decision options). The
model output suggests the expected incremental net benet, given uncertainty in
all the inputs, is E(Y ) = $500 (per person treated).
When asked to estimate the model error (i.e. the dierence between the true
incremental net benet, Z, and the model output Y ) it is likely that the modeller
will at least be able to specify a distribution that is less vague than gure 3.2a.
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They might believe that their model will underestimate the true value and specify
something like gure 3.2b. Or perhaps the modeller has reasonable condence
in the model, with gure 3.2c representing their beliefs. Of course, in reality,
the implied distribution on model error in most cases is gure 3.2d. We think
that in general, it is unlikely that a crude evaluation of the model error will be
particularly useful or robust to criticism.
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Figure 3.2: Possible distributions for hypothetical model error,  = Z   Y
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Zio and Apostolakis (1996) suggested a possible solution to this problem when
a set of plausible models is available, one of which is considered by experts to
be the `best'. The case study the authors present concerns a set of six plausible
predictive models for ground water ow in the context of a radioactive waste
repository safety analysis. In the discrepancy analysis it is assumed that the
structural error for the best model is normally distributed with expectation equal
to the mean of the dierences in output between this best model and the other ve
models in the set (termed `residuals'), and variance equal to the sample variance
of the residuals. In a second analysis each model residual was weighted by the
probability that the corresponding model provided an `appropriate description of
the ground water phenomenon for the objective of the analysis'. This does beg
the question: how good does a model have to be to be `appropriate' for some
analysis?
Zio and Apostolakis (1996)'s empirical approach to specifying the discrepancy
is attractive in that it directly incorporates information from all six models, but
it excludes any prior information that we may have, say, about a source of error
that is common to the whole set of models. What if we were faced with six models
that were similar in structure, with similar outputs, but were all very wrong?
3.5 Constructing a single framework
We are uncertain about the (comparative) net benets of range of decision op-
tions. Our beliefs about these unknown net benets are informed by `data' that
we model statistically, but also by our ideas about the causal relationships (`laws')
that underlie the order that we observe in the world. We have a range of tech-
niques (parameter uncertainty analysis, bias modelling, emulation for expensive
simulators, model averaging, discrepancy analysis) that can help us make state-
ments about the unknown net benets that are consistent with our knowledge of
the world, and that properly reect our true uncertainty. None of the approaches
for managing uncertainty that we have discussed are mutually exclusive, and all
can coexist within a single modelling framework. More specically, the techniques
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that relate to `structural' uncertainty, model averaging and model discrepancy, can
comfortably sit together. Both rely on `augmenting' an existing model or a set
of existing models to construct a larger augmented model or `meta-model'1 that
has additional parameters (model weights in the case of model averaging, and
discrepancy terms in the case of discrepancy analysis). Indeed, if we consider our
problem as determining p(ZjD) rather than p(ZjX) then we might envisage a
single `augmented' model within which are located bias modelling parameters and
discrepancy terms and sub-model weights.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have reviewed the management of uncertainty in computer
models. We have determined the sources of our uncertainty about the target
quantity given the model we have built, and have considered some of the methods
available for managing these uncertainties. We have argued that the problem of
model uncertainty in health economic evaluation is particularly dicult because
we do not observe net benets. We cannot assess the `t' of our model output to
data. This makes both likelihood based methods (model averaging) and model
calibration based methods (e.g. as proposed by Kennedy and O'Hagan, 2001)
challenging. Given an absence of data it is always possible for a Bayesian to turn
to expert judgement, but even this may be of little use when making judgements
about the net benets of some set of decision options conditional on the output
of a health economic evaluation model.
In chapters 5 and 6 we return to the problem of specifying model discrepancy
in the absence of observations on the model output. We will suggest that instead
of making judgements about the discrepancy at the level of the model output,
that we `open up' the model and make judgements about model error at the level
of the revealed intermediate parameters within the model.
1The term `meta-model' is also used to denote a statistical emulator for a computationally
expensive simulator, so to avoid confusion we will use the term `augmented model' instead
Chapter 4
Elicitation
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is about elicitation, the process of assisting an expert to express his
or her knowledge about an unknown quantity in a probabilistic form. We saw
in the last chapter that, in the context of health economic model uncertainty, we
are likely to be in a position of having to make statements about model error in
the absence of data. Hence, we briey review some of the relevant theory that
underpins elicitation, describe methods that have been established to conduct
the process, and discuss examples of the use of elicitation in health services and
medical research.
We end the chapter with a discussion of some of the challenges that we are
likely to face when using elicitation to derive distributions in the context of model
structural uncertainty.
4.2 What is elicitation?
Elicitation is the process of extracting expert knowledge about an uncertain quan-
tity (or quantities), and representing this knowledge as a (joint) probability dis-
tribution for the unknown(s) (O'Hagan et al., 2006). We recognise that in many
decision problems experts have relevant information that either augments the
information contained within some data, or provides helpful statements about
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unknowns in the absence of data. Elicited information has a particular role in
forming the prior distribution for the purposes of doing Bayesian inference. Health
economic evaluation is inherently Bayesian because we wish to make probabilistic
statements about unknown quantities (costs and health eects) that represent our
beliefs about those quantities for the purposes of making some decision. Elicita-
tion ts naturally within this framework as a tool for formalising the process of
incorporating judgements into the decision making process (Stevens and O'Hagan,
2002).
Elicitation has been used in a wide range of applications including engineering
reliability (Bedford et al., 2006) accident risk analysis for nuclear power plants
(Cooke and Goossens, 2000), reliability of nuclear weapons (Wilson et al., 2011),
water industry planning (Garthwaite and O'Hagan, 2000), agricultural land man-
agement (Orton et al., 2011), climate science (Rougier, 2007; Dijkstra and Dixon,
2010), ecology (Kuhnert et al., 2010), including future polar bear populations
under climate change (O'Neill et al., 2008), seismic hazard (Klugel, 2008) and
the probability that unexploded ordnance will explode (MacDonald et al., 2008).
Quantifying very small risks for events that cause considerable levels of public
concern is a particularly fraught area for policy makers and elicitation has been
used here to assess the health impact of chemicals in food (van der Voet et al.,
2009), and the health risk of nano particles (Kandlikar et al., 2007). We note some
of the many other applications in health care and medical research in section x4.4.
4.3 How does elicitation work?
There has been a considerable volume of research directed at establishing robust
methods for elicitation. Some important papers are O'Hagan (1998); Garthwaite
et al. (2005) and the recent review by Johnson et al. (2010). A comprehensive
text on elicitation is O'Hagan et al. (2006). Software to assist the elicitation
process and to allow the tting of probability distributions is available1 along
with accompanying tutorials for univariate (Oakley, 2010) and multivariate cases
1http://www.tonyohagan.co.uk/shelf/
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(Daneshkhah and Oakley, 2010).
The basic idea of elicitation is as follows. There are four `actors': the decision
maker, the expert, the statistician and the facilitator (although it is common
for the last two roles to be played by the same person). We introduced the
decision maker in chapter 2. This is the individual who requires the probability
distribution for the purposes of making some decision. The expert is the individual
who is deemed to have useful subject matter knowledge, and can therefore provide
meaningful statements about the uncertain quantities in question (she2 needs not
be an `expert' in any more formal way than this). The elicitation process involves
elements of training in the basic ideas of probability, and the validation of results,
both of which require a `statistician' (again, not necessarily in a formal sense).
Finally the facilitator is the expert in the application of the elicitation process
who manages the dialogue with the expert.
Sometimes the term `analyst' is used to describe the combined statistician and
facilitator role taken by a single individual, and in some circumstances the expert,
statistician and facilitator are the same person. In this latter case we refer to
the resulting process as self-elicitation. We note here that determining one's own
probabilities is not easy, vagueness being the major obstacle (Savage, 1971). This
may be relevant later when we discuss the use of elicitation by modellers with the
aim of improving their own models.
The elicitation process involves a number of steps. First the uncertain quan-
tities are identied. This sounds trivial, but it is extremely important that the
expert is asked to provide information about the quantity or quantities that re-
ally are required for the inference or decision. Next the expert is identied and
recruited. The elicitation session itself begins with a careful explanation of the
process and training in the basic ideas of probability. After a process of calibra-
tion (which we discuss below) the expert is asked to make a series of statements
about the unknown quantity or quantities that reveal aspects of her underlying
subjective distribution. The facilitator or statistician ts a probability distribu-
tion to these summaries. Through an iterative process of feedback and checking
2We adopt the convention of referring to the expert as `she' and the facilitator as `he'.
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the elicited distribution is rened until the expert is condent that it reects her
judgements.
In the following sections we briey review some specic issues involved in the
elicitation process.
4.3.1 Probabilities versus distributions
Firstly, we make a distinction between the elicitation of distributions versus prob-
abilities. An expert may be asked to make a statement about some quantity, for
example the relative risk of death given drug A versus drug B, and here the use
of a probability distribution to represent the expert's beliefs about the relative
risk is clear. However, if the expert is asked to make a statement concerning a
single probability (\what is the probability that it will rain tomorrow?") then
it is sometimes helpful to consider the probability as representing a long run fre-
quency or proportion, about which the expert can express beliefs via a probability
distribution.
4.3.2 Calibration
It is helpful to have some measure of the `quality' of an expert's ability to make
probabilistic statements about unknowns. We may wish, for example, to weight
each of a group of experts according to how accurate they are in judging uncertain
quantities. Calibration refers to the process of comparing an expert's statements
with reality. The expert is asked to make a series of judgements about unrelated
quantities and then for each judgement a probability of some event is extracted
(e.g P (a <  < b), where  is the unknown quantity of interest). This results
in a set of probabilities. For the set of judgements concerning events in which
we have determined some event probability p we then compare p with the actual
relative frequency of those events. If the proportion of events is equal to p then
the expert is perfectly calibrated. Of note is the common nding that experts
are overcondent (for a set of events assigned probability 90%, only 60% occur),
and/or that they exhibit over-extremity (on low frequency events they place too
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low a probability, and on high frequency events they place too high a probability).
4.3.3 Specic methods for eliciting responses
There are a number of dierent methods for eliciting judgements that require the
expert to make statements about dierent, but related quantities. We will not
discuss this in detail, other than to note that since we are deriving a series of
statements of the form P (a <  < b), methods can focus on judging P given a
and b (xed interval methods), or focus on judging b (or a) given P and b (or a)
(variable interval methods).
4.3.4 Fitting a distribution
Once a series of statements of the form P (a <  < b) for dierent a and b are made
then a probability distribution can be `tted' which reects those statements. In
theory an innite number of statements of the form P (a <  < b) will need to be
made to properly determine the distribution of a continuous variable , and this
is one of the motivations for the Bayes linear approach in which only the rst two
moments are specied (Goldstein, 1992). However, in practice, we can usually
assume that beliefs are represented by smooth (usually uni-modal) distributions,
allowing a fully Bayesian approach.
If we choose to use a parametric distribution to represent the beliefs, then we
will be guided in choice of distribution by the nature of the uncertain quantity,
whether unrestricted over the whole real line, strictly non-negative or positive,
or bounded. Respectively we may choose for example, a normal, a gamma, and
a beta distribution to represent the experts probability judgements. Once the
distribution form is chosen, it is `tted' to the probability statements obtained
from the expert. The t will be exact if the expert's probability statements
uniquely determine a single distribution. If we have elicited more probability
statements than required to determine a unique distribution, then the t can be
based on a method such as least squares (this is called overtting, which we discuss
below).
CHAPTER 4. ELICITATION 77
4.3.5 Obtaining a `good' elicited distribution: feedback
and overtting
It is important to check with the expert that the distribution that is tted following
the initial elicitation does really represent her judgements. This can be done by
reporting back to the expert some of the implications of the tted distribution, a
process known as feedback. For example, if a N(5; 1) distribution is tted to reect
judgements about some unknown quantity , then the expert could be informed
that this implies that there is approximately only a 5% probability that the value
of  lies outside the interval (3; 7). The expert then has a chance to review her
initial statements if the implied distribution does not t her beliefs about .
Overtting is a somewhat dierent approach to obtaining a `good' representa-
tion of the expert's beliefs. Here, the expert is asked to make more statements that
are necessary to t the chosen form of parametric distribution. This (usually) then
results in a series of statements that are incompatible with a single distribution.
Fitting is then an optimisation problem whereby a single distribution is chosen
that best ts the range of statements made by the expert (e.g. via minimising a
sum of squared dierences, or sum of absolute dierences). The resulting distri-
bution is based on a greater number of pieces of information obtained from the
expert than in the simple approach, and as such might be expected to be a better
representation of her beliefs. Overtting also allows the checking of `residuals',
the dierences between the expert's probability statements and those implied by
the tted distribution. The presence of large residuals may imply either that the
distribution form does not reect the expert's beliefs very well, or that there are
inconsistencies in the expert's statements. In either case, further discussion with
the expert is necessary to ensure an adequate elicitation of beliefs.
4.3.6 Multivariate distributions
Elicitation of beliefs about independent quantities is hard. Elicitation of beliefs
about dependent quantities as even harder. Imagine we wish to learn the values
of two quantities: the ecacy of drug A relative to placebo (as a relative risk),
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and the proportion of patients taking the drug who will experience adverse eects
(again compared to placebo). We have reason to believe that there is a certain
action of the drug that causes both a component of the therapeutic eect and
an adverse eect. For the purposes of the elicitation the two uncertain quantities
are therefore not independent, and we must represent beliefs by a multivariate
distribution of some kind.
Immediately we envisage two problems. Firstly, how do we elicit beliefs about
dependent quantities, and secondly, how do we choose a distribution that reects
these beliefs? Important issues include the choice whether to elicit joint summaries
or conditional summaries, and whether or not it is helpful to elicit second moments
or correlation coecients directly (this can be dicult, see Kadane and Wolfson,
1998; Garthwaite et al., 2005).
There has been signicant work done to formalise methods for elicitation of
the parameters of a multivariate normal distribution (e.g. Garthwaite and Al-
Awadhi, 2001), and for the parameters of regression models (both linear and
GLM, see e.g. Kadane et al., 1980; Bedrick et al., 1996), but the research question
remains very much open. Moala and O'Hagan (2010) propose a general non-
parametric approach in which the expert's unknown multivariate density function
is modelled using a vague Gaussian process prior. The expert is asked to provide
certain (mainly marginal, but with some joint) summary quantities (probabilities
or quantiles, or perhaps means, etc). These are treated as data and a Bayesian
update performed to derive a posterior multivariate distribution that represents
the expert's beliefs. In chapter 6 we describe a similar Gaussian process based
approach for representing beliefs about the model error in a Markov model.
4.3.7 Uncertainty about uncertainty? Imprecision and the
need for sensitivity analysis
An expert can not precisely state her subjective probability for some event. It
is not reasonable to expect that she can meaningfully make a statement that her
probability is 0.1 rather than 0.11, or 0.1002342 say. Elicitation is not precise.
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And, even if the expert were able to make such precise statements, there would
still be the problem of tting the unique distribution that properly represents her
beliefs across the whole range of the uncertain quantity in question. For an expert
to specify her `true' distribution for a continuous quantity would require to be able
to specify perfectly an innite number of probabilities. This is not feasible, so, we
have epistemic uncertainty about the expert's beliefs.
In order to avoid the innite regress of specifying uncertainty about uncer-
tainty, O'Hagan and Oakley (2004) suggest that we consider the epistemic un-
certainty about the expert's distribution as being owned by the facilitator (or
`analyst'). The facilitator expresses his own prior beliefs about the expert's den-
sity function, which are then updated by the expert's beliefs in a formal Bayesian
analysis (see Oakley and O'Hagan, 2007). This approach implies that it is the an-
alyst's posterior uncertainty that is of interest, and that the expert is treated as a
source of (noisy) data. Of course, in reality, it is the decision maker's distribution
that will inform the decision. The decision maker may accept the distribution
that results from the elicitation exercise and adopt it as their own if they have
very weak prior knowledge (or perhaps more likely, they accept the elicited dis-
tribution if it does not conict with the distribution they, in some informal sense,
elicit from themselves). This approach of treating the expert's elicited summaries
as data does not entirely solve the imprecision problem since the facilitator's (or
decision maker's) prior distribution is only an imprecise representation of their
own uncertainty. The dierence is that, in the case of the decision maker, they
own the problem, and therefore choose in some sense to live with the consequences
of the imprecise nature of their own probability statements.
A more informal approach to the problem of elicitation imprecision is to take
a range of distributions that may reect the expert's beliefs and determine the
sensitivity of the resulting inference or decision to changes in the uncertainty
specication. If the choice does not materially aect the outcome, then this is
reassuring.
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4.4 Elicitation in health services and medical re-
search
Formally elicited expert knowledge has been used in a diverse range of settings
within health services and medical research. We note the following practical appli-
cations of elicitation. In drug trials it has been used to inform patient allocation
in a clinical trial (Kadane, 1994); sample size (Oremus et al., 2002); dosage sched-
ules and dose response in early phase trials (Morita, 2011; Zohar et al., 2011); and
cancer survival in a phase 3 trial (Hiance et al., 2009). Elicitation has also been
used in the meta analysis of trial results to augment missing data (White et al.,
2008), and to `bias adjust' studies (Turner et al., 2009).
Within the eld of epidemiology, elicitation has been used to make judgements
about the outcomes of patients for whom follow-up data are incomplete (Shardell
et al., 2008; Paddock and Ebener, 2009), as well as in the context of studies
that assess the health benets of air quality control (Kinney et al., 2010). In
the occupational health setting elicitation has been used to assess the probability
of nickel exposure in the workplace (Ramachandran et al., 2003), and in health
services management, the risk of clinical untoward events in a hospital pharmacy
department (Cagliano et al., 2011).
4.4.1 Elicitation in cost-eectiveness studies
There are very few reports in the literature of the use of elicitation to inform
parameters specically for the purposes of a cost-eectiveness analysis3 despite
Stevens and O'Hagan (2002)'s call for its adoption. Five years later Leal et al.
(2007) noted the lack of the use of formal elicitation methods in health economic
evaluation studies, and developed a practical computer based elicitation tool with
the aim of introducing theoretically sound methods into practice. The tool was
3We note that in the context of health economic evaluation the term elicitation is commonly
used to describe the process of obtaining health state preferences (e.g. Ryan et al., 2001). This
is not elicitation in the sense in which we use the term to mean the assessment of subjective
uncertainty, but rather describes the collection of data on individuals' preferences without any
assessment of their uncertainty.
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tested in an application in which six experts made judgements about a set of
parameters required for a cost-eectiveness model for the diagnosis of hypertrophic
cardiomyopathy. The invited experts reported that although the elicitation task
was dicult, the process was straightforward.
A `real life' application of elicitation is described in Girling et al. (2007) where
informative priors were obtained from a group of experts for parameters that
represented perioperative mortality and median survival in patients who were t-
ted with a left ventricular assist device. The device was deemed unlikely to be
cost eective at $30,000/QALY, largely due to its high cost of $60,000. Even if
the device were to be given away free there was still substantial decision uncer-
tainty, driven primarily by the uncertainty in the survival benets of the device.
The elicited priors were therefore important in determining the expected value
of perfect information, which was reported as being greater than the cost of an
randomised controlled trial under certain assumptions. The authors made the
following (rather tongue in cheek) observation about their results:
\The subjective nature of the cost-eectiveness probabilities means
that healthcare providers may view them with little more than aca-
demic interest..."
This probably reects a reality that properly elicited subjective information is
likely to be treated with scepticism in the health care allocation decision process,
even though the NICE health technology assessment methods guide explicitly
invites the use of formal elicitation methods (NICE, 2009).
Bojke et al. (2010) elicited progression rates for psoriatic arthritis in patients
on treatment with anti-tumour necrosis factor and after treatment failure in order
to populate a cost-eectiveness model. They found that the results (expressed as
incremental cost-eectiveness ratios) were sensitive to the method used to derive a
single distribution given multiple experts. This highlights the problem, inherent in
all group elicitation exercises, of how to derive a single distribution from multiple
experts.
We will not discuss multiple expert elicitation at length, other than to note
that methods for combining opinion fall into two broad categories: mathemat-
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ical or behavioural. Mathematical methods construct a single distribution p()
from the experts densities fp1(); : : : ; pn()g, for example by linear pooling where
p() =
Pn
i=1wipi() for some set of weights w1; : : : ; wn (O'Hagan et al., 2006). Or
the density may be derived using formal Bayesian methods (known in this con-
text as supra-Bayesian methods), an approach rst proposed by Morris (1974).
Behavioural aggregation approaches attempt to elicit a single distribution from
the group of experts, who may or may not use a formal consensus generating
procedure (e.g. Delphi, or Nominal Group Technique).
Recently, Soares et al. (2011) described a comprehensive elicitation study to
inform the parameters for a cost-eectiveness study of pressure ulcer treatments.
Notably, this ambitious project showed that it is feasible to elicit from front line
health care workers the range of quantities necessary to parameterise a three state
Markov model with time varying transition probabilities. Twenty three nurses
took part in the exercise and distributions were pooled (with equal weighting),
despite highly discordant judgements about some quantities. Again, the problem
of how to derive a single distribution from multiple experts was not easy to resolve.
Finally, two further cost-eectiveness studies of note are Stevenson et al.
(2008), in which parameters concerning vCJD epidemiology and surgical instru-
ment decontamination were elicited in order to populate a patient level simulation
model, and Stevenson et al. (2009), in which beliefs about the long term ecacy
of an osteoporosis treatment were elicited. In this latter study, the purpose of
the economic model was explicitly to guide a decision on whether a randomised
controlled trial to establish the long term ecacy was cost-eective, rather than
guiding the drug adoption decision itself.
4.4.2 Elicitation and model uncertainty
Health economic model uncertainty may not be resolvable using data for the
reasons we have explained in chapter 3. Elicitation therefore has the potential
to play an important role in managing this source of uncertainty, but at present
there are very few published descriptions of its use in this context. In Bojke
et al. (2009)'s paper on the characterisation of structural uncertainty the authors
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suggest that expert elicitation could be used to derive distributions for model
weights for the purposes of averaging, or alternatively to provide distributions for
parameters that control choices between competing sub-models within a larger
model that encompasses the smaller models as special cases.
This approach was tested in the Bojke et al. (2010) paper described above. The
uncertainty in the psoriatic arthritis study was described as `structural', reecting
the approach of replacing a set of models that dier with respect to a set of
`structual' assumptions with a single model that contains uncertain parameters
that `index' the assumptions. The newly introduced parameters are then the
subject of an elicitation exercise, and the value of learning them can be established
using standard methods (see also the related paper, Jackson et al., 2011).
The use of elicitation to inform model weights was tested by Negrn and
Vazquez-Polo (2008) in a cost-eectiveness study of anti-retroviral treatment reg-
imens for HIV. The competing models were identical except for the parameteri-
sation of two linear regression equations that related costs and health eects to a
series of patient level covariates. Experts were asked to judge, for each covariate,
the probability that it should be included in the model. Models were then aver-
aged over this (joint) distribution. It is not clear from the paper how easy the
experts found this task. Eliciting beliefs about the probability that a covariate
should be included in a regression is quite removed from asking an expert to make
a statement about an observable quantity.
4.4.3 Some other challenges
In the clinical encounter, health care professionals are used to sequentially updat-
ing prior beliefs (knowledge of the background prevalence of disease in the present-
ing patient) with data in the form of the patient history, then data in the form of
examination ndings and nally data in the form of test results. Decision making
under uncertainty and the ideas underlying Bayesian prior to posterior analysis
are therefore not alien to practitioners and researchers in the eld (see for example
O'Connor and Sox, 1991). Quite properly there are reservations about the use of
a prior distribution derived from an expert with a conict of interest (it is not ap-
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propriate to ask a drug company sponsor for their prior beliefs about the ecacy
of their new drug), but this should not prevent the use of elicitation per se (as ar-
gued by Stevens and O'Hagan, 2002). However, despite the comfort practitioners
may have with Bayesian decision making, there are still widespread objections to
the use of subjective information in health related research, as summed up by the
following from pharmaceutical statistician Senn (2008):
\... the gloomy conclusion to which I am drawn on reading de Finetti
(1974) is that ultimately the Bayesian theory is destructive of any form
of public statistics."
A recent review of the use of elicitation by Johnson et al. (2010) found that
although there were now a reasonable number of studies (33 at that point) in the
health and medical literature, there had been very little evaluation of the methods
that had been employed. Given the hostility to the explicit use of subjective infor-
mation in medical decision making (as encapsulated in Senn's statement above)
we would do well not to underestimate the importance of ensuring the quality of
the elicitation process.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have reviewed the process of eliciting expert judgements about
uncertain quantities in probabilistic form. We have reviewed some of the applica-
tions of elicitation in health services and medical research as well as specically
in health economic evaluation. We have seen that formal elicitation methods,
though well described in the methodological literature, are not yet established
in routine research practice. Of concern is the general lack of evaluation of the
process where elicitation has been used. This makes it somewhat dicult to de-
termine at present how robust the process of elicitation is when used in every day
research practice.
A number of studies reported experts as describing the task of making judge-
ments about unknown quantities as dicult, even if the elicitation process was
straightforward. This diculty is likely to increase with the complexity of the
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elicitation exercise, and particularly when there are many uncertain quantities
with a complicated dependency structure. This makes the application of formal
elicitation methods to the problem of making judgements about computer model
error potentially daunting.
In the next chapter we introduce a method for incorporating judgements about
model discrepancy into the analysis for a decision problem. We illustrate the
method in two case studies in which model discrepancy distributions were derived
in a rather informal process of `self-elicitation'. This elicitation approach was
deemed sucient for the purposes of this initial `proof of concept' piece of work,
but it is not clear whether informal self-elicitation would be sucient in a real
application. We suspect though that any serious consideration of potential model
error will add value to the modelling process. How we might elicit such judgements
in a real application is an open question, and we return to this point in chapter 8.
Chapter 5
Case Study 1 - Managing
Structural Uncertainty in a
Decision Tree Model
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter1 we propose a method for quantifying model error in a health eco-
nomic model, and demonstrate the application of the method in a simple decision
tree cost-eectiveness model. We have seen in chapter 3 that making judgements
about model error is dicult, particularly in the context of health economic eval-
uation where there are no observations on the model output against which to
calibrate the model. However, one advantage that health economic modellers do
perhaps have over other modellers is the relative simplicity of their models. Health
economic models tend to be `white box' models that can be `opened up' and ex-
amined, unlike the highly complex models used, say, in climate science. Does
this ability to easily comprehend the internal structure of the model allow us to
make more informed statements about the model error than by just considering
the model output?
We propose a method for quantifying model discrepancy based on decompos-
1The content of this chapter is published as Strong M., Oakley J.E. and Chilcott, J. (2012).
Managing structural uncertainty in health economic decision models: a discrepancy approach.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series C (Applied Statistics). In press.
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ing the cost-eectiveness model into a series of sub-functions, and considering
potential error at the sub-function level, rather than at the model output level.
We then use a variance based sensitivity analysis to locate the important sources
of discrepancy within the model in order to guide model renement. The resulting
improved model is judged to contain less structural error, and the distribution on
the model output better reects our true uncertainty about the costs and eects
of the intervention.
In section x5.2 we introduce the model that forms the basis for our case study.
The model is a modied version of a cost-eectiveness model that was published
by the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and used
to inform a decision concerning interventions to promote physical activity in a
sedentary population (NICE, 2006). We nish the section by reporting the `base
case' results without any assessment of structural uncertainty. In section x5.3 we
propose a method for managing structural uncertainty, and then in section x5.4
describe the application of the method to the case study model. We report results
of the discrepancy analysis in section x5.5.
5.2 The base case model: a physical activity in-
tervention cost-eectiveness model
Our simplied version of the NICE physical activity intervention cost-eectiveness
model aims to predict the incremental net benet of two competing decision op-
tions: exercise on prescription (e.g. from a general medical practitioner) to pro-
mote physical activity (the `intervention', d = 2), and a `do nothing' scenario
(`no intervention', d = 1). We assume that the intervention impacts on health
by reducing the risks of three diseases: coronary heart disease (CHD), stroke and
diabetes and we wish to include in the model health eects that relate to these
three diseases. We are interested in costs that accrue as a result of the treatment
of the three diseases, as well as those that relate to the intervention itself. The
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net benet under decision option d 2 (1; 2) is
NBd = Qd   Cd (5.1)
where Qd is the population mean per person health eect measured in Quality
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), Cd is the population mean per person cost, and  is
the NICE `threshold' monetary value of one QALY (as discussed in section x2.15).
Our target quantity is the incremental net benet of decision 2 over decision 1,
measured in monetary units. This is dened as
Z = NB2  NB1: (5.2)
The decision maker's utility for decision option 2 over option 1 is taken to be
equal to Z, the incremental net benet, and we assume the constraints of the
NICE Reference Case (section x2.15).
5.2.1 Description of `base case' model - no assessment of
structural uncertainty
The model is a simple static cohort model which can be viewed as a decision tree
(gure 5.1). The left-most node represents the two decision options, d = 1, no
intervention, and d = 2, the exercise prescription intervention. The rst `chance'
node represents the proportion of the population who undertake new exercise
under each decision option, with the second node representing the proportion
of the population who maintain exercise, conditional on starting new exercise.
The third node represents the proportion of the population who experience eight
mutually exclusive health states conditional on each of the three outcomes from
the rst two nodes: exercise that is maintained, exercise that is not maintained,
and no exercise (sedentary lifestyle).
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Figure 5.1: The model expressed as a decision tree
The structure of the model represents our beliefs about the causal links be-
tween the intervention and exercise, and exercise and health outcomes. There are
no data available that relate to the model outputs; we have not observed costs
and health outcomes for control and treatment groups on the exercise interven-
tion. However, separate data sources are available regarding the eectiveness of
the intervention in promoting exercise, and the risks of the various disease out-
comes for active versus sedentary patients, and the availability of such data has
guided the choice of model structure.
In our model each comorbid health state (e.g. the state of CHD and stroke)
is treated as having a single onset point in time. Individuals do not progress, say,
from the disease free state, to CHD and then to CHD plus stroke as they might
do in reality. This is clearly unrealistic and is a consequence of the choice to use a
very simple decision tree structure. Modelling sequential events is possible using a
decision tree structure, but the number of terminal tree branches quickly becomes
very large in all but the simplest of problems (Sonnenberg and Beck, 1993). A
Markov or discrete event model structure would be more suited to addressing our
decision problem (see Karnon (2003) for a comparison of these methods), but
we have chosen to retain the important features of the structure of the model
published by NICE, upon which our case study is based (NICE, 2006).
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We denote the set of eight health states, disease free, CHD alone, stroke alone,
diabetes alone, CHD and stroke, CHD and diabetes, stroke and diabetes, CHD and
stroke and diabetes as H = fhi; i = 1; : : : ; 8g, where i indexes the set in the order
given above. Each of the eight health states hi 2 H, under each decision option d,
has a cost cid (measured in $), a health eect (measured in Quality Adjusted Life
Years) qid, and a probability of occurrence id (as approximated by the relative
frequency with which this health state occurs within a large cohort). Total costs
and total health eects for decision d are obtained by summing over health states,
i.e. Cd =
P
i=1 n
8cidid and Qd =
P8
i=1 qidid. Given these, the model predicted
incremental net benet, Y is
Y = (Q2  Q1)  (C2   C1) = Q C: (5.3)
To relate the notation we have introduced here back to that of chapter 2, we
note that the relevant outcomes for health state i under decision d are the costs,
cid and health eects qid, i.e. that oid = fcid; qidg.
The costs cid, health eects qid, and health state probabilities id are not
themselves input parameters in the model, but instead are functions of input pa-
rameters. There are 24 uncertain and three xed input parameters that relate to
the costs, quality of life and epidemiology of CHD, stroke and diabetes, and the
eectiveness of the intervention in increasing physical activity. These inputs are
denoted X = (X1; : : : ; X27), and uncertainty is represented via the joint distri-
bution p(X). Finally, we denote the deterministic function that links the model
inputs to the model output as f , i.e. Y = f(X), and call this the base case model.
5.2.2 Input distributions
Our case study, although for illustrative purposes only, is based on a published
model (NICE, 2006). However, the original modelling document did not contain
enough information to allow us to derive distributions for all uncertain inputs.
Where information was insucient we derived plausible distributions through an
informal elicitation process. The input distributions are described in tables 5.1
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and 5.2. Starred entries denote those inputs for which distributions were derived
through informal elicitation.
Where we had only point estimates for inputs we considered the following
as plausible: costs were Gamma distributed with variance equal to the mean;
counts of cases were Poisson distributed; the correlation between the proportion
of the sedentary cohort who began new exercise in the intervention group and the
corresponding proportion in the non-intervention group was 0.5; the correlation
between the proportion of the new exercise cohort who maintained exercise in
the intervention group and the corresponding proportion in the non-intervention
group was 0.9; the standard deviations for the mean age of onset of disease and
mean ages of death from the three diseases were all 2 years.
The input parameters that relate to the eectiveness of the intervention in
increasing physical activity were estimated from a randomised controlled trial
(Lamb et al., 2002), cited in the modelling document (NICE, 2006). The observed
relative eectiveness would therefore be expected to be a reasonable estimate of
the `true' relative eectiveness in a similar population to that recruited to the
Lamb et al. (2002) trial. In contrast, the inputs that relate to the risks of disease
conditional on exercise status were estimated from observational studies, and those
estimates are therefore more prone to bias and confounding. For the purposes of
our analysis, however, we assume that the distributions in table 5.1 represent
our best judgements about the inputs, given the limitations of the studies from
which they were obtained. Clearly, there is a large medical statistics literature
that relates to the problem of estimating treatment eects in trials, and similarly a
large epidemiology literature that relates to the problem of estimating associations
between risk factors and disease in observational studies.
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Table 5.1: Uncertain inputs and their distributions
Input Label Description Distribution Hyperparameters
X1 c0 Intervention cost ($) Gamma shape=100; scale=1
X2 tchd Total NHS costs (2005) for CHD ($) Gamma sh=3:677109; sc=1
X3 tstr Total NHS costs (2005) for stroke ($) Gamma sh=2:872109; sc=1
X4 tdm Total NHS costs (2005) for diabetes
($)
Gamma sh=5:314109; sc=1
X5 nchd Number of UK cases of CHD Poisson  = 2:60 106
X6 nstr Number of UK cases of stroke Poisson  = 1:40 106
X7 ndm Number of UK cases of diabetes Poisson  = 1:53 106
X8 q
(dec)
chd Discounted decremental health eect
for CHD (QALYs)
Normal  = 6:71;  = 0:048
X9 q
(dec)
str Discounted decremental health eect
for stroke (QALYs)
Normal  = 10:23;  = 0:048
X10 q
(dec)
dm Discounted decremental health eect
for DM (QALYs)
Normal  = 2:08;  = 0:048
X11 p
(ex)
1 Proportion of sedentary cohort who
begin new exercise in non-intervention
group
9>=>; MVN
 = 0:246;  = 0:038
 = 0:5
X12 p
(ex)
2 Proportion of sedentary cohort who
begin new exercise in intervention
group
 = 0:294;  = 0:040
X13 p
(mnt)
1 Proportion of new exercise cohort who
maintain exercise in non-intervention
group
9>=>; MVN
 = 0:5;  = 0:1
 = 0:9
X14 p
(mnt)
2 Proportion of new exercise cohort who
maintain exercise in intervention group
 = 0:5;  = 0:1
X15 r
(sed)
chd Risk of CHD in a sedentary group Beta  = 80;  = 385
X16 r
(sed)
str Risk of stroke in a sedentary group Beta  = 226;  = 4072
X17 r
(sed)
dm Risk of diabetes in a sedentary group Beta  = 346;  = 3344
X18 RRchd Relative risk of CHD in active vs
sedentary pop
Lognormal  = 0:666;  = 0:130
X19 RRstr Relative risk of stroke in active vs
sedentary pop
Lognormal  = 0:720;  = 0:343
X20 RRdm Relative risk of diabetes in active vs
sedentary pop
Lognormal  = 0:710;  = 0:123
X21 age
(onst) Average age of onset of disease (same
for all diseases)
Normal  = 57:5;  = 2
X22 age
(dth)
chd Average age of death for CHD (years) Normal  = 71;  = 2
X23 age
(dth)
str Average age of death for stroke (years) Normal  = 59;  = 2
X24 age
(dth)
dm Average age of death for diabetes
(years)
Normal  = 61;  = 2
Table 5.2: Fixed inputs
Input Label Description Value
X25 age
(int) Average age of cohort at time of intervention (years) 50
X26  Discount rate (per year) 0.035
X27  NICE threshold for value of 1 QALY ($/QALY) 20,000
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5.2.3 Base case model results
The model function (which we describe in detail in section x5.4) was implemented
in R (R Development Core Team, 2010). We sampled the input space and ran the
model 100,000 times. The mean of the model output, Y , at =$20,000/QALY
was $247 and the 95% credible interval was (-$315, $1002). The probability that
the intervention is cost-eective, P (INB > 0), at  =$20,000 was 0.77. Results
for the base case model are shown graphically in gure 5.2
Figure 5.2 shows the cost-eectiveness plane (with 100 Monte Carlo samples).
The sloped line shows the NICE threshold of $20,000 per QALY. To aid clarity
gure 5.2b is a contour plot representation of the cost-eectiveness plane, showing
the 95th percentile of an empirical kernel density estimate of the joint distribu-
tion of costs and eects. Figure 5.2c shows the cost-eectiveness acceptability
curve (i.e. a plot of P (INB > 0) against ) for values of  from $0/QALY to
$40,000/QALY. Finally, gure 5.2d shows the kernel density estimate for Y , the
base case model estimate of the incremental net benet at  =$20,000.
The expected population mean incremental net benet of $247 implies that
the intervention will accrue costs and health eects that have a positive net value
of $247 per person treated (assuming that a QALY is valued at $20,000). The
probabilistic sensitivity analysis implies that, at =$20,000/QALY, a choice to
recommend the intervention would have a probability of 0.77 of being better than
the choice not to recommend.
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Figure 5.2: Base case model output shown as (a) cost-eectiveness plane (b)
cost-eectiveness plane contour plot (c) cost-eectiveness acceptability curve (d)
incremental net benet empirical density.
5.3 Managing uncertainty due to structure: a
discrepancy approach
Given a model, written as a function f , with (uncertain) inputs X, we link the
model output Y = f(X) to the true, but unknown value of the target quantity
we wish to predict, Z via
Z = f(X) + z; (5.4)
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The discrepancy term, z, quanties the structural error : the dierence between
the output of the model evaluated at its true inputs and the true target quantity.
For the decision maker to base their decision on the model output, the model
must have credibility. The model must be judged good enough to support the
decision being made. The primary goal of our analysis is therefore to provide
a means for quantifying judgements about structural error and specically to
determine the relative importance of structural compared to input uncertainty in
addressing the decision problem. If uncertainty about structural error is large then
we may wish to review the model structure. Conversely, if we can demonstrate
that the uncertainty about structural error is small in comparison to that due to
input uncertainty, then we have a stronger claim to have built a credible model.
In building the base case model we made a series of assumptions, for example
we assumed that occurrences of CHD, stroke and diabetes are independent at the
level of the individual and therefore that disease risks act multiplicatively. Such
assumptions drive the structural choices that we make when formulating a model,
and incorrect assumptions will lead to structural error. We must therefore focus
our attention on the assumptions within a model if we are to assess its adequacy
and properly quantify our uncertainty about the target quantity.
We therefore propose a method for deriving a distribution for the model dis-
crepancy, z, as dened in equation (5.4). In contrast to the model averaging
approach (chapter 3) we do not attempt to make assessments about the adequacy
of the model structure in relation to alternative structures; we instead assess how
large an error might be due to the structure of the model at hand.
5.3.1 Discrepancy between model output and reality
Making meaningful judgements about the model discrepancy will be dicult,
though it should always be possible to make a crude evaluation of a plausible
range of orders of magnitude of z, for example by asking questions like `could
the true incremental net benet of decision 1 over decision 2 be a billion pounds
greater than that predicted by the model, or a million pounds greater, or only a
hundred pounds greater?'. However, it may be easier to make judgements about
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z indirectly. If we consider f in more detail we may be able to determine where in
the model structural errors are likely to be located, and what their consequences
might be. We therefore propose making judgements about discrepancy at the
sub-function level.
5.3.2 Discrepancy at the `sub-function' level
Any model f , except the most trivial, can be decomposed into a series of sub-
functions that link the model inputs to the model output. To illustrate, gure
5.3a shows a hypothetical model with ten inputs, Y = f(X1; : : : ; X10), that aims
to predict a quantity Z. The model has been decomposed into a series of sub-
functions, for example Y1 = f1(X1; X2; X3) and Y2 = f2(X4; X5), revealing a set
of six `intermediate' parameters Y1; : : : ; Y6 that have `true' values Z1; : : : ; Z6.
For each sub-function, we ask the question `would this sub-function, if evalu-
ated at the true values of its inputs, result in the true value of the sub-function
output?'. If not then we recognise potential structural error and introduce an
uncertain discrepancy term, j, either on the additive scale, i.e. Yj = fj()+ j, or
multiplicative scale, i.e. log(Yj) = logffj()g + log(j). The idea is that, because
each sub-function represents a much simpler process than the full model f , mak-
ing judgements about discrepancy in fj will be easier than making judgements
about discrepancy in f .
Repeating the process for all sub-functions in the model will leave us with a
series of n discrepancy terms, which we denote  = (1; : : : ; n). Note that for
some sub-functions we will judge there is no structural error, usually when an
intermediate parameter is by denition equal to the sub-function that generates
it.
Returning to our hypothetical model, we judge there to be structural error
in three of the sub-functions, and therefore introduce three discrepancy terms to
correct the error. The three terms are introduced on the additive scale giving:
Z1 = Y1+ 1; Z5 = Y5+ 2 and Z6 = Y6+ 3. Figure 5.3b shows the incorporation
of the three uncertain discrepancy terms.
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Figure 5.3: (a) Hypothetical model with ten inputs and one output, decomposed
to reveal six intermediate parameters. (b) We suppose that there is structural
error in the sub-functions that result in Y1, Y5 and Y6. Three discrepancy terms
are added to correct the error, i.e. Z1 = Y1 + 1; Z5 = Y5 + 2 and Z6 = Y6 + 3.
There will usually not be a unique decomposition of the model f into a series
of sub-functions that links the model inputs X to the model output Y . However,
some decompositions will be more useful than others for assessing discrepancy.
Following the advice that it is preferable to elicit beliefs about observable quan-
tities (Kadane and Wolfson, 1998; O'Hagan et al., 2006), we search for decompo-
sitions where both inputs and outputs of the sub-functions are observable.
Once we have introduced discrepancy terms at the locations within the model
where we judge there is potential structural error, we must make judgements about
the discrepancies via the specication of the joint probability distribution p(X; ).
We assume in our case study that discrepancies are independent of inputs, such
that we can factorise the joint density p(X; )=p(X)p(). This independence
assumption does not need to hold for the discrepancy method to be valid, but
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specication of p() independent of p(X) will clearly be easier than specifying
p(X; ) where there is dependence.
Even if we are able to assume that discrepancies are independent of inputs, we
will need to think quite hard about the correlation structure in the discrepancies
themselves. For example, in gure 5.3b the discrepancy term 1 is `proximal' to 2.
We are assuming that we have correctly specied 1 when we specify 2. We are
also (implicitly here) assuming that the joint distribution on the inputs, p(X), is
properly specied. This may have required introducing discrepancy components
even more `proximally' at the level of the model inputs. This provides a nice link
to Turner et al. (2009)'s work on bias modelling.
In specifying p() we begin by considering the mean and variance for each
discrepancy term j; j = 1; : : : ; n. In our case study we make judgements about
the sizes of the discrepancies relative to the mean values of the corresponding
intermediate parameters, and set variances such that
p
var(j) = vjjE(Yj)j, with
vj chosen to reect our judgements. Determining plausible values for vj may not
be a trivial task, a point to which we return later. We treat each j as independent
of all other uncertain quantities, unless there are constraints that prevent this (a
constraint would arise, for example, in relation to a set of population proportion
parameters that must sum to one) or unless there are good reasons to assume
strong correlation between terms. Finally we select appropriate distributions with
the specied means and variances.
Propagating the uncertainty we have specied for  through the model, along
with the uncertainty in the inputs, X, allows us to check that the uncertainty in
Z that our specication of p() implies is plausible. If this is not the case then
we must rethink our choice of distributions for the components of , most easily
through altering our choices for vj.
The sub-function discrepancy approach has two important consequences. Firstly,
if we can adequately make judgements about all the discrepancy terms in the
model (there may be many) then we will derive p(z) and hence be able to make
statements about our uncertainty about the incremental net benet that incorpo-
rates beliefs about both inputs and structure. Perhaps more usefully though, we
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can use sensitivity analysis techniques to investigate the relative importance of the
dierent structural errors, allowing us improve the parts of the model where this
is most needed. If, after repeating the sensitivity analysis in our improved model,
we nd that discrepancies now have a lesser impact on the output uncertainty,
then we have in an important sense built a more robust model structure.
5.4 Applying the sub-function discrepancy method
to our physical activity model
We now return to our base case physical activity model, and beginning at the net
benet equation (5.3), work `backwards' through the model, assessing potential
structural error at each sub-function.
5.4.1 Assessment of sub-function generating the output
parameter Y
The model output, Y predicts the incremental net benet,
Y = (Q2  Q1)  (C2   C1) = Q C: (5.5)
Evaluation of equation (5.5) at the true values of Q and C would, by denition,
result in the true value of the incremental net benet, Z, so there is no structural
error at this point in the model, and therefore no discrepancy term. We take as
given that the two decision options are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, but
clearly, if this were not to be so, then this would be a (possibly very important)
source of structural error.
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5.4.2 Assessment of sub-function generating the interme-
diate parameter Q
The incremental health eect of the intervention over the non-intervention, Q
is
Q =
8X
i=1
i2qi2  
8X
i=1
i1qi1; (5.6)
where id and qid are the probabilities and discounted health eects in QALYs
respectively for health state i under decision d. Future health eects (and future
costs) are discounted to reect time preference whereby higher value is placed
on benets that occur in the near future than on those occurring in the distant
future. See Krahn and Gafni (1993) for a discussion of the role of discounting in
health economic evaluation.
Health eects for each state i are assumed to be equal under each decision d,
i.e. that qi1 = qi2 = qi. The total health eects are
Q = Q2  Q1 (5.7)
=
8X
i=1
i2qi  
8X
i=1
i1qi (5.8)
=
8X
i=1
(i2   i1)qi (5.9)
=
8X
i=1
(i2   i1)(qi   q1) (5.10)
=
8X
i=1
(i2   i1)q(dec)i ; (5.11)
where the nal term is a re-expression in terms of the decremental health eect,
q
(dec)
i relative to the disease free state i = 1.
We ask the question, `given the true values of id and qi, does (5.7) result in
the true value of Q?'. Because we imagine that the intervention could have an
impact on a number of diseases other than CHD, stroke and diabetes we recognise
potential structural error and introduce an uncertain additive discrepancy term,
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Q into (5.7), which becomes
Q =
8X
i=1
(i2   i1)q(dec)i + Q: (5.12)
Since exercise can result in poor health outcomes as well as good outcomes,
for example through musculo-skeletal injuries or accidents, we specify a mean of
zero for Q. We could assume a non-zero mean for Q if we felt that increased
exercise was likely to be on balance benecial. This will have the eect of shifting
the mean of the model output unless the sub-function related to the discrepancy
is entirely unimportant.
We judge that Q is unlikely to be more than 10% of Q, and we represent
our beliefs about Q using a normal distribution with a standard deviation equal
to 5% of the mean of Q, i.e. Q  N[0; f0:05 E(Q)g2].
5.4.3 Assessment of sub-function generating the interme-
diate parameter C
The incremental cost of the intervention over the non-intervention, C is
C =
8X
i=1
i2ci2  
8X
i=1
i1ci1; (5.13)
where id and cid are the probabilities and discounted costs respectively that are
associated with health state i under decision d.
Costs, not including the cost of the intervention itself c0, are assumed to be
equal across decision arms, i.e. that ci2 = ci1 + c0, and therefore that
C =
8X
i=1
i2(ci1 + c0) 
8X
i=1
i1ci1 (5.14)
= c0 +
8X
i=1
(i2   i1)ci1; (5.15)
where c0 is a model input.
As above, there may be costs that relate to diseases other than CHD, stroke
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and diabetes that are not included in C and we therefore introduce an additive
discrepancy term, C , and specify that C  N[0; f0:05 E(C)g2].
5.4.4 Assessment of sub-function generating the interme-
diate parameters ci1
The intermediate parameters ci1 represent the discounted cost associated with
the eight health states under decision 1. In the base case model the costs for
the eight states are derived from the costs associated with the three individual
diseases, with costs for comorbid states assumed to be the sum of the costs for
the constituent diseases, i.e.
c1;1 = cwell; (5.16)
c2;1 = cchd; (5.17)
c3;1 = cstr; (5.18)
c4;1 = cdm; (5.19)
c5;1 = cchd + cstr; (5.20)
c6;1 = cchd + cdm; (5.21)
c7;1 = cstr + cdm; (5.22)
c8;1 = cchd + cstr + cdm: (5.23)
Costs may not be additive in this way, so we introduce additive discrepancy
terms, cj , for the intermediate parameters that relate to the comorbid states,
ci1 i = 5; : : : ; 8 (equations (5.20) to (5.23)).
We judge that comorbid state costs could be higher or lower than the sum of
the constituent costs, so we assumed a mean of zero for each discrepancy term,
ci ; i = 5; : : : ; 8. We represent beliefs about ci via ci  N[0; f0:05E(ci1)g2]; i =
5; : : : ; 8.
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5.4.5 Assessment of sub-function generating the interme-
diate parameters cchd, cstr and cdm
The discounted costs for CHD, stroke and diabetes are
ck = c

k  k; (5.24)
where k indexes the set fCHD; stroke; diabetesg. Costs (other than the cost of the
intervention) are assumed to occur at some time in the future, and are discounted
at 3.5% per year. The parameters ck represent undiscounted costs, and k, are
the discounting factors for the length of time between the intervention and the
occurrence of the relevant health outcomes.
Given true values for ck and k equation (5.24) will result in a true value for
ck, and there is no structural error at this point.
5.4.6 Assessment of sub-function generating the interme-
diate parameters cchd, c

str and c

dm
The undiscounted mean per-person lifetime costs for CHD, stroke and diabetes
are
ck =
tk
nk

age
(dth)
k   age(onst)k

; (5.25)
where k indexes the set fCHD; stroke; diabetesg, and where tk are total annual
NHS costs for disease k, and where nk are UK prevalent cases of disease k for the
same year. The parameters tk; nk; age
(dth)
k and age
(onst) are model inputs.
Mean per person undiscounted costs are calculated as the mean per person
annual NHS cost multiplied by the mean length of time in the disease state. If
the per person per year cost of disease is dependent on the length of time the
individual spends in the disease state (e.g. if costs are greater near to the end of
life), then cchd, c

str and c

dm as calculated will not equal the mean per person per
year costs. To properly calculate the mean we need to know the joint distribution
of the costs and length of time in the disease state. To account for the dierence
we introduce discrepancy terms ck .
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We judge that disease costs could in reality be higher or lower than the mod-
elled costs as a result of the structural error, so we assume a mean of zero for
each discrepancy term, ck . We represent beliefs about ck via ck  N[0; f0:05
E(ck)g2].
5.4.7 Assessment of sub-function generating the interme-
diate parameters chd, str and dm
The discounting factors for CHD, stroke and diabetes are
k = (1 + )
 lk ; (5.26)
where lk is the mean length of life remaining at the time of intervention for disease
k 2 fCHD; stroke; diabetesg, and  is the per-year discount rate for both costs
and health eects. The mean length of life remaining, lk, is given by
lk =
1
2

age
(onst)
k + age
(dth)
k

  age(int); (5.27)
where age
(onst)
k is the mean age of onset of disease k, age
(dth)
k is the mean age of
death from disease k and age(int) is the mean age of the cohort at the time of the
intervention. The parameters ; age
(dth)
k ; age
(onst)
k and age
(int) are model inputs.
In the base case model we assume that the costs of each disease will be realised
at a time midway between the average age of disease onset, and the average age
of death from that disease. This is not necessarily true and we introduce additive
discrepancy terms k .
Discount factors must lie in (0; 1], and so discrepancies must lie in ( k; 1 k].
To satisfy this constraint we assume that k+ k follows a beta distribution. We
have no reason to believe that the true values of the discount rates will be higher
or lower than the modelled values, so we assume that k has mean zero for all k.
As above, we assume that the standard deviation is 5% of the mean value of the
intermediate parameter, i.e. that
p
var(k) = 0:05E(k).
The more general Dirichlet distribution specication of uncertainty is required
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for other discrepancy terms in the model, so for brevity we treat k + k and
1   (k + k) as `sum-to-one' parameters and the beta distribution as a special
case of the Dirichlet distribution. We describe in section x5.4.12 how we chose
Dirichlet distribution hyperparameters to satisfy these requirements.
5.4.8 Assessment of sub-function generating the interme-
diate parameters q
(dec)
i
The intermediate parameters q
(dec)
i represent the discounted decremental health
eects (in QALYs) associated with the eight health states. In the base case model
these terms are derived from the discounted decremental health eects associated
with the three individual diseases, with decremental eects for comorbid states
assumed to be the sum of the decremental eects for the constituent diseases, i.e.
q
(dec)
1 = 0; (5.28)
q
(dec)
2 = qchd   qwell = q(dec)chd ; (5.29)
q
(dec)
3 = qstr   qwell = q(dec)str ; (5.30)
q
(dec)
4 = qdm   qwell = q(dec)dm ; (5.31)
q
(dec)
5 = (qchd   qwell) + (qstr   qwell) = q(dec)chd + q(dec)str ; (5.32)
q
(dec)
6 = (qchd   qwell) + (qdm   qwell) = q(dec)chd + q(dec)dm ; (5.33)
q
(dec)
7 = (qstr   qwell) + (qdm   qwell) = q(dec)str + q(dec)dm ; (5.34)
q
(dec)
8 = (qchd   qwell) + (qstr   qwell) + (qdm   qwell)
= q
(dec)
chd + q
(dec)
str + q
(dec)
dm ; (5.35)
where the parameters q
(dec)
chd , q
(dec)
str and q
(dec)
dm are model inputs. Decremental health
eects may not be additive in this way, so we introduce discrepancy terms qi for
the comorbid health states i = 5; : : : ; 8 (equations (5.32) to (5.35)).
We judge that comorbid state decremental health eects could be higher or
lower than the sum of the constituent terms, so assume a mean of zero for each
discrepancy term, qi ; i = 5; : : : ; 8. We represent beliefs about qi via qi 
N[0; f0:05 E(qi)g2]; i = 5; : : : ; 8.
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5.4.9 Assessment of sub-function generating the interme-
diate parameters id
The proportions of the population who are expected to experience each disease
state i = 1; : : : ; 8 under decision options d = 1; 2 are
id = p
(ex)
d p
(mnt)
d r
(ex)
i + p
(ex)
d

1  p(mnt)d

r
(sed)
i +

1  p(ex)d

r
(sed)
i ; (5.36)
where r
(ex)
i and r
(sed)
i are the risks of disease state i in those who exercise and
in those who are sedentary, respectively. The probability of new exercise under
decision option d is p
(ex)
d , and the probability of maintenance of exercise is p
(mnt)
d .
The parameters p
(ex)
d and p
(mnt)
d are model inputs.
Parameters dening health state probabilities lie in [0; 1], and must sum to
one over i, so discrepancies must lie in [ id; 1  id], and must sum to zero over
i. To satisfy this constraint we assume a Dirichlet distribution for id + id .
We have no reason to believe that the true values of the health state prob-
abilities would be higher or lower than the modelled values, so we assume that
E(id) = 0; 8i; d. We assume that the standard deviation was 5% of the mean
value of the intermediate parameter, i.e.
1
8
8X
i=1
p
var(id)
E(id)
= 0:05: (5.37)
See section x5.4.12 for details of the calculation of the Dirichlet hyperparameters
that satisfy these requirements.
5.4.10 Assessment of sub-function generating the interme-
diate parameters r
(ex)
i and r
(sed)
i
The parameters r
(ex)
i and r
(sed)
i represent the risks of health state i in a population
that exercises and in a sedentary population, respectively. In the base case model
we assume that occurrences of CHD, stroke and diabetes are independent, and
therefore that the r
(ex)
chd ; r
(ex)
str and r
(ex)
dm act multiplicatively to generate the r
(ex)
i
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY 1 107
(and similarly multiplicatively in the sedentary population). So for example,
r
(ex)
1 = (1  r(ex)chd )(1  r(ex)str )(1  r(ex)dm ): (5.38)
We assume that occurrences of CHD, stroke and diabetes are independent,
which may not be true, so we introduce additive discrepancy terms 
r
(sed)
i
and 
r
(ex)
i
.
Following the same argument as that in 5.4.9 we assume a Dirichlet distributions
for r
(ex)
i + r(ex)i
and for r
(sed)
i + r(sed)i
. We have no reason to believe that the true
values of the disease risks would be higher or lower than the modelled values,
so we assume that E(
r
(ex)
i
) = E(
r
(sed)
i
) = 0; 8i. We assume that the standard
deviations were 5% of the mean values of the intermediate parameters, i.e.
1
8
8X
j=1
r
var


r
(ex)
i

E

r
(ex)
i
 = 1
8
8X
i=1
r
var


r
(sed)
i

E

r
(sed)
i
 = 0:05: (5.39)
5.4.11 Assessment of sub-function generating the interme-
diate parameters r
(ex)
k
The parameters r
(ex)
k where k indexes the set fCHD; stroke; diabetesg represent
the risks of CHD, stroke and diabetes in those who exercise. They are calculated
by multiplying baseline risk by the relative risk of disease given exercise, i.e.
r
(ex)
k = r
(sed)
k RRk; (5.40)
where r
(sed)
k and RRk are model inputs.
Given true values for r
(sed)
k and RRk, and an assumption that the relative eect
size is constant with respect to baseline risk, sub-function (5.40) will result in the
true value of r
(ex)
k by denition of a relative risk. There is therefore no structural
error at this point. The assumption of constant eect size with respect to baseline
is felt to be reasonable in this case, but if in another circumstance it was not then
we would add a discrepancy term at this point.
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5.4.12 Generating a sample from the distribution on the
discrepancy relating to a sum-to-one parameter
We denote a sum-to-one intermediate parameter as Y = (Y1; : : : ; Yn), where Yj 2
[0; 1] 8j and Pnj=1 Yj = 1.
The true unknown value of the intermediate parameter is denotedZ = (Z1; : : : ; Zn)
where Z = Y + Y and Y = (Y1 ; : : : ; Yn). The same constraints apply to Z as
to Y , i.e. Zj 2 [0; 1] 8j and
Pn
j=1 Zj = 1.
We state the following beliefs about Y . Firstly, that E(Yj) = 0 8j, and
secondly that the mean of the ratio of the standard deviation of the discrepancy
to the expected value of the parameter is some constant v, i.e. that
1
n
nX
j=1
p
var(Yj)
E(Yj)
= v: (5.41)
We generate a sample from p(Z) as follows. Firstly, we sample fys; s =
1; : : : ; Sg from p(Y ). Conditional on Y we then generate a sample fzs; s =
1; : : : ; Sg from p(Z), where each zs is a single draw from p(ZjY = ys). The
conditional distribution of ZjY = ys is Dirichlet with hyperparameter vector
ys = (y1;s; : : : ; yn;s).
The expectation of Yj is
E(Yj) = E(Zj)  E(Yj) = EYifEZj(ZjjYj)g   E(Yj) = 0; (5.42)
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as required. The variance of Yj is
var(Yj) = var(Zj) + var(Yj)  2Cov(Zj; Yj) (5.43)
= EYjfvarZj(ZjjYj)g+ varYjfEZj(ZjjYj)g
+var(Yj)  2cov(Zj; Yj) (5.44)
= EYjfvarZj(ZjjYj)g+ varYjfEZj(ZjjYj)g
+var(Yj)  2var(Yj) (5.45)
= EYjfvarZj(ZjjYj)g+ var(Yj) + var(Yj)  2var(Yj) (5.46)
= EYjfvarZj(ZjjYj)g (5.47)
= EYj

(Yj(1  Yj)
 + 1

(5.48)
=
E(Yj)f1  E(Yj)g
 + 1
  var(Yj)
 + 1
(5.49)
' E(Yj)f1  E(Yj)g
 + 1
: (5.50)
The nal step follows because var(Yj) is small relative to E(Yj)f1   E(Yj)g in
this application. The Yj (j = 1; : : : ; n) are intermediate parameters in the case
study model where they represent proportions of the population in certain states.
Because they are derived from other uncertain quantities they usually do not have
a standard distribution. However, if we assume that Yj is approximately beta
distributed with hyperparameters j and J , then the ratio of E(Yj)f1  E(Yj)g
to var(Yj) is approximately equal to j + j + 1. Unless the distribution of Yj is
very dispersed,  +  + 1 will not be small and therefore E(Yj)f1   E(Yj)g will
dominate var(Yj).
The hyperparameter  is chosen such that the mean of the ratio of the standard
deviation to the expected value of the parameter is v, i.e. so that
1
n
nX
j=1
p
var(Yj)
E(Yj)
=
1
n
nX
j=1
q
E(Yj)f1 E(Yj)g
+1
E(Yj)
= v: (5.51)
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Approximating E(Yj) by the sample mean yj and rearranging gives
 =
1
v2
(
1
n
nX
j=1
s
1  yj
yj
)2
  1: (5.52)
5.5 Discrepancy analysis results
Following the discrepancy analysis in the case study model a total of 48 discrep-
ancy terms were introduced. The addition of the discrepancy terms `corrects' any
structural error, and allows us now to write
Z = f (X; ); (5.53)
where f  takes the same functional form as f , but with the inclusion of the
discrepancy terms as described in section x5.4.
5.5.1 Model output after inclusion of discrepancy terms
We sampled the input and discrepancy distributions and ran the model f  100,000
times. This resulted in a predicted mean incremental net benet of $247, which is
equal to the that predicted by the base case model. The 95% credible interval was
-$886 to $1444, which is wider than that of the base case model, reecting the
recognition of our additional uncertainty about the true incremental net benet
due to possible model structural error.
Figure 5.4 shows the model results after the addition of the 48 discrepancy
terms. We note the larger cloud of points on the cost-eectiveness plane (gures
5.4a and 5.4b), reecting the additional uncertainty. The additional uncertainty
has reduced the probability that the intervention is cost-eective, P (INB > 0),
at  =$20,000 to 0.66 (closer to the value of 0.5 that represents complete un-
certainty), and attened the cost-eectiveness acceptability curve towards the
horizontal line at P (INB > 0) = 0:5 (gure 5.4c). The additional uncertainty is
also reected in the wider empirical distribution in gure 5.4d.
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Figure 5.4: Results after the addition of discrepancy terms as (a) cost-eectiveness
plane (b) cost-eectiveness plane contour plot (c) cost-eectiveness acceptability
curve (d) incremental net benet empirical density.
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5.5.2 Determining important structural errors via vari-
ance based sensitivity analysis
Following our analysis of structural error we may then wish to make improvements
to the model. It is unlikely that all the sub-model discrepancy terms are equally
`important', by which we mean that some terms may be located in parts of the
model in which structural errors contribute very little to uncertainty about Z, the
incremental net benet. If we can identify the most important discrepancy terms,
we can consider reducing structural errors through better modelling, perhaps by
relaxing certain assumptions, or by including features that were omitted initially.
Similarly, identifying unimportant discrepancy terms will tell us where it is not
worth improving the model.
Note that any re-modelling following a sensitivity analysis may not reduce
uncertainty about Z, for example if the improved model structure introduces
new, uncertain parameters. In this situation we are eectively `transferring' our
uncertainty from structure to inputs. This may be helpful simply because input
uncertainty is generally easier to manage, but in any case we believe that a formal
consideration of the balance between uncertainty due to model structure and
uncertainty due to model inputs is desirable.
We can identify a set of important discrepancy terms using sensitivity analysis
techniques. Various methods exist (as discussed in chapter 3), but for the purposes
of this case study we have chosen to use a variance based sensitivity analysis
approach. In this approach the measure of importance for each discrepancy term,
j j = 1; : : : ; n, is dened as its `main eect index',
varjfE(Zjj)g
var(Z)
: (5.54)
Given the identity var(Z) = varjfE(Zjj)g + Ejfvar(Zjj)g the numerator of
the main eect index gives the expected reduction in the variance of Z obtained
by learning the value of j.
The main eect index for uncorrelated discrepancy terms is straightforward to
calculate using Monte Carlo methods. In this case E(Zjj) can be approximated
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by
E(Zjj) ' 1
S
SX
s=1
f(xs;  j;s; j); (5.55)
where f(xs;  j;s); s = 1; : : : ; Sg is a (large) sample from the distribution p(X;  j).
However, if j is correlated with other discrepancy terms or inputs, then
this method would require us to draw samples from the conditional distribution
p(X;  jjj). Such conditional distributions may not be known, so we approx-
imated the conditional expectation using a novel method that we describe in
chapter 7.
Following a variance based sensitivity analysis of the discrepancy terms in our
model, eight of the terms appeared to be important, having main eects > 5%.
The pattern of importance suggests that re-expressing the sub-functions for the
parameters id is key to reducing structural error (table 5.3).
Table 5.3: Main eect indices for discrepancy terms (> 5% in bold)
Discrepancy Main eect Discrepancy Main eect Discrepancy Main eect

r
(ex)
1
0.002 1;1 0.266 cchd 0.002

r
(ex)
2
0.002 2;1 0.128 cstr 0.002

r
(ex)
3
0.003 3;1 0.076 cdm 0.001

r
(ex)
4
0.002 4;1 0.002 dchd 0.002

r
(ex)
5
0.003 5;1 0.054 dstr 0.002

r
(ex)
6
0.002 6;1 0.025 ddm 0.002

r
(ex)
7
0.003 7;1 0.014 q5 0.002

r
(ex)
8
0.004 8;1 0.010 q6 0.002

r
(sed)
1
0.002 1;2 0.257 q7 0.002

r
(sed)
2
0.002 2;2 0.124 q8 0.002

r
(sed)
3
0.002 3;2 0.076 c5 0.002

r
(sed)
4
0.002 4;2 0.002 c6 0.002

r
(sed)
5
0.002 5;2 0.049 c7 0.002

r
(sed)
6
0.002 6;2 0.025 c8 0.002

r
(sed)
7
0.002 7;2 0.013 q 0.003

r
(sed)
8
0.002 8;2 0.008 c 0.001
We noted in section x3.4.1 that the main eect index does not measure the
sensitivity of the decision to changes in the inputs, and we will address this prob-
lem in the next case study by computing the expected value of perfect information
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rather than the main eect index. If, however, the focus of a modelling eort is to
predict an unknown quantity rather than to support a decision, then the variance
based approach is entirely reasonable. In this case, we would also compute the
total eect index for each input in order to ensure that inputs that have a small
main eect index are not inuential due to interactions with other inputs. The
total eect index for Xi is
var(Y )  varX ifEXi(Y jX i)g
var(Y )
=
EX ifvarXi(Y jX i)g
var(Y )
; (5.56)
where X i is the vector of all inputs except Xi. As discussed in section x3.4.1
the total eect index measures the overall eect of the input Xi, including any
interactions. It is the expected variance (as a proportion of the total variance)
that is left when all inputs except Xi are xed. In general, the main eect index is
useful in determining the eect of learning a single input, whereas the total eect
index is useful in determining non-inuential inputs.
5.5.3 The relative importance of parameter to structural
error uncertainty
We may also wish to understand the relative importance of the contributions of
uncertainty about structural error and uncertainty about input parameters to the
overall uncertainty in Z. We can measure this using the structural parameter
uncertainty ratio, which we dene as
varfEX(Zj)g
varXfE(ZjX)g : (5.57)
This is straightforward to calculate if  is independent ofX since EX(Zj = 0) =
EXff (X; )j = 0g = EXff(X; 0)g and E(ZjX = x) = Eff (X; )jX =
xg = Eff(x; )g. If  and X are not independent calculating the conditional
expectations is more dicult, though methods are available (for example via the
specication of a Gaussian process emulator, Oakley and O'Hagan, 2004).
The structural parameter uncertainty ratio in our model is 2.0 indicating that,
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given our specication of discrepancy, learning the discrepancy terms would result
in double the expected reduction in the variance of the output compared with
the expected reduction in variance on learning the true values of all the input
parameters.
5.5.4 Analysis of robustness to dierent choices of vj
In our case study we set vj (the ratio of the discrepancy standard deviation to
the mean of the corresponding intermediate parameter) to 5% equally for all dis-
crepancy terms, judging this to be an appropriate reection of the likely range
of structural error. The resulting additional uncertainty in the model output was
plausible, and the variance based sensitivity analysis implied that there was impor-
tant structural error in the sub-model that generates the health state probability
parameters, id (section x5.4.9).
In order to test the robustness of our conclusion to minor variations in the
specication of the discrepancies we altered values for vj over a plausible range. We
grouped the discrepancy terms into four sets: terms relating to cost parameters,
terms relating to health eect parameters, terms relating to population proportion
parameters, and terms relating to the discount factors. Within each set the values
for vj were either doubled, halved or maintained at 5%. Given three levels for vj
and four sets of discrepancy terms there are 34 = 81 combinations of choices for
vj including our original specication of vj = 5% for all j.
In all 81 cases a very similar pattern of main eect indexes to that reported
in table 5.3 was observed, with the id terms dominating, indicating robustness
to choices of vj over the range 2.5% to 10%.
5.5.5 Remodelling the sub-functions where there is impor-
tant structural error
Variance based sensitivity analysis has identied id to be important discrepancy
terms, indicating that we have important structural error in the sub-model that
generates the health state probability parameters, id.
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In the base case model the proportion of people who begin and then maintain
exercise is assumed constant over time. If we believe that there will be a decline
in the proportion of people who exercise over time then we could re-structure the
model sub-function to reect this. We could, for example, assume an exponential
decline, whereby the proportion exercising at each year in the future is equal
to the proportion exercising in the previous year multiplied by some (uncertain)
constant. If the risk of each disease state i decreased (increased for the well state)
linearly from r
(sed)
i to r
(ex)
i with increasing time spent exercising (with a threshold
achieved after, say, four years exercise), then we could write
id =

1  p(ex)d

r
(sed)
i + p
(ex)
d (1 md) r(sed)i
+ p
(ex)
d
 
md  m2d
1
4
r
(ex)
i +
3
4
r
(sed)
i

+ p
(ex)
d
 
m2d  m3d
1
2
r
(ex)
i +
1
2
r
(sed)
i

+ p
(ex)
d
 
m3d  m4d
3
4
r
(ex)
i +
1
4
r
(sed)
i

+ p
(ex)
d m
4
dr
(ex)
i ; (5.58)
where md is the proportion of the population who exercised in year t who continue
to exercise in year t+ 1, under decision d.
To complete the new model specication we need to specify distributions for
m1 and m2. After informal discussion with an expert we specied m1 and m2 as
jointly normally distributed with means of 0.5, variances of 0.01 and a correlation
of 0.9.
5.5.6 Results following sub-function remodelling
The mean net benet following remodelling was $71 (95% credible interval -$273
to $572), with the probability that the intervention is cost-eective, P (INB > 0),
at  =$20,000 equal to 0.59. Figure 5.5 shows the results after remodelling. We
see that there is now a smaller cloud a points on the cost-eectiveness plane,
and that these are shifted towards the left and the line of no eect (at Q =
0). The cost-eectiveness acceptability curve (gure 5.5c) suggests that following
remodelling we predict that the intervention has a lower probability of being cost-
eective than predicted by the base case model at all values of . The leftwards
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shift of the incremental net benet density towards zero supports this (gure
5.5d).
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Figure 5.5: Results after remodelling as (a) cost-eectiveness plane (b) cost-
eectiveness plane contour plot (c) cost-eectiveness acceptability curve (d) in-
cremental net benet empirical density.
By re-structuring the important sub-function in the model to better incor-
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porate our beliefs about real-world processes, we nd that the incremental net
benet distribution is shifted downwards. This is due to our judgement that a
proportion of those who begin new exercise will cease exercising, and that instead
of this drop being a single step change, the fall will be exponential over time.
This results in a lower proportion of maintained exercise in both the intervention
and non-intervention groups, and a lower absolute reduction in disease risk and
smaller incremental benet.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced a method for making judgements about model dis-
crepancy at the level of the intermediate parameters within the model. We showed
how it is possible to determine the subset of discrepancy terms that are impor-
tant in driving model output uncertainty. This then allowed us to reconsider those
parts of the model where the structure is uncertain, and where this uncertainty
was an important contributor to output uncertainty. The resulting model better
reected our judgements about the underlying process. However, the method re-
lies on the ability to meaningfully specify judgements about the model error at
the sub-function level via p(X; ). This may not be easy. We return to this point
in chapter 8.
In the next chapter we apply our method in a rather more complex model,
a Markov model where the addition of time dependency considerably increases
the number of discrepancy terms that must be specied. We recognise that the
main eect index is not an adequate measure of importance for the discrepancy
terms in a decision theoretic context and therefore compute the expected value of
perfect information instead.
Chapter 6
Case Study 2 - Managing
Structural Uncertainty in a
Markov Model
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we illustrate the application of the discrepancy method that we
introduced in chapter 5 to another common type of health economic decision
model, the Markov model. We imagine a scenario where we have built a relatively
simple Markov model, but recognise that reality is more complex. We do not
believe that even if we were to learn the `true' values of the Markov transition
probabilities and all other uncertain inputs in the model, that the predicted costs
and health outcomes would equal their true values. We know that the model is a
simplication, and we seek to answer the question `is it good enough?'.
The Markov model that we use for this second case study predicts the costs and
health eects of two competing treatments for HIV/AIDS. The time dependency
that is present in the Markov model, but was absent from the decision tree model,
presents us with the new challenge of specifying a joint distribution for a large
number of discrepancy terms that are correlated in time, as well as within and
between decision options. In order to parsimoniously specify the distribution on
these terms we use a Gaussian process to represent our judgements about the
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CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY 2 120
model error.
In chapter 5 we used a variance-based sensitivity analysis to determine the
relative importance of the discrepancy terms in driving the uncertainty in the
output. In this chapter we adopt a decision theoretic approach and compute the
expected value of learning the true values of the discrepancies. This avoids the
need for the output of the model to be scalar, and more importantly tells us
where uncertain model structure is likely to have an eect on the decision, rather
than just on the model output. It is quite possible for a discrepancy term to be
inuential on the model output, but not to change the decision. If the value of
learning the true values of the discrepancies is small compared with the expected
value of learning the true values of inputs, then this oers reassurance that our
current model is good enough for the decision at hand. We interpret the expected
value of perfect information for the discrepancy terms as giving an upper bound
on the expected value of model improvement (EVMI).
The chapter is organised as follows. In section x6.2 we introduce the case
study: a simple Markov model designed to predict the costs and health eects
of two competing treatment options for HIV/AIDS. In section x6.3 we apply the
discrepancy analysis method in three scenarios that represent plausible sets of
assumptions regarding the structural error. In section x6.4 we present results
including the `expected value of model improvement' (EVMI) in each scenario.
6.2 Case study model
In order to illustrate the method we introduce a case study that is based on a
four state Markov model rst described in Chancellor et al. (1997) and subse-
quently used for illustrative purposes in Drummond et al. (2005) and Briggs et al.
(2006). The purpose of the model is to predict costs and health outcomes (in
life years) under two decision options, zidovudine monotherapy versus zidovudine
plus lamivudine combination therapy, in people with HIV. Allowable transitions
between the four health states are shown in gure 6.1. The authors of the original
paper chose time steps of 1 year and ran the model to a time horizon of 20 years.
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State 1
CD4 > 200
CD4 < 500
State 3
AIDS
State 2
CD4 < 200
State 4
Death
Figure 6.1: Structure of the case study Markov model
Note that this is no longer a credible model given the development of our
understanding of the pathology of HIV/AIDS. Importantly, it is now understood
that transitions can occur from worse to better states (see for example the models
described in Miners et al., 2001; Simpson et al., 2004), transitions that are not
possible in the Chancellor et al. (1997) model.
6.2.1 Notation
We index the monotherapy and combination therapy decision options d = 1; 2
respectively, the four mutually exclusive health states as i = 1; : : : ; 4, and the
time steps in years as t = 0; : : : ; 20. If we imagine a cohort of people exposed
to decision option d, we denote djt as the proportion of the cohort who are in
health state i during time step t (alternatively, djt represents, under decision
option d at time step t, the probability that a single individual exists in health
state i versus the other states). We call dt = (d1t; : : : ; d4t)
0 the state vector for
decision option d at time step t, and note the constraint
P4
i=1 djt = 1 8d; t.
We denote the costs and health eects accrued for health state i during time
step t under decision d as cdjt and edjt respectively. Costs and outcomes are
time dependent to allow the discounting of costs and eects accrued in the future
(Krahn and Gafni, 1993). We can therefore write costs and eects at time step
t in terms of costs and eects at time zero via cdjt = cdi0(1 + rc)
 t and edjt =
edi0(1 + re)
 t, where rc and re are the per-year discount rate for costs and health
eects. The health eect of interest for this decision problem is life years, so
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edi0 = 1 for health states i = 1; 2; 3, and zero for the death state i = 4. We
denote the vector of costs for all health states at time step t under decision d as
cdt = (cd1t; : : : ; cd4t)
0, and the vector of health eects as edt = (ed1t; : : : ; ed4t)0.
6.2.2 The Markov model
The authors assumed a simple time-homogeneous Markov process (i.e. transition
probabilities remain xed for all time steps). Under this assumption the prob-
ability that an individual will move from health state x to health state y under
decision d is given by pdxy, and we note the constraints that pdxy  0 8d; x; y andP4
y=1 pdxy = 1 8d; x.
Transition from a worse health state to a better health state is considered
impossible in this decision scenario. The transition matrix for the monotherapy
(d = 1) option is therefore of the form,
M1 =
0BBBBBB@
p111 p112 p113 p114
0 p122 p123 p124
0 0 p133 p134
0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCA ; (6.1)
where the lower diagonal elements are zero. Death is an absorbing state.
The matrix M1 is modied by the incorporation of a combination therapy
treatment eect parameter, RR, to give the transition matrix for the combination
therapy (d = 2) option,
M2 =
0BBBBBB@
1 RR(p112 + p113 + p114) RR  p112 RR  p113 RR  p114
0 1 RR(p123 + p124) RR  p123 RR  p124
0 0 1 RR  p133 RR  p134
0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCA :
(6.2)
Given the transition matrix Md and state vector dt, we can generate d;t+1
via the evolution equation
0d;t+1 = 
0
dtMd; (6.3)
CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY 2 123
and we can therefore express dt in terms of the state vector at time step 0, i.e.
0dt = 
0
d0M
t
d, where M
t
d =
Qt
l=1Md:
If we value (in cost units) one unit of health outcome at , our nal model for
the net monetary benet associated with decision option d is
NBd = e
tot
d   ctotd = 
20X
t=0
0d0M
t
dedt  
20X
t=0
0d0M
t
dcdt: (6.4)
Assuming that we are uncertain about some or all the inputs into the model, our
optimum decision is that which maximises the expected net benet.
6.2.3 Base case input parameter values
Transition probabilities, costs and the treatment eect parameter are all consid-
ered uncertain in the base case model, with distributions shown in tables 6.1 and
6.2.
Table 6.1: Transition probability distributions for d = 1
(p111; p112; p113; p114)  Dirichlet (1251,350,115,14)
(p121; p122; p123; p124)  Dirichlet (0,731,512,15)
(p131; p132; p133; p134)  Dirichlet (0,0,1312,437)
(p141; p142; p143; p144) = (0; 0; 0; 1)
Table 6.2: Cost and relative risk distributions
Label Description Distribution Mean SD
cc1 Undiscounted care costs of 1 time step in state 1 ($) normal 2756 400
cc2 Undiscounted care costs of 1 time step in state 2 ($) normal 3052 437
cc3 Undiscounted care costs of 1 time step in state 3 ($) normal 9007 1449
RR Treatment eect (combi vs monotherapy) lognormal log(0.509) 0.05
Drug treatment costs are considered xed and known, as are discount rates
(table 6.3). We assume that the combination therapy is eective throughout the
whole of the modelled 20 year period, rather than just for the rst year (this is
presented as an alternative scenario rather than the base case in Chancellor et al.,
1997).
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Table 6.3: Fixed inputs
Label Description Value
cZ Zidovudine cost ($) 2278
cL Lamivudine cost ($) 2087
rc Discount rate for costs 3.5% per year
re Discount rate for outcomes 3.5% per year
6.3 Discrepancy analysis
6.3.1 Incorporating judgements about model structural
error into the Markov model
We believe that the transition of individuals through health states is not ad-
equately described by the simple `base case' time-homogeneous Markov model
described above, and therefore expect there to be error in the predicted costs and
health eects. We wish to quantify this structural error to determine whether
we need to build a more complex model. In particular we wish to determine the
expected value of improving the model. We restrict ourselves in this case study to
considering only structural error that relates to the Markov model itself. In many
applications a Markov model is part of a larger model that may also include, for
example, a decision tree element where we may also judge there to be structural
error.
We recognise that there are many potential sources of structural error in our
base case model, given its simplicity, and the new knowledge that has accumulated
in the 15 years between the development of the model and now. In our analysis
we will explore three potential sources of error in order to illustrate our method.
Clearly, the three scenarios that we present are in no way exhaustive.
We introduce a series of discrepancy terms, each of which represents the dif-
ference between the output of a sub function in the built model and the true value
of that output quantity. Discrepancy terms are incorporated in the model at the
level of the evolution of the health state vector, replacing equation (6.3) with
0dt = 
0
d;t 1Md + dt; (6.5)
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where dt is a vector of discrepancy terms that quanties the error in the state
vector at time t for decision option d.
In the analysis for our case study we have found it more intuitive to think
about discrepancies as applying to the transition matrix rather than to the state
vector, writing dt = 
0
d;t 1dt and expressing judgements about the model error
via dt, a matrix of discrepancy terms of the same dimensionality as Md. We
re-express equation (6.5) as
0dt = 
0
d;t 1Md + dt;
= 0d;t 1Mdt + 
0
d;t 1dt;
= 0d;t 1(Md +dt): (6.6)
The matrix (Md+dt) must obey the same constraints asMd, i.e. all elements
must lie within the interval [0; 1] and each row must sum to one. We can ensure this
if each element of dt, dtxy, is constrained to lie in the interval [ pdxy; 1  pdxy],
and if each row of dt sums to zero.
Given the transition probability matrices (equations 6.1 and 6.2), there are
potentially six such unconstrained discrepancy terms per decision option per time
step, and we denote these djt; j = 1; : : : ; 6. The discrepancy matrix dt is
therefore
dt =
0BBBBBB@
 (d1t + d2t + d3t) d1t d2t d3t
0  (d4t + d5t) d4t d5t
0 0  d6t d6t
0 0 0 0
1CCCCCCA : (6.7)
We may judge that structural error relates only to a subset of the transitions in
the model. Where we judge there to be no structural error the corresponding
discrepancy term will be zero.
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6.3.2 Scenario 1 - time dependent transition probabilities
In the rst scenario of our case study we judge that there is an important time
dependent relationship between age and the probability of death that is not cap-
tured in the simple time homogeneous model. We therefore introduce three dis-
crepancy terms (per time step per decision), one for each transition from an alive
state to the death state. Given the general expression for the discrepancy ma-
trix in equation (6.7) we expect that djt is non-zero for j = 3; 5; 6, and zero for
j = 1; 2; 4. Given three discrepancy terms per decision option per time step there
are 3 2 21 = 126 discrepancy terms in total. Specifying judgements about the
model discrepancy via the joint distribution of such a large number of terms clearly
requires a parsimonious parametrisation that reects the dependencies between
discrepancy terms.
To illustrate our approach to this specication problem we consider the dis-
crepancy term, d6t, that describes the structural error in the built model with
respect to the probability of transition from AIDS to death. We judge that the
probability of this transition increases monotonically over time rather than being
constant in the base case model, but we are unsure as to the exact nature of the
relationship between the probability of death and time. This belief implies that
the uncertain discrepancy term d6t must also increase monotonically with respect
to time. We judge that at t = 0 the probability of death may be approximately
20% lower than the constant value (0.250) in the built model, and at t = 20 may
be approximately 20% higher, but we have considerable uncertainty. Figure 6.2
represents some plausible realisations of the discrepancy d6t as a function of time
for d = 1.
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Figure 6.2: Four plausible realisations of the discrepancy term d6t for d = 1 in
scenario 1
6.3.3 Parametrising the discrepancy using a Gaussian pro-
cess
We wish to nd a convenient and parsimonious parametrisation for the joint distri-
bution of the 126 discrepancy terms djt, d = 1; 2, j = 3; 5; 6, and t = 0; : : : ; 20. We
begin by noting that the reason for choosing a Markov model structure for our built
model was to reect a dynamic time dependent process, so it seems reasonable to
consider discrepancy as a function of time step, i.e. djt = fdj(t). We then assume
that the functions fdj(t) follow a Gaussian process, i.e. that ff1;1(0); : : : ; f2;6(20)g
has a multivariate normal distribution with mean function, Effdj(t)g = m(d; j; t)
and covariance function Covffdj(t); fdj(t)g = c(d; j; t; d; j; t).
This highly exible and parsimonious parametrisation of set of unknown func-
tions allows us to specify not only our uncertainty about each djt, but also the
correlation structure of discrepancies through time, the correlations between the
three non-zero discrepancy terms per decision, and the correlation between the
discrepancy terms for the d = 1; 2 decisions for each transition j.
Gaussian processes are well understood and have many attractive properties,
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hence their widespread use in the modelling of unknown complex processes (their
use is ubiquitous in the Managing Uncertainty in Complex Models project for
example, see www.mucm.ac.uk). However, we must remember that the Gaussian
process is only a model for the unknown discrepancy `process', and its attractive-
ness may be illusory. Does the Gaussian process with the mean and covariance
functions that we specify really represent our beliefs about the discrepancies? It
may be very dicult to answer this.
We may judge that an alternative representation of our beliefs about the dis-
crepancies is more appropriate. Other options for characterising the joint distri-
bution of the discrepancies on the transition matrix would include the use of a
copula (Possolo, 2010). A copula is a device for generating a multivariate distri-
bution that has univariate margins with certain dened properties. So, in our case
we might want to dene a copula with a Beta distributed margin corresponding to
each discrepancy. Our beliefs about the correlation between discrepancies would
be specied by the hyperparameters of a multivariate normal distribution. The
copula can be thought of as the function that links the univariate Beta marginals
to the underlying multivariate normal distribution.
A second possibility, given the sum-to-one constraint on the rows of the tran-
sition matrix, is the specication of a series of Dirichlet distributions. However,
the diculty with this approach is the problem of describing correlations between
rows and over time. This is not straightforward. It may be possible to combine
these latter two approaches and specify a copula with Dirichlet marginals; an
interesting area for further work.
Specifying the mean function
We specify the mean for each discrepancy, Effdj(t)g, as a function m(d; j; t). For
scenario 1 a linear form, Effdj(t)g = m(d; j; t) = 0;dj + 1;djt; adequately reects
our judgements, but depending on the decision problem alternative choices might
be higher order polynomial, Effdj(t)g = m(d; j; t) = 0;dj+; : : : ;+n;djtn; expo-
nential, Effdj(t)g = m(d; j; t) = 0;dj + 1;dj exp(2;djt); or stepped, Effdj(t)g =
m(d; j; t) = 0;dj + 1;djI(t > 2;dj): We placed normal distributions on the linear
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mean function parameters 0;dj and 1;dj with hyperparameters shown in table
6.4.
Table 6.4: Hyperparameters to specify GP mean function
Hyperparameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Transition
Intercept (0;dj) Mean (sd) 10 3 Mean (sd) 10 3 Mean (sd) 10 3 state x to y; decision
0;11 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 to 2; monotherapy
0;12 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 to 3; monotherapy
0;13 -1.0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 to 4; monotherapy
0;14 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 to 3; monotherapy
0;15 -1.2 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 to 4; monotherapy
0;16 -25.0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 to 4; monotherapy
0;21 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 to 2; combi therapy
0;22 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 to 3; combi therapy
0;23 -0.5 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 to 4; combi therapy
0;24 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 to 3; combi therapy
0;25 -0.61 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 to 4; combi therapy
0;26 -12.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 to 4; combi therapy
Slope (1;dj) Mean (sd) 10 4 Mean (sd) 10 4 Mean (sd) 10 4 state x to y; therapy
1;11 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 to 2; monotherapy
1;12 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 to 3; monotherapy
1;13 1.0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 to 4; monotherapy
1;14 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 to 3; monotherapy
1;15 1.2 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 to 4; monotherapy
1;16 25.0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 to 4; monotherapy
1;21 0 (0) 24.8 (13.78) 0 (0) 1 to 2; combi therapy
1;22 0 (0) 8.2 (4.57) 0 (0) 1 to 3; combi therapy
1;23 0.51 (0) 1.2 (0.68) 0 (0) 1 to 4; combi therapy
1;24 0 (0) 50.0 (27.8) 0 (0) 2 to 3; combi therapy
1;25 0.61 (0) 1.5 (0.82) 0 (0) 2 to 4; combi therapy
1;26 12.7 (0) 30.7 (17.0) 0 (0) 3 to 4; combi therapy
Specifying the covariance function
We make a number of simplifying assumptions when specifying the covariance
function, but note that all of these assumptions may be relaxed at the cost of
specifying a greater number of hyperparameters. We assume in scenario 1 that
the variance of each discrepancy djt remains constant for all t, requiring the
specication of 23 = 6 variances, which we denote 2dj. We state beliefs about the
within-decision, between-transition term correlation through a parameter j;j =
cor(djt; djt), assuming that this is constant over time t and across decisions. We
state beliefs about the between-decision correlation through a parameter  d;d =
cor(djt; djt), assuming that this is constant over time t and across transitions j.
Finally we state beliefs about the correlation of the discrepancies through time
by dening a correlation function (; ) that depends on the distance between time
steps, assuming this holds for all d and j. For the purposes of scenario 1 we use
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the `Gaussian form'
(t; t) = exp
(
 

t  t
!
2)
; (6.8)
where ! is the correlation length. The correlation length determines the degree of
correlation between discrepancy terms at any particular `distance', where distance
is the number of Markov time steps between the terms. See Neal (1999) for a
discussion of alternatives to this simple Gaussian form of correlation function.
The overall covariance function is therefore
Covffdj(t); fdj(t)g = c(d; j; t; d; j; t);
= djdj d;dj;j(t; t
);
= djdj d;dj;j exp
(
 

t  t
!
2)
: (6.9)
Finally we specify a correlation structure for the discrepancies as they evolve
through time via the correlation function with parameter ! (equation 6.8). Values
chosen are shown in table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Hyperparameters to specify GP covariance function
Variance Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Transition
hyperparameters (jd) (10 3) (10 3) (10 3)
11 0 0 28.9 A to B monotherapy
12 0 0 9.6 A to C monotherapy
13 1.0 0 1.4 A to D monotherapy
14 0 0 58.1 B to C monotherapy
15 1.2 0 1.7 B to D monotherapy
16 25.0 0 35.7 C to D monotherapy
21 0 5.1 14.7 A to B combi therapy
22 0 1.7 4.9 A to C combi therapy
23 0.51 0.25 0.7 A to D combi therapy
24 0 10.4 29.6 B to C combi therapy
25 0.61 0.31 0.9 B to D combi therapy
26 12.7 6.4 18.1 C to D combi therapy
Correlation Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Description
hyperparameters
 0.8 0.9 0 Between discrepancy term correlation
 0.9 0 0 Between decision correlation
! 32 7 7 Correlation length parameter
Monotonicity constraint for fdj(t)
We have chosen the Gaussian process as a method to model the discrepancy terms,
with discrepancy with respect to time being considered an uncertain function,
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fdj(t). We may wish to constrain the form of fdj(t), and in particular we may
wish to ensure that fdj(t) is monotone with respect to t to reect our belief that
the probability of death increases with time. However, realisations of a Gaussian
process tend to be `wiggly' non-monotone functions, with the degree of `wiggliness'
controlled by the ! parameter. Increasing values of ! will result in an increasingly
smooth functions, so by carefully choosing ! we can ensure that the realisations of
the Gaussian process are constrained to be monotone to reect our beliefs about
the relationship between discrepancy and time.
Monotonicity with respect to t implies that, for a once dierentiable function
fdj(t) that @fdj(t)=@t > 0 8t, or @fdj(t)=@t < 0 8t. Informally then, we can ensure
monotonicity by choosing hyperparameters for the mean and covariance functions
such that this holds with some probability .
It is a property of an n times dierentiable Gaussian process f(x)  GPfm(x); c(x; x)g
with n times dierentiable mean and covariance functions, that @nf(x)=@xn is also
a Gaussian process with mean function
E

@n
@xn
f(x)

=
@n
@xn
m(x); (6.10)
and covariance function
cov

@n
@xn
f(x)

x=x
;
@n
@xn
f(x)

x=x

=
@2n
@xn@xn
c(x; x): (6.11)
See O'Hagan (1992) for further details.
This implies that @fdj(t)=@t is the Gaussian process,
@
@t
fdj(t)  GP

@
@t
m(d; j; t);
@2
@t@t
c(d; j; t; d; j; t)

; (6.12)
and we can ensure monotonicity of fdj(t) with some pre-specied probability  by
choosing parameters of m() and c(; ) such that
 @
@t
m(d; j; t)
   1()r @2
@t@t
c(d; j; t; d; j; t) > 0; (6.13)
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where  1() is the inverse normal cumulative distribution function (Montes Diez
and Oakley, 2010).
Given a linear mean function, m(d; j; t) = 0;dj+1;djt, and a Gaussian form for
the correlation function with respect to time, c(d; j; t; d; j; t) = 2dj exp
n
    t t
!
2o
,
equation (6.13) becomes
1;dj   1()
s
22dj
!2
> 0; (6.14)
which by solving for ! gives
! >
 1()
p
2dj
1;dj
: (6.15)
We can therefore, given 1;dj and 
2
dj, ensure with some probability  that fdj(t) is
monotone through a choice of correlation length parameter ! that obeys (6.15). If
1;dj is itself uncertain this approach is more dicult. In this case we may choose
! such that
! >
 1()
p
2dj
0:0251;dj
; (6.16)
where 0:0251;dj is the value of the 2.5th centile of the distribution of the random
variable 1;dj.
For scenario 1, 1;dj was considered known with certainty allowing us to use
(6.15). We set  = 0:95 and chose ! accordingly.
We must keep in mind that this approach relies on properties of the Gaussian
process, which is only a model for our unknown function. We do not know for
certain that the `true' function that describes the relationship between discrepancy
and time is smooth n times dierentiable. Indeed, if we have reason to believe
that it is not, then choosing a Gaussian process representation of the unknown
function may well be inappropriate.
Ten samples from the Gaussian process for discrepancy term 1;6;t are shown
in gure 6.3. Note the variation in functional form generated by the Gaussian
process, reecting our uncertainty about the relationship between probability of
death and time, but with the constraint that the relationship between discrepancy
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and time should be monotone.
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Figure 6.3: Ten samples from the distribution on discrepancy term 1;6;t in scenario
1
6.3.4 Sensitivity analysis to determine whether the dis-
crepancies make any dierence to the decision
Given our specication of discrepancy for our built model we can determine
whether we should build a more complex model by examining the sensitivity
of the decision to the discrepancy. We calculate, using standard Monte Carlo
methods, the expected value of learning the true value of the discrepancy terms
via the partial expected value of perfect information (EVPI),
EVPI() = Efmax
d
EXj(NBd)g  max
d
E(NBd);
where X is the vector of model inputs, and  is the vector of discrepancy terms
(see chapter 3 for discussion of EVPI). If EVPI() is large compared with the value
of learning the inputs, EVPI(X), then we conclude that the potential structural
error in adopting the simple Markov model is important.
The expected value of learning the discrepancy terms, EVPI(), is the `ex-
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pected value of model improvement' (EVMI) under the assumption that any new
input parameters that are introduced into the model during the structural im-
provement are known with certainty. It is likely however that model improvement
will involve the addition of new uncertain input parameters. In this case the
EVPI() provides an upper bound for the EVMI. If the EVPI() is small this of-
fers us some reassurance that the model is good enough for the decision, whereas
if it is large we know our uncertainty about the model structure is resulting in
decision uncertainty. In the latter case improving the model may be worthwhile,
but this will depend on the degree of decision uncertainty induced by any newly
introduced uncertain inputs.
6.3.5 Scenario 2 - an uncertain relationship between e-
cacy and time since treatment commencement
The duration of eect of the combination therapy was a key uncertainty at the time
of publication of Chancellor et al. (1997), and the authors presented results for
three alternative scenarios: eectiveness lasting one year, two years and 20 years.
We ask the following question: if our built model assumes that the combination
therapy is eective over 20 years, but we are uncertain whether this is true, do we
need to build a more complex model that incorporates an uncertain relationship
between ecacy and time from commencement of treatment?
The treatment eect acts on six unconstrained terms in the transition matrix
for the combination therapy (equation 6.2), but does not act on the transition
matrix for the monotherapy, therefore resulting in six non-zero discrepancies per
time step, 2;1;t; : : : ; 2;6;t. This specication of discrepancy is equivalent to incor-
porating a time varying treatment eect parameter (RR), but with the additional
exibility that allows the treatment eect to vary across the dierent transitions
in the model (e.g. HIV to AIDS versus HIV to death).
We believe that ecacy falls over time, and therefore that the discrepancy
between our built model and reality increases over time. We again chose a linear
mean function E(2jt) = 0;i + 1;jt with uncertain slope. The intercept param-
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eter 0;j is zero in this case to reect our judgement that during time step 1 the
treatment eect parameter RR correctly determines the eectiveness of the com-
bination therapy. We placed normal distributions on the six 1;j parameters with
hyperparameters 1;j and 
2
1;j
shown in table 6.4.
Next, we specify the covariance function. Our uncertainty about the six dis-
crepancies 2;1;t; : : : ; 2;6;t is controlled through variance terms 
2
2;1; : : : ; 
2
2;6, as-
sumed to hold for all t. We specify our judgement about the dependency between
the discrepancy terms for the six transitions through a single correlation param-
eter j;j =  8j 6= j which we assume constant for all t. Since there is no
discrepancy for the monotherapy option d = 1 in this scenario we do not need
to specify between-decision correlations (i.e. there is no  d;d correlation parame-
ter). Finally we specify a correlation structure for the discrepancies as they evolve
through time via a Gaussian form correlation function with parameter ! (equation
6.8), ensuring via equation (6.15) that discrepancy as a function of time is mono-
tone with probability  = 0:95. Values for all covariance function parameters are
shown in table 6.5.
Ten samples from the Gaussian process for discrepancy term 2;1;t are shown
in gure 6.4. Note the variation in functional form generated by the Gaussian
process, reecting our uncertainty about the relationship between ecacy and
time.
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Figure 6.4: Ten samples from the distribution on discrepancy term 2;1;t in scenario
2
6.3.6 Scenario 3 - relaxation of the memoryless property
In scenario 3 we judge that the probability of transition to state y at time step t+1
is dependent not only on the state x at time t but on the states occupied at time
steps  t   1. We therefore want to relax the Markov assumption and consider
more complex time dependencies that would necessitate a more exible modelling
framework (for example using a discrete event or agent based approach). In order
to judge whether this is necessary we add relatively unstructured discrepancy to
allow for a wide range of possible deviations from the simple memoryless Markov
process. Hyperparameters are shown in tables 6.4 and 6.5. Ten samples from the
Gaussian process for discrepancy term 2;1;t are shown in gure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5: Ten samples from the distribution on discrepancy term 2;1;t in scenario
3
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Base case model
We implemented the model in R (R Development Core Team, 2011). We sampled
from the base case model input parameters and ran the model 10,000 times. The
mean incremental cost of combination therapy over monotherapy was $45,402
and the mean incremental benet was 3.86 life years, representing a cost per
life year gained of $11,749. Figure 6.6 shows the cost-eectiveness plane and
cost-eectiveness acceptability curve (CEAC) for the base case, representing the
uncertainty due to uncertainty in the model inputs.
Value of information analysis with  = $12; 000 per life year1 suggests that
decision uncertainty is being driven by uncertainty in the treatment eect pa-
rameter with EVPI(RR)=$169.91 (EVPI index, 46.5%), and uncertainty in the
1We assumed for the purposes of this case study that the value of one QALY is  = $12; 000
per life year to ensure that we were in the region of decision uncertainty. This is lower than
the `threshold' value that would be used for decisions in many Western health economies. At
 = $30; 000 there is almost no decision uncertainty with EVPI negligible for all inputs and
discrepancies.
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cost parameters with EVPI(costs)=$194.41 (53.2%). See table 6.6. It is not the
case that the partial EVPI values necessarily sum to the overall EVPI. The par-
tial EVPI values are expressed as percentages of overall EVPI (the `EVPI index')
merely to aid comparison of their relative sizes.
2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
35
00
0
40
00
0
45
00
0
50
00
0
55
00
0
a
Incremental effect (life years)
In
cr
em
en
ta
l c
os
t (£
)
8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000 14000 15000
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
b
Willingnesss to pay for 1 life year
P(
IN
B>
0)
Figure 6.6: (a) cost-eectiveness plane (b) CEAC for base case model
Table 6.6: Partial EVPI results
Parameter Partial EVPI (EVPI indexy)
Base case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Transition probabilities $0 (0%) $0 (0%) $0 (0%) $1.17 (0.1%)
Relative risk $169.91 (46.5%) $193.09 (48.1%) $64.63 (19.4%) $164.55 (17.2%)
Costs $194.41 (53.2%) $201.72 (50.2%) $65.17 (19.55%) $167.53 (17.5%)
Discrepancy terms - $7.86 (2.0%) $110.21 (33.1%) $699.06 (73.0%)
Overall EVPI $365.42 $401.53 $333.43 $957.28
y The partial EVPI as a proportion of the overall EVPI
6.4.2 Scenario 1
After the addition of discrepancy to reect the judgements about model error due
to the time homogeneity assumption, the mean incremental cost of combination
therapy over monotherapy was $44,697 and the mean incremental benet was 3.80
life years, representing a cost per life year gained of $11,769. Figure 6.7 shows
the cost-eectiveness plane and cost-eectiveness acceptability curve (CEAC) for
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scenario 1, overlaid on those for the base case. Note the similarity between scenario
1 and the base case suggesting that the discrepancy terms have not introduced
signicant new uncertainty.
Value of information analysis suggests that the decision uncertainty is still
dominated by the uncertainty in the inputs with EVPI(RR)=$193.09 (48.1%) and
EVPI(costs)=$201.72 (50.2%). There is little value in learning  with EVPI()
=$7.86 (2.0%), indicating that building a more complex model is not advisable
at a willingness to pay for one life year of  = $12; 000.
It appears that uncertainty regarding the model error that results from the
time homogeneity assumption is not a signicant driver of decision uncertainty.
This would suggest that our simple built model is `good enough' for the decision
in this scenario.
2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
35
00
0
40
00
0
45
00
0
50
00
0
55
00
0
a
Incremental effect (QALYs)
In
cr
em
en
ta
l c
os
t (£
)
Base case
Scenario 1
8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000 14000 15000
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
b
Willingnesss to pay for 1 QALY
P(
IN
B>
0)
Base case
Scenario 1
Figure 6.7: (a) cost-eectiveness plane (b) CEAC for scenario 1
6.4.3 Scenario 2
After the addition of discrepancy terms to reect the judgements about model er-
ror due to the constant treatment ecacy assumption, the mean incremental cost
of combination therapy over monotherapy was $39,741 and the mean incremental
benet was 3.20 life years, representing a cost per life year gained of $12,409.
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Figure 6.8 shows the cost-eectiveness plane and cost-eectiveness acceptability
curve (CEAC) for scenario 2, overlaid on those for the base case. Note the shift
in the cloud of points on the CE plane towards the origin reecting the reduced
ecacy of the drug and consequent reduction in both life years gained, and care
costs accrued. With smaller benets and costs the combination therapy inter-
vention will only now be cost eective at higher values of the willingness to pay,
hence the shift of the CEAC curve to the right.
Value of information analysis (table 6.6) suggests that although there is still
some value in learning the treatment eect and cost parameters, it is the dis-
crepancy terms that are now most important in driving decision uncertainty at
 = $12; 000. In this scenario there is value in improving the model such that
it better reects our judgements about the decision problem, as well as value in
reducing parameter uncertainty.
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Figure 6.8: (a) cost-eectiveness plane (b) CEAC for scenario 2
6.4.4 Scenario 3
After the addition of discrepancy terms to reect the judgements about model
error due to the Markovian assumption of memorylessness, the mean incremen-
tal cost of combination therapy over monotherapy was $45,111 and the mean
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incremental benet was 3.84 life years, representing a cost per life year gained of
$11,744. Figure 6.9 shows the cost-eectiveness (CE) plane and cost-eectiveness
acceptability curve (CEAC) for scenario 3, overlaid on those for the base case.
Note the somewhat larger cloud of points on the CE plane and atter CEAC
reecting the additional uncertainty.
Value of information analysis (table 6.6) suggests that the decision is again sen-
sitive to the discrepancy terms, and that building a more complex model to better
represent non-Markovian transitions between health states may be worthwhile.
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Figure 6.9: (a) cost-eectiveness plane (b) CEAC for scenario 3
6.5 Could we have added fewer discrepancy terms?
Adding discrepancies to the transition probabilities for each time step resulted in
a large number of terms. In order to manage this large number of uncertain terms
we specied a stochastic model for their joint distribution, the Gaussian process.
An alternative would have been to consider adding the discrepancy further `down-
stream' in the model. So, instead of adding discrepancies to the transition matrix,
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giving
NBd = e
tot
d   ctotd = 
20X
t=0
0d0(Md +dt)
tedt  
20X
t=0
0d0(Md +dt)
tcdt (6.17)
we might add discrepancies to total costs and eects at time t.
NBd = e
tot
d   ctotd = 
20X
t=0
 
0d0M
t
dedt + 
e
t
  20X
t=0
 
0d0M
t
dcdt + 
c
t

: (6.18)
There is a trade o here. There may be fewer discrepancies to specify downstream,
but the discrepancies may be more dicult to make judgements about. Eventually
we reach the model output, and here we are back in the position we discussed in
section x3.4.3. At this level it might be very dicult to say anything particularly
meaningful about the discrepancy. By adding discrepancy `upstream' we can
potentially utilise our detailed knowledge about how specic parts of the model
might dier from our `best conceptual' model of the problem.
Where to add discrepancies is a judgement in itself. We could start at the
model output and consider whether we are able to make useful judgements at
this point. If not, we would then work upstream towards the model inputs until
we came to a level in the model at which we can make useful judgements about
discrepancy. This is one possible approach. Finding an the best solution to this
problem requires future research.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we applied the discrepancy method to a Markov model. This ne-
cessitated making judgements about a large number of discrepancy terms. We
imposed structure on the set of uncertain discrepancy terms by respecifying them
as a Gaussian process. We determined the value of learning the uncertain discrep-
ancy terms by calculating the partial expected value of perfect information. We
interpreted this as an upper bound on the expected value of improving the model
(EVMI).
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As we noted at the end of chapter 5, specifying a meaningful distribution on
the discrepancy terms is likely to be hard. We return to this point in chapter
8. In the next chapter we describe a novel method for calculating conditional
expectations for the purposes of sensitivity analysis when inputs are correlated.
Chapter 7
Ecient Computation of the
Main Eect Index and Partial
Expected Value of Perfect
Information when Inputs are
Correlated
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter1 we describe a novel method for eciently computing the main
eect index and the partial expected value of perfect information when inputs are
correlated. In the context of the discrepancy analyses in chapters 5 and 6, each
discrepancy term would be considered as just another `input' to the model for the
purposes of calculating these two sensitivity measures. In both our case studies
discrepancy terms were correlated.
The standard two level Monte Carlo approach to calculating both the main
eect index and the partial EVPI is to sample a value of the input parameter of
interest in an outer loop, and then to sample values from the joint conditional
1A paper based on the content of this chapter was submitted to Medical Decision Making in
October 2011.
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distribution of the remaining parameters and run the model in an inner loop
(Brennan et al., 2007; Koerkamp et al., 2006). Sucient numbers of runs of both
the outer and inner loops are required to insure that these quantities are estimated
with sucient precision. For the computation of partial EVPI there is the added
complication that without sucient numbers of inner loop samples the EVPI will
be estimated with an unacceptable level of upward bias due to the maximisation
step (Oakley et al., 2010).
We recognise two important practical limitations to the standard two level
Monte Carlo approach to calculating the main eect index and partial EVPI.
Firstly, the nested two level nature of the algorithm with a model run at each
inner loop step can be highly computationally demanding for all but very small
loop sizes if the model is expensive to run. Secondly, we require a method of
sampling from the joint distribution of the inputs (excluding the parameter of
interest) conditional on the input parameter of interest. If the input parameter of
interest is independent of the remaining parameters then we can simply sample
from the unconditional joint distribution of the remaining parameters. Indeed,
Ades et al. (2004) show that in certain classes of model, most notably decision
tree models with independent inputs, the Monte Carlo inner loop is unnecessary
since the target inner expectation has a closed form solution. However, if inputs
are not independent we may need to resort to Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods if there is no closed form analytic solution to the joint conditional dis-
tribution. Including an MCMC step in the algorithm is likely to increase the
computational burden considerably, as well as requiring additional programming.
In this chapter we present a simple one level `ordered input' algorithm for
calculating the main eect index and the partial EVPI that takes into account
any dependency in the inputs. The method avoids the need to sample directly
from the conditional distributions of the inputs, and instead requires only a single
set of the sampled inputs and corresponding outputs in order to calculate the
main eect index and partial EVPI values for all input parameters.
We introduce the method in section x7.2 and present a theoretical justication
in section x7.4. We derive the sampling distribution of the estimator and discuss
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sample size choices in section x7.5, followed by a case study in section x7.6 where
we use the method to calculate EVPI. In section x7.7 we discuss some strengths
and limitations of the approach.
7.2 Method for partial EVPI
We assume we are faced with D decision options, indexed d = 1; : : : ; D, and
have built a computer model yd = f(d;x) that aims to predict the net benet
of decision option d given a vector of input parameter values x. We denote
the true unknown values of the inputs X = fX1; : : : ; Xpg, and the uncertain
net benet under decision option d as Yd. We denote the parameter for which
we wish to calculate the partial EVPI as Xi and the remaining parameters as
X i = fX1; : : : ; Xi 1; Xi+1; : : : ; Xpg. We denote the expectation over the full
joint distribution of X as EX , over the marginal distribution of Xi as EXi , and
over the conditional distribution of X ijXi as EX ijXi . The partial EVPI for
input Xi is
EV PI(Xi) = EXi
h
max
d
EX ijXi ff(d;Xi;X i)g
i
 max
d
EXff(d;X)g: (7.1)
We wish to evaluate the partial EVPI for each input Xi without sampling
directly from the conditional distribution X ijXi, since this may require compu-
tationally intensive numerical methods if inputs are correlated.
Our method for avoiding this diculty rests on recognising the following.
Given a Monte Carlo sample of S input parameter vectors drawn from the joint
distribution p(X), we can order the set of sample vectors with respect to the
parameter of interest Xi, i.e.,0BBBBBB@
x
(1)
1 : : : x
(1)
i : : : x
(1)
p
x
(2)
1 : : : x
(2)
i : : : x
(2)
p
...
...
...
...
...
x
(S)
1 : : : x
(S)
i : : : x
(S)
p
1CCCCCCA ; (7.2)
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where x
(1)
i  x(2)i  : : :  x(S)i . Then, for some small integer  and index k where
 < k  S    the vectors x(k ) i ; : : : ;x(k) i ; : : : ;x(k+) i are approximate samples
from the conditional distribution X ijXi = x(k)i if S is large compared to . We
can approximate the problematic expectation in equation (7.1) by
EX ijXi ff(d;Xi;X i)g '
1
 + 1
k+X
j=k 
f
 
d;x(j)

: (7.3)
The second term in the RHS of equation (7.1) can be estimated simply via Monte
Carlo sampling, i.e.
max
d
EXff(d;X)g ' max
d
1
N
NX
n=1
f(d;X): (7.4)
7.2.1 Algorithm for calculating partial EVPI via the one
stage `ordered input' method
We propose the following algorithm for computing the rst term in the RHS of
equation (7.1). Code for implementing the algorithm in R (R Development Core
Team, 2011) is shown in section x7.2.2.
Stage 1
We rst obtain a single Monte Carlo sample M = f(xs; ys1; : : : ; ysD); s = 1; : : : ; Sg
where xs are drawn from the joint distribution of the inputs, p(X), and ysd =
f(d;xs) is the evaluation of the model output at xs for decision option d =
1; : : : ; D. Note the use of superscripts to index the randomly drawn sample sets.
We let M be the matrix of inputs and corresponding outputs
M =
0BBBBBB@
x11 : : : x
1
p y
1
1 : : : y
1
D
x21 : : : x
2
p y
2
1 : : : y
2
D
...
...
...
...
...
...
xS1 : : : x
S
p y
S
1 : : : y
S
D
1CCCCCCA : (7.5)
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Stage 2
For parameter of interest i, we extract the xi and y1; : : : ; yD columns and reorder
with respect to xi, giving
M =
0BBBBBB@
x
(1)
i y
(1)
1 : : : y
(1)
D
x
(2)
i y
(2)
1 : : : y
(2)
D
...
...
...
...
x
(S)
i y
(S)
1 : : : y
(S)
D
1CCCCCCA ; (7.6)
where x
(1)
i  x(2)i  : : :  x(S)i .
Stage 3
We partition the resulting matrix into k = 1; : : : ; K sub matrices M(k) of J rows
each,
M(k) =
0BBBBBB@
x
(1;k)
i y
(1;k)
1 : : : y
(1;k)
D
x
(2;k)
i y
(2;k)
1 : : : y
(2;k)
D
...
...
...
...
x
(J;k)
i y
(J;k)
1 : : : y
(J;k)
D
1CCCCCCA ; (7.7)
retaining the ordering with respect to xi, and where the row indexed (j; k) in
equation (7.7) is the row indexed (j + (k   1)J) in equation (7.6). Note that
J K must equal the total sample size S.
Stage 4
For eachM(k) we estimate the conditional expectation (k)d = EX ijXi=x(k)i
ff(d;Xi;X i)g
for each decision option by
^
(k)
d =
1
J
JX
j=1
y
(j;k)
d ; (7.8)
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where x
(k)
i =
PJ
j=1 x
(j;k)
i =J . The maximumm
(k) = maxdEX ijXi=x(k)i
ff(d;Xi;X i)g
is estimated by
m^(k) = max
d
^
(k)
d : (7.9)
Finally, we estimate the rst term in the RHS of equation (7.1) by
^m =
1
K
KX
k=1
m^(k): (7.10)
Stages 2 to 4 are repeated for each parameter of interest. Note that only a single
set of model runs (stage 1) is required.
7.2.2 R code for implementing the partial EVPI algorithm
The partial.evpi.function function as written below takes as inputs the costs
and eects rather than the net benets. This allows the partial EVPI to be
calculated at any value of willingness to pay, .
partial.evpi.function<-function(inputs,input.of.interest,costs,effects,lambda,J,K)
{
S <- nrow(inputs) # number of samples
if(J*K!=S) stop("The number of samples does not equal J times K")
D <- ncol(costs) # number of decision options
nb <- lambda*effects-costs
baseline <- max(colMeans(nb))
perfect.info <- mean(apply(nb,1,max))
evpi <- perfect.info-baseline
sort.order <- order(inputs[,input.of.interest])
sort.nb <- nb[sort.order,]
nb.array <- array(sort.nb,dim=c(J,K,D))
mean.k <- apply(nb.array,c(2,3),mean)
partial.info <- mean(apply(mean.k,1,max))
partial.evpi <- partial.info-baseline
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partial.evpi.index <- partial.evpi/evpi
return(list(
baseline = baseline,
perfect.info = perfect.info,
evpi = evpi,
partial.info = partial.info,
partial.evpi = partial.evpi,
partial.evpi.index = partial.evpi.index
))
}
7.3 Method for main eect index
We assume we have built a computer model y = f(x) with a scalar output,
and a vector of input parameter values x. We denote the true unknown val-
ues of the inputs X = fX1; : : : ; Xpg, and the uncertain output Y . We de-
note the parameter of interest as Xi and the remaining parameters as X i =
fX1; : : : ; Xi 1; Xi+1; : : : ; Xpg. We denote the expectation over the full joint dis-
tribution of X as EX , over the marginal distribution of Xi as EXi , and over the
conditional distribution of X ijXi as EX ijXi . The main eect index for Xi is
varXi

EX ijXi ff(Xi;X i)g

var(Y )
: (7.11)
7.3.1 Algorithm for calculating the main eect index via
the one stage `ordered input' method
We propose the following algorithm for computing the numerator of (7.11). Code
for implementing the algorithm in R is shown in section x7.3.2.
Stage 1
We rst obtain a single Monte Carlo sample M = f(xs; ys); s = 1; : : : ; Sg where
xs are drawn from the joint distribution of the inputs, p(X), and ys = f(xs) is
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the evaluation of the model output at xs. Note the use of superscripts to index the
randomly drawn sample sets. We letM be the matrix of inputs and corresponding
outputs
M =
0BBBBBB@
x11 : : : x
1
p y
1
x21 : : : x
2
p y
2
...
...
...
...
xS1 : : : x
S
p y
S
1CCCCCCA : (7.12)
Stage 2
For parameter of interest i, we extract the xi and y columns and reorder with
respect to xi, giving
M =
0BBBBBB@
x
(1)
i y
(1)
x
(2)
i y
(2)
...
...
x
(S)
i y
(S)
1CCCCCCA ; (7.13)
where x
(1)
i  x(2)i  : : :  x(S)i .
Stage 3
We partition the resulting matrix into k = 1; : : : ; K sub matrices M(k) of J rows
each,
M(k) =
0BBBBBB@
x
(1;k)
i y
(1;k)
x
(2;k)
i y
(2;k)
...
...
x
(J;k)
i y
(J;k)
1CCCCCCA ; (7.14)
retaining the ordering with respect to xi.
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Stage 4
For eachM(k) we estimate the conditional expectation (k) = E
X ijXi=x(k)i
ff(Xi;X i)g
for each decision option by
^(k) =
1
J
JX
j=1
y(j;k); (7.15)
where x
(k)
i =
PJ
j=1 x
(j;k)
i =J .
Finally we estimate the variance of the conditional expectation by
v^ar(^(k)) =
1
K   1
KX
k=1
 
^(k)   ^(k)2 ; (7.16)
Stages 2 to 4 are repeated for each parameter of interest. Note that only a single
set of model runs (stage 1) is required.
7.3.2 R code for implementing the Main Eect Index al-
gorithm
The main.effect.index.function function as written below takes as inputs the
incremental costs and incremental eects rather than the incremental net benet.
This allows the main eect index to be calculated at any value of willingness to
pay, .
main.effect.index.function<-function(inputs,input.of.interest,costs,effects,lambda,J,K)
{
S <- nrow(inputs) # number of samples
if(J*K!=S) stop("The number of samples does not equal J times K")
inb <- lambda*effects-costs
var.Y <- var(inb)
sort.order <- order(inputs[,input.of.interest])
sort.inb <- inb[sort.order]
inb.array <- array(sort.inb,dim=c(J,K,1))
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mean.k <- apply(inb.array,c(2,3),mean)
var.exp <- var(mean.k)
return(list(
var.Y = var.Y,
var.exp = var.exp,
main.effect.index = var.exp/var.Y
))
}
7.4 Theoretical justication
The ordered algorithm is a method for eciently computing the inner expectation
in the rst term of the RHS in the EVPI equation (7.1), and the numerator in
the main eect index expression (7.11). Dropping the decision option index d for
clarity but without loss of generality, our target is EX ijXi=xi ff(xi ;X i)g where
xi is a realised value of the parameter of interest, and X i are the remaining
(uncertain) parameters with joint conditional distribution p(X ijXi = xi ).
Given a sample
n
x
(1)
 i ; : : : ;x
(J)
 i
o
from p(X ijXi = xi ), the Monte Carlo esti-
mator for EX ijXi=xi ff(xi ;X i)g is
E^X ijXi=xi ff(xi ;X i)g =
1
J
JX
j=1
f

xi ;x
(j)
 i

: (7.17)
In our ordered approximation method we replace (7.17) with
E^X ijXi=xi ff(xi ;X i)g =
1
J
JX
j=1
f

xi + "j; ~x
(j)
 i

; (7.18)
where fxi+"1; : : : ; xi+"Jg = fx(1)i ; : : : ; x(J)i g is an ordered sample from p(XijXi 2
[xi  ]) for some small  (and therefore " ' 0), and ~x(j) i is a sample from
p(X ijXi = xi + "j).
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The expression (7.18) is an unbiased Monte Carlo estimator of
EXi2[xi]

EX ijXif(Xi;X i)
	
=
Z
X i
Z
Xi
f(Xi;X i)p(X ijXi)p(XijXi 2 [xi  ])dXidX i; (7.19)
which we can rewrite by introducing an importance sampling ratio as
Z
X i
Z
Xi
f(Xi;X i)p(X ijXi)p(XijXi 2 [xi  ])dXidX i
=
Z
X i
Z
Xi
f(Xi;X i)
p(X ijXi)p(XijXi 2 [xi  ])
p(X ijXi)p(XijXi = xi )
p(X ijXi)p(XijXi = xi )dXidX i
=
Z
X i
Z
Xi
f(Xi;X i)
p(X ijXi)
p(X ijXi = xi )
p(XijXi 2 [xi  ])dXi p(X ijXi = xi ) dX i:
(7.20)
We write the terms f(Xi;X i)
p(X ijXi)
p(X ijXi=xi ) within the inner integral as a function
g(), i.e.
f(Xi;X i)
p(X ijXi)
p(X ijXi = xi )
= g(Xi; x

i ;X i):
If g() is approximately linear in the small intervalXi 2 [xi] then we can express
g(Xi; x

i ;X i) as a rst order Taylor series expansion about g(x

i ; x

i ;X i), giving
f(Xi;X i)
p(X ijXi)
p(X ijXi = xi )
= g(Xi; x

i ;X i);
' g (xi ; xi ;X i) + (Xi   xi )
@g (Xi; x

i ;X i)
@Xi

Xi=xi
= f(xi ;X i) + (Xi   xi )
@g (Xi; x

i ;X i)
@Xi

Xi=xi
:
Substituting back into (7.20) with c =
@g(Xi;xi ;X i)
@Xi

Xi=xi
gives
Z
X i
Z
Xi
f(Xi;X i)
p(X ijXi)
p(X ijXi = xi )
p(XijXi 2 [xi  ])dXi p(X ijXi = xi ) dX i
'
Z
X i
Z
Xi
ff(xi ;X i) + c(Xi   xi )g p(XijXi 2 [xi  ]) dXi p(X ijXi = xi ) dX i:
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Since
R
Xi c(Xi   xi )p(XijXi 2 [xi  ])dXi = EXi2[xi]fc(Xi   xi )g ' 0 andR
Xi p(XijXi 2 [xi  ]) dXi = 1, thenZ
X i
Z
Xi
ff(xi ;X i) + c(Xi   xi )g p(XijXi 2 [xi  ]) dXi p(X ijXi = xi ) dX i;
'
Z
X i
f(xi ;X i)p(X ijXi = xi ) dX i;
= EX ijXi=xi ff(xi ;X i)g:
Hence, we have shown that as long as g(Xi; x

i ;X i) = f(Xi;X i)
p(X ijXi)
p(X ijXi=xi ) is
suciently smooth such that it is approximately linear in some small intervalXi 2
[xi  ], the ordered approximation method (7.18) will provide a good estimate of
our target conditional expectationEX ijXi=xi ff(xi ;X i)g. For f(Xi;X i) p(X ijXi)p(X ijXi=xi )
to be smooth both the model function f(Xi;X i) and the conditional probability
density function p(X ijXi) must be smooth with respect to Xi in the interval
[xi  ]. Economic models tend to be smooth functions of their inputs, and it is
also likely that in most health economic modelling scenarios that the conditional
density p(X ijXi) will be smooth with respect to Xi.
7.5 Sample size considerations for the estima-
tion of partial EVPI
In this section we derive the sampling distribution of the estimator for the partial
EVPI, and suggest a method for choosing optimum values of J and K.
7.5.1 Estimating the precision of the partial EVPI estima-
tor
For the purposes of this section we assume that we can estimate the second term in
the RHS of equation (7.1) with sucient accuracy by choosing large N in equation
(7.4), and therefore that this second term does not contribute signicantly to the
variance of the estimate of the partial EVPI.
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If we denote dk = argmaxd

^
(k)
d

we can rewrite equation (7.10) as
E^Xi(m^
(k)) = ^m =
1
K
KX
k=1
m^(k);
=
1
K
KX
k=1
^
(k)
dk
;
=
1
K
KX
k=1
 
1
J
JX
j=1
y
(j;k)
dk
!
;
=
1
S
KX
k=1
JX
j=1
y
(j;k)
dk
: (7.21)
The variance of ^m is
var( ^m) = var
 
1
S
KX
k=1
JX
j=1
y
(j;k)
dk
!
;
=
1
S2
KX
k=1
JX
j=1
var

y
(j;k)
dk

; (7.22)
since the y
(j;k)
dk
are independent. The estimator for var( ^m) is therefore simply
cvar( ^m) = 1
S(S   1)
KX
k=1
JX
j=1

y
(j;k)
dk
  ^m
2
: (7.23)
We see therefore that the precision of the estimator does not depend on the indi-
vidual choices of J and K, but only on S = J K.
7.5.2 Choosing values for J and K
We assume that we have a xed number of model evaluations S and wish to choose
values for J and K subject to the constraint J K = S.
Firstly we note that for small values of J the EVPI estimator is upwardly
biased due to the maximisation in equation (7.9) (Oakley et al., 2010). Indeed for
J = 1 (and K = S) our ordered input estimator for the rst term in the RHS of
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equation (7.1) reduces to
1
S
SX
s=1
max
d
(ysd); (7.24)
which is the Monte Carlo estimator for the rst term in the expression for the
overall EVPI, EX fmaxd f(d;X)g  maxdEXff(d;X)g:
Secondly we note that for very large values of J , and hence small values of K,
the EVPI estimator is downwardly biased, and converges to zero when J = S. In
this case our ordered input estimator for the rst term in the RHS of equation
(7.1) reduces to
max
d
1
S
SX
s=1
ysd; (7.25)
which is the Monte Carlo estimator for the second term in the RHS of equation
(7.1).
Given that the algorithm is computationally inexpensive we can nd appropri-
ate values for J and K empirically by running the algorithm at a range of values
of J and K, subject to J K = S (in practice we only need choose J K  S).
Figure 7.1 shows values for the estimated partial EVPI against J (on the log10
scale) for input X6 in scenario 1 of the case study that we introduce in section
x7.6. The total number of model evaluations, S, is 1,000,000. Note the upward
and downward biases at extreme values of J , but also the large region of stability
between J = 100 (K = 10; 000) and J = 100; 000 (K = 10).
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Figure 7.1: Partial EVPI at values of J ranging from 1 to 106 where the total
number of model evaluations, S, is 106.
7.6 Case study
In this case study we compare the ordered input method with the standard two
level Monte Carlo method for calculating partial EVPI. The model for the case
study is a hypothetical decision tree model previously used for illustrative purposes
in Brennan et al. (2007), Oakley et al. (2010) and Kharroubi et al. (2011). The
model predicts monetary net benet, Yd, under two decision options (d = 1; 2)
and can be written in sum product form as
Y1 = (X5X6X7 +X8X9X10)  (X1 +X2X3X4); (7.26)
Y2 = (X14X15X16 +X17X18X19)  (X11 +X12X13X4); (7.27)
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where X = fX1; : : : ; X19g are the 19 uncertain input parameters listed in table
7.1, and the willingness to pay for one unit of health output in QALYs is  =
$10; 000=QALY. We implemented the model in R (R Development Core Team,
2011).
Parameter Mean (sd)
d = 1 d = 2
Cost of Drug (X1; X11) $1000 ($1) $1500 ($1)
% Admissions (X2; X12) 10% (2%) 8% (2%)
Days in Hospital (X3; X13) 5.20 (1.00) 6.10 (1.00)
Cost per day (X4) $400 ($200) $400 ($200)
% Responding (X5; X14) 70% (10%) 80% (10%)
Utility Change if respond (X6; X15) 0.30 (0.10) 0.30 (0.05)
Duration of response (years) (X7; X16) 3.0 (0.5) 3.0 (1.0)
% Side eects (X8; X17) 25% (10%) 20 (5%)
Change in utility if side eect (X9; X18) -0.10 (0.02) -0.10 (0.02)
Duration of side eect (years) (X10; X19) 0.50 (0.20) 0.50 (0.20)
Table 7.1: Summary of input parameters
7.6.1 Scenario 1: correlated inputs with known condi-
tional distributions
In scenario 1 we assume that a subset of the inputs are correlated, but with a
joint distribution such that we can sample from the conditional distributions of
the correlated inputs without the need for MCMC. We assume that the inputs
are jointly normally distributed, with X5, X7, X14 and X16 all pairwise correlated
with a correlation coecient of 0.6, and with all other inputs independent. In a
simple sum product form model the assumption of multivariate normality allows
us to compute the inner conditional expectation analytically, as well as allowing
us to sample directly from the conditional distribution X ijXi in the standard
nested two level method, but this will not necessarily be the case in models with
additional non-linearity.
We calculated partial EVPI using three methods. Firstly, we calculated the
partial EVPI for each parameter using a single loop Monte Carlo approximation
for the outer expectation in the rst term of the RHS of equation (7.1) with 106
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samples from the distribution of the parameter of interest, and an analytic solution
to the inner conditional expectation. Next, we calculated the partial EVPI values
using the standard two level Monte Carlo approach with 1,000 inner loop samples
and 1,000 outer loop samples (i.e 106 model evaluations in total). Finally, we
computed the partial EVPI values using the ordered sample method with a single
set of 106 samples and a value of J = 1; 000.
Standard errors for the two level method estimates were obtained using the
method presented in Oakley et al. (2010), and for the ordered input method esti-
mates via equation (7.23). We measured the total computation time for obtaining
EVPI values for all 19 parameters. We performed the computations on a single
processor core on a 2.93GHz Intel Core i7 machine running 64 bit Linux.
Results for scenario 1
Calculating the expected net benets for decision options 1 and 2 analytically
results in values of $5057.00 and $5584.80 respectively, indicating that decision
option 2 is optimal. Running the model with 106 Monte Carlo samples from the
joint distribution of the input parameters results in option 2 having greater net
benet than option 1 in only 54% of samples, suggesting that the input uncertainty
is resulting in considerable decision uncertainty. This is conrmed by the relatively
large overall EVPI value of $1046.10.
The partial EVPI values for parameters X1 to X4, X8 to X13 and X17 to X19
were all less than $0:01 and therefore considered unimportant in terms of driving
the decision uncertainty. Results for the remaining parameters are shown in table
7.2. The standard errors of the EVPI values estimated via the ordered input
method are considerably smaller than those estimated via the two level method,
and computation time is reduced by a factor of ve.
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Parameter Partial EVPI (SE), $
Analytic conditional Two level Ordered input
expectation Monte Carlo method
X5 22.50 9.52 (65.20) 25.29 (3.26)
X6 612.38 614.76 (33.16) 612.63 (3.15)
X7 11.56 77.65 (66.38) 14.86 (3.28)
X14 230.94 312.39 (69.59) 233.63 (3.19)
X15 271.52 315.02 (29.52) 273.00 (3.30)
X16 458.97 502.91 (77.98) 462.42 (3.12)
Computation timey 57 seconds 12 seconds
y Computation time is for all 19 input parameters
Table 7.2: Partial EVPI values for scenario 1
7.6.2 Scenario 2: correlated inputs with conditional dis-
tribution sampling requiring MCMC
In scenario 2 we assume that a subset of the inputs are correlated, but with a
joint distribution such that we can only sample from the conditional distributions
of the correlated inputs using MCMC. We assume, as in scenario 1, that X5, X7,
X14 and X16 are pairwise correlated, but with a more complicated dependency
structure based on an unobserved bivariate normal latent variable Z = (Z1; Z2)
that has expectation zero, variance 1 and correlation 0.6. Conditional on this
latent variable, which represents some measure of eectiveness, the proportions
of responders (X5 and X14) are assumed beta distributed, and the durations of
response (X7 and X16) assumed gamma distributed. The hyperparamters of the
beta and gamma distributions are dened in terms of Z such that X5, X7, X14
and X16 have the means and standard deviations in table 7.1.
We calculated partial EVPI for each parameter using a the standard two level
Monte Carlo approach with 1,000 inner loop samples and 1,000 outer loop samples
(i.e 106 model evaluations in total) using OpenBUGS (Lunn et al., 2009) to sample
from the conditional distribution of X ijXi.
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Parameter Partial EVPI (SE), $
Two level Monte Carlo Ordered input
with MCMC inner loop method
X5 102.55 (34.48) 34.65 (3.26)
X6 610.82 (38.02) 618.80 (3.10)
X7 132.16 (36.10) 56.25 (3.25)
X14 334.13 (51.94) 368.87 (3.18)
X15 223.09 (25.73) 275.78 (3.25)
X16 554.20 (64.00) 663.25 (3.13)
Computation timey 2.7 hours 12 seconds
y Computation time is for all 19 input parameters
Table 7.3: Partial EVPI values for scenario 2
Results for scenario 2
Running the model with 106 samples from the joint distribution of the input
parameters resulted in expected net benets of $5043.12 and $5549.93 for decision
options 1 and 2 respectively, indicating that decision option 2 is optimal, but again
with considerable decision uncertainty. Based on this sample, the probability that
decision 2 is best is 54% and the overall EVPI $1240.33.
Partial EVPI results are shown in table 7.3. Values for parameters X1 to
X4, X8 to X13 and X17 to X19 were again all less than $0:01 and are not shown.
Standards errors for the partial EVPI values estimated via the order input method
are again smaller than those estimated via the two level method. The total time
required to compute partial EVPI for all 19 inputs was approximately 2.7 hours.
In comparison, the ordered input method with a single set of 106 samples and a
value of J = 1; 000 took just 12 seconds, an approximately 1,000 fold reduction
in computation time.
7.7 Conclusion
We have presented a method for calculating the main eect index and partial ex-
pected value of perfect information that is simple to implement, rapid to compute,
and does not require an assumption of independence between inputs. In a case
study we showed that the saving in computational time is particularly marked
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if the alternative is to use a nested two level approach in which the conditional
expectations are estimated using MCMC. The method is straightforward to apply,
even with little programming knowledge in a spreadsheet application.
Our approach requires only a single set of model evaluations in order to calcu-
late the main eect index and/or partial EVPI for all inputs, allowing a complete
separation of the sensitivity analysis from the model evaluation. This separation
may be particularly useful when the model has been evaluated using specialist
software (e.g. for discrete event or agent based simulation) that does not allow
easy implementation of the sensitivity analysis, or where those who wish to per-
form the sensitivity analysis do not `own' (and therefore cannot directly evaluate)
the model.
As presented, the method calculates the main eect index and the partial EVPI
for single inputs one at a time. We may however wish to calculate the value of
learning groups of inputs simultaneously. There are good reasons for this. Firstly,
for certain forms of model we may nd that learning single inputs alone has
little value, but learning a group of inputs has high value due to the interactions
between those inputs within the model. It is important to note that interactions
result from non-additive eects within the model, and can occur even if inputs
are uncorrelated. Secondly, a certain subset of model inputs may be derived from
a single study, and therefore learning one input in this set (by conducting the
`perfect' study) implies learning them all. If we are considering the value of a
study in reducing uncertainty about inputs, we will consider the value of all the
information that arises from the study, not just the information which informs a
single input.
The value of our method may then be in `drilling down' to specic inputs, or
small groups of inputs within some larger group of inputs that is judged to be pol-
icy relevant. If inputs can be partitioned into broad `policy relevant' groups (i.e.
those which might be considered together when a decision is made to commission
further research), and if these groups can be treated as uncorrelated, then calcu-
lating the EVPI for each group of inputs using two level Monte Carlo methods is
straightforward. At this point, the ordered approximation method could be used
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to compute the value of single inputs (or small groups of inputs) if this was felt
necessary.
Although it is possible to extend our approach to groups of inputs, we quickly
come up against the `curse of dimensionality'. This is because the method relies on
partitioning the input space into a large number of `small' sets such that in each set
the parameter of interest lies close to some value. This works well where there is a
single parameter of interest, but if we wish to calculate the sensitivity measures for
a group of parameters, the samples quickly become much more sparsely located
in higher dimensional space. Given a single parameter of interest imagine that
we obtain adequate precision if we partition the input space into K = 1; 000 sets
of J = 1; 000 samples each. With two parameters of interest, we would need to
order and partition the space in two dimensions, meaning that to retain the same
marginal probabilistic `size' for each set we now require K2 = 1; 000; 000 sets of
J = 1; 000 samples each.
Another problem arises when considering more than one input. How do we
partition an n-dimensional space into sets of equal probabilistic size (i.e. con-
taining equal numbers of samples) when the inputs are correlated? If inputs are
uncorrelated this is straightforward. In two dimensions we can imagine placing a
grid over the cloud of points in two dimensions, partitioning the space (gure 7.2).
But the same method will not work when inputs are correlated, as in gure 7.3.
In this case we must apply some kind of transformation to the inputs; in eect
distorting the grid (gure 7.4). One approach is to transform the grid based on
the principal components of the correlated variables of interest.
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Figure 7.2: Uncorrelated variables with grid based on marginal empirical deciles.
This partitions the space into 10 x 10 equal probability sub-spaces with equal
numbers of samples in each sub-space.
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Figure 7.3: Correlated variables with grid based on empirical deciles that are
correct for margins. This results in dierent numbers of samples in each sub-
space.
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Figure 7.4: The same correlated variables as in gure 7.3, but now with a grid
based on empirical deciles derived from the principal components of Var 1 and
Var 2. There are equal numbers of samples in each sub-space.
For groups of more than two or three inputs, the standard two level approach
is likely to be more ecient due to the curse of dimensionality that plagues our
ordered input method. If this is impractical an alternative such as emulation may
be necessary (Oakley and O'Hagan, 2004; Oakley, 2009).
Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Summary
We have considered the problem of managing structural uncertainty in health eco-
nomic decision models. We have seen that we will almost always be in a position
of making judgements about the `correct' model structure, or the size of the model
error, in the absence of observations on the model output. This diculty has moti-
vated the development of the model discrepancy approach that we have presented
in chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis. In our method we incorporated beliefs about
structural error through the addition of discrepancy terms at the sub-function
level in the model because this was easier than making similar judgements at the
level of the model output. Adding discrepancy terms at the sub-function level
allowed us to understand the relative eect of the dierent structural uncertain-
ties on the model output and on the decision. This was helpful in guiding choices
about model improvement.
In the rst case study we used the discrepancy method to determine the sources
of structural error that had an important impact on the output uncertainty and
hence were able to make a rational choice about how best to improve the model.
In a complex model it may not be at all obvious which are the most important
sources of structural error, and so the method reveals features of the model that
are otherwise hidden.
In the second case study we showed how it is possible using the sub-function
167
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discrepancy method to establish an upper bound on the expected value of model
improvement (EVMI) using value of information methods. This approach will
be most valuable in cases where the decision problem is complex, but due to
diculties in obtaining input parameter estimates or lack of time or resources we
have built a simple model. We feel that this may be of particular relevance in the
emerging eld of economic evaluation of public health interventions where decision
problems generally have many complex elements, but models are often relatively
simple (for good examples see descriptions of the models that have been used by
the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence to support public health
intervention resources allocation decisions in England1).
We believe the approach oers some advantages over model averaging meth-
ods where, in the absence of data, elicitation of model weights is required. Mak-
ing probability statements about models, which are by denition abstract non-
observables is likely to be very dicult. The sub-function discrepancy terms iden-
tied in our method are, by contrast, dened such that they relate to observables,
precisely so that judgements about them are easier to elicit.
A model's structure rests upon a series of assumptions regarding the relation-
ships between the inputs, the intermediate parameters and the output. In any
modelling process it is unavoidable that such assumptions are made, and in one
sense model building is just a formal representation of a set of assumptions in
mathematical functional form. Health economic modellers sometimes explore the
sensitivity of the model prediction to underlying assumptions in a `what if' sce-
nario analysis in which sets of alternative assumptions are modelled. However,
this process cannot in any formal sense quantify the sensitivity of the results to
the assumptions, and nor can it quantify any resulting prediction uncertainty.
Our method is an attempt to formally quantify the eect of all assumptions in
the model about which we do not have complete certainty.
The method is most useful as a sensitivity analysis tool, highlighting areas
of the model that may require further thought. However, if the modeller can
satisfactorily specify a joint distribution for the inputs and the discrepancies,
1http://www.nice.org.uk/Guidance/PHG/Published
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then the method results in a proper quantication of uncertainty about the `true'
incremental net benet of one decision over an alternative, taking into account
judgements about both parameters and structure.
We determined the sensitivity of the model to the discrepancies from two per-
spectives, variance based, and value of information. The variance based approach,
which we applied in case study 1 in chapter 5, quanties the expected reduction
in variance on learning the value of an uncertain input or discrepancy term. This
gives us a direct measure of the sensitivity of the output to variations in an in-
put or discrepancy, taking into account any correlations. However, it does have
limitations. In this formulation the main eect index can only be calculated for
a scalar model output, and more importantly it does not tell us about decision
uncertainty. If there is very little decision uncertainty in a particular decision
problem, then even an input that has a very large main eect index will have a
very small EVPI. This limitation does not matter if the primary purpose of the
discrepancy analysis is to manage the uncertainty in the prediction that arises due
to uncertainty about model structure, but for a decision model, calculating EVPI
will usually be more appropriate.
In case study 2 in chapter 6 we adopted a decision theoretic perspective and
quantied the sensitivity of the decision to the uncertain structure by calculating
the partial EVPI for the discrepancy terms. We interpret this a being an up-
per bound on the expected value of model improvement (EVMI). Reviewing the
structure of a model may introduce new uncertain inputs, which is why the EVPI
for the discrepancies will not necessarily equal the EVMI. The value of modelling
is rarely discussed in the literature, but implicit in all decisions to commission a
model is the belief that it will be worth the resources that are committed for the
purpose.
This is an interesting area for further exploration. Is it possible to meaningfully
quantify the expected value of building a model in the rst place? Given no
model, my beliefs about some quantity under decision d 2 D are p(Zd). If I
decide to commission a model Y = f(X) to tell me about Z = (Z1; : : : ;ZD),
then my posterior beliefs will be p(ZjY ;X; f). The expected value of the model
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is therefore
EY ;X;f [max
d
EZjY ;X;ffU(Zd)g] max
d
EfU(Zd)g: (8.1)
Can I meaningfully determine p(Y ;X; f) and p(ZjY ;X; f) without building the
model?
In both case studies we specied a joint distribution for the discrepancies in
which terms were correlated. This motivated the development of the `ordered
input' method for quantifying the main eect index and the EVPI for correlated
terms. In chapter 7 we demonstrated the method in a small case study along with
presenting a theoretical justication. We showed that not only does the method
allow for correlation, it also provides a gain in eciency (both statistical and
computational) over the standard two level Monte Carlo method.
8.2 Model complexity and parsimony
Current good practice guidance on modelling for health economic evaluation states
that a model should only be as complex as necessary (Weinstein et al., 2003), but
this well intentioned advice does not actually help us make judgements about
how complex any particular model should be. Another guiding principle is the
requirement for a model to be comprehensible to the non-modeller: a decision
maker's trust in a model can easily be eroded if the model is so complicated that
its features cannot be easily communicated (Taylor-Robinson et al., 2008).
Our view is that, in the health economic context, increasing the model com-
plexity can have the eect of transferring uncertainty about structural error, which
we express through the specication of model discrepancy terms, to uncertainty
about model input parameters. Structural error often arises when a simple model
is used to a model a complex real world process, thereby omitting aspects that
could eect costs or consequences. If we make the model more complex by includ-
ing such omitted features, typically we will then have more input parameters in
the model.
Increasing the complexity of a model will therefore be desirable if the ad-
ditional complexity relates to parts of the model in which discrepancy terms are
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inuential, and if we have suitable data to tell us about any extra parameters that
are required. This is because, to the decision-maker, data-driven probability dis-
tributions for model parameters will be preferable to distributions on discrepancy
terms based solely on subjective judgements of the modeller.
Our framework can help guide the choice of model complexity by identifying
which discrepancy terms are likely to be important. If we are satised that a
structural error will have little eect on the model output, then increasing the
complexity of the model to reduce such an error is likely to have little benet.
8.3 How might this work in practice?
We envisage that the sub-function discrepancy approach has the greatest poten-
tial if used prospectively during model building. This will allow the modeller to
incorporate judgements about structural error as they construct the model, en-
couraging an explicit recognition of the potential impact of the structural choices.
Model development is a sequential, hierarchical, iterative process of uncovering
and evaluating options regarding structure, parameterisation and incorporation of
evidence (Chilcott et al., 2010a). The process depends on the modeller developing
an understanding of the decision problem, which is by its nature subjective. This
understanding of the decision problem is the foundation upon which judgements
are made in the model building process, and also provides the basis for making
judgements about the likely discrepancy inherent in dierent model formulations.
The essence of the discrepancy approach is that it allows a formal quantication
of the impact of the choices made throughout the model building process.
Ultimately, the validity of the method relies on the ability to meaningfully
specify the joint distribution of inputs and discrepancies, p(X; ). In both case
studies we represented our beliefs about p(X; ) fairly crudely, making assump-
tions of independence between inputs and discrepancies and independence be-
tween groups of discrepancies that were not otherwise constrained. Whilst we felt
that this was sucient in the case studies for the purposes of identifying impor-
tant model sub-functions we recognise that making defensible judgements about
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model discrepancies is in general likely to be dicult. If we wish to proceed to
a full quantication of our uncertainty about the target quantity then a more
sophisticated specication of p(X; ) will typically be required.
We could choose to make only a crude specication of uncertainty, as long
as we are `generous' with our uncertainty. The expected value of learning  will
then provide an upper bound on the value of better modelling. If EVPI() is small
compared with the value of learning the inputs, even with the generous estimate of
uncertainty about the structural error, then we can be reassured that the current
model as `good enough'. In contrast, if EVPI() dominates EVPI(X) then we
conclude that it is worthwhile either to think a little harder about the model
discrepancy, or to rebuild the model so that it better reects our beliefs about
the relationships between the inputs and the target quantities we wish to predict.
Developing practical methods for making helpful judgements about p(X; ) is an
area for future research.
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